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Introduction 
“Change is the core business of all sciences, from biology and genetics to anthropology 
and sociology. The question is: why, when, and how does change occur, and what does 
such change really mean? Trying to provide answers to such questions is the unending 
task of all involved in the field of scientific study.”(Capano, 2009) 
 
“Climate change is the most intractable collective action challenge in human history, 
being inherently global, extremely long term, technologically demanding, and replete 
with distributional difficulties, among countries, people, and generations.” (Wolf, 2012, 
p. 777) 
 
Policy change is one of the central issues of political science, public administration, 
sociology, and law studies (Grant and Kelly, 2008, Howlett and Cashore, 2009, Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2012, Sabatier, 2007, Tsebelis, 1999, Clinton and Dryzek, 2006, Knill et al., 
2010a). Research on this theme dates back to the late 1950s when scholars like Herbert Simon 
(1957), Charles Lindblom (1959), and Thomas Kuhn (1962) postulated “that general patterns 
of policy development cannot only be identified but predicted“ (Howlett and Cashore, 2009). 
Understanding and explaining policies and policy change became important with the 
increasing involvement of the state in more and more realms of social life: “The modern state 
is widely seen as an active and as a proactive state, increasingly managing, shaping, even 
creating its constituent population”  (Pierson, 2004a).  
The analysis on policies and policy change is at the core of current political science 
scholarship because the theoretical and empirical insights are strongly related to the other 
dimensions of political systems: polity (political institutions) and politics (maneuvering and 
bargaining of political actors) (Tosun, 2013, Mahoney, 2000, Baumgartner et al., 2011, 
Tsebelis, 2010). As Dye has stated: “policy analysis is finding out what governments do, why 
they do it, and what difference it makes” (Dye, 1976). Policy analysis therefore creates an 
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essential link between polity and politics on the one side and policy outcomes on the other 
side.  
The last two decades have seen a tremendous activity in the explanation of policy 
change. Debates have centered on the role of ideas (Beland and Hacker, 2004, Pedersen, 
2007, Schmidt, 2008, Blyth, 2003), actors (Richardson, 2000, Schmidt, 1996, Allan and 
Scruggs, 2004, Iversen and Stephens, 2008, Vis and van Kersbergen, 2005, Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and institutions (Immergut, 1994, Tsebelis, 1995, Kaiser, 1997, Peters, 
1999, MacIntyre, 2002) as competing and coordinated explanatory accounts. However, 
despite a plethora of studies, there is little generalization and comparability of findings. 
Recently, a number of scholars have attributed this inconsistency to the lack of a common 
understanding and operationalization of the concept of policy change – the so-called 
“dependent variable problem” (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, Howlett and Cashore, 2009, 
Graham et al., 2012, Green-Pedersen, 2004, Kuhner, 2007, Pierson, 2001).  
Therefore, my dissertation attempts to make three major contributions towards solving 
this problem: 1) the thesis provides a theoretical framework for policy output and develops an 
empirical measurement for it; 2) it argues that one needs to consider entire policy portfolios 
rather than individual instruments for a meaningful assessment of policy change; 3) and it 
analyzes how the nature of the policy field affects the assessment and explanation of policy 
change. 
At the core of the “dependent variable problem“ is the conceptual and methodological 
challenge to capture what we really mean by policy output. The challenges are 
interdependent. An undefined concept of policy output and policy change has resulted in 
simplistic and highly variable measurements of policies and policy change such as the 
diffusion of single policy instruments across countries. These in turn have limited scholars 
ability for theory testing, refinement, and development. My contribution integrates the 
4 
 
concept of policy instruments into a three-level schema of goals/instrumental logics, 
objectives/mechanisms, and settings/calibrations as suggested by Howlett and Cashore (2007, 
2009) and provides a comparable measure of policy output: the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity. The major focus is on the level of policy instruments as “a technical device with the 
generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and 
sustained by a concept of regulation” (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). This “set of 
techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure 
support and effect social change“ (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998, p. 50) reveals concrete 
policy output with real and actual consequences. This focus allows an integration of the 
specific settings/calibrations as a measure of the policy instruments’ intensity as well as an 
aggregation of these characteristics towards an instrumental logic or policy style of the policy 
portfolio. 
Second, a large number of studies on policy change is on single or pre-selected sets of 
policy instruments rather than on the policy portfolio, i.e. the entirety of all instruments 
adopted and active in a policy field. This approach is limited when investigating policy 
change of whole policy fields because it might give a selective impression that is not valid for 
the whole portfolio. I demonstrate the utility of a portfolio perspective for two theoretical 
approaches of policy change. One central heuristic to understand policy change has been the 
difference between evolutionary incremental and path-breaking revolutionary shifts in the 
policy paradigm (Capano, 2009, Capano and Howlett, 2009, Cashore and Howlett, 2007). In 
this model, innovations are seen as a substantial trigger of policy change. My dissertation 
shows that this perspective requires policy portfolios as a basis for assessment since the 
innovative character of policies cannot be defined in absolute terms but relative to the existing 
policy context. The second debate has looked at policy change in a qualitative perspective 
asking the question if there is a trend in policy-making towards a lower involvement of the 
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state (Dent et al., 2007, Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Steurer, 2011). My results reveal that 
despite the existence of new instruments, traditional policy predominates even in the newly 
emerging policy field of climate mitigation where national-policymaking starts from scratch. 
Third, the majority of studies on policy change were conducted in long established 
policy fields such as social security (Gough, 2001, Hölsch and Kraus, 2006, Whiteside and 
Salais, 1998, Bouget, 2003, Olesen, 2009, Kuhner, 2007, Korpi and Palme, 2003) or 
economic policy (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003, Hall, 1993, Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998, 
Merkel, 2003, Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). Theoretical work similarly assumes that policy 
change consists mostly of policy successions (Hogwood and Peters, 1982, Hogwood and 
Peters, 1983) which are often path-dependent (Pierson, 2001). Consistent with the observation 
that the state filters into more and more areas of society (Pierson, 2004a), many new policy 
fields have emerged over the last decades and continue to emerge. These new fields provide a 
very different context for decision-making considering that new actors and coalitions are 
evolving, preferences have to be formed, and both are more variable and subject to framing 
processes or political bargaining (Massey and Huitema, 2013, Howlett et al., 2009, Hogwood 
and Peters, 1983). This high level of dynamic and the uncertainty in the decision-making 
context of new fields could challenge assumptions of the policy change literature relying on 
fields with engrained institutions, relatively stable actor coalitions, epistemic communities 
and preferences. Therefore, it is important to understand if policy change looks and works 
differently under these conditions. This dissertation focuses on climate mitigation policies as 
an exemplary case of a new policy field that only started to be under public regulation in the 
early 1990s (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2007, Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). My findings show 
that climate mitigation policy, although newly established, relies predominantly on traditional 
instruments. My research also indicates that mobilizing actors (climate leaders) are more 
important than veto players preferences for explaining policy change in this field.  
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In Section 1 of this introduction, I discuss existing frameworks of policy output and 
outline how this dissertation attempts to address the levels of abstractions discussed by 
Howlett and Cashore (2007, 2009). In Section 2, I demonstrate the limitations of policy 
change analyses, which focus on single instruments, and the benefits of a policy portfolio 
perspective. Section 3 describes the challenges of emerging policy fields in general and 
climate mitigation policy in particular. The state-of-the-art empirical studies in the newly 
emerging field of climate mitigation are discussed in Section 4. I summarize the contribution 
of this dissertation and assess the selected research design in Section 5. Finally Section 6 
provides an overview of the four publications constituting this cumulative dissertation, 
clarifies their publication status, and explains how they interrelate to the overarching goal of 
improving our understanding of policy change.  
1 The “Dependent Variable Problem” and Policy Output 
The “dependent variable problem“ of policy change points to the fact that policy output as the 
core concept of policy change is analyzed differently across studies (Howlett and Cashore, 
2009, Green-Pedersen, 2004, Kuhner, 2007). The concept of policy output describes political 
action capturing laws, policy, policy instruments, measures, principles, or policy programs 
giving “concrete form to the generalized intentions of statements of policy. [...] [Policy 
outputs] [...] combine in different ways the basic resources and tools of governments – laws, 
public personnel, public expenditure, tax incentives and exhortation“ (McConnell, 2010).  
One framework addressing the conceptual vacuum by Howlett and Cashore (2007, 
2009) is to consider two commonalities: (i) distinguishing between ends and means, and (ii) 
differentiating between levels of abstraction. Differentiating between ends and means is 
established practice in policy science (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, Howlett and Cashore, 
2009, Hall, 1993) although sometimes different terms such as goals and means (Jenkins, 
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1978), goals and tools (Ingram et al., 2007, Schneider and Sidney, 2009), intention and tools 
(McConnell, 2010), as well as intention and action (Page, 2006) are used. As Howlett and 
Cashore (2007, 2009) argue, this differentiation can be made on three analytical levels of 
abstraction (see Table 1). On the highest level of abstraction, overarching goals determine the 
general policy targets while norms of goal-implementation define what kind of instruments 
are used to reach these goals. The medium level includes objectives and mechanisms, i.e. the 
specific types of policy instruments that are used. On the lowest level of abstraction, settings 
define the specific on-the-grounds requirements of policy instruments whereas calibrations 
describe the way in which instruments are used. Howlett and Cashore (2007, 2009) argue that 
the levels of abstraction are interdependent:  
“the range of choices left at the micro-level of concrete targeted policy tool calibrations is 
restricted by the kinds of meso level decisions made about policy objectives and policy 
tools, and both of these, in turn, are restricted by the kind of choices made at the highest 
or meta-level of general policy aims and implementation preferences“ (Howlett and 
Cashore, 2009). 
This trajectory allows us to systematize the variety of studies on policy change 
according to their assumption on which level of abstraction different modes of policy change 
take place. Scholars widely agree upon Hall’s (1993) distinction between an evolutionary 
incremental and revolutionary paradigmatic mode of change but come to different conclusion 
on which levels these changes occur (Capano, 2009, Coleman et al., 1996). Hall argues that 
first order change in settings/calibrations and second order changes of objectives/mechanisms 
are considered to be incremental whereas third order change is inherently paradigmatic, 
constituting a more fundamental shift in goals/instrument logic (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, 
Howlett and Cashore, 2009, Coleman et al., 1996). There are at least three competing 
approaches which discuss this argumentation: path dependency, process sequencing, and what 
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can be captured under the term of cumulative incrementalism (for a review see Capano, 2009, 
Howlett and Rayner, 2006, Van der Heijden, 2013). 
 
Table 1 Taxonomy on Ends and Means and Different Levels of Abstraction 
   Policy Content  
  High Level Abstraction Programme Level 
Operationalization 
Specific On-the-Ground 
Measures 
 Policy 
Ends or 
Aims 
GOALS 
What General Types of 
Ideas Govern Policy 
Development? 
 
(e.g. environmental 
protection, economic 
development) 
OBJECTIVES 
What Does Policy 
Formally Aim to 
Address 
 
(e.g., saving wilderness or 
species habitat, increasing 
harvesting levels to create 
processing jobs) 
SETTINGS 
What are the Specific 
On-the-ground 
Requirements of Policy 
 
e.g. considerations about 
the optimal size of 
designated stream-be 
riparian zones, or 
sustainable levels of 
harvesting) 
Policy 
Focus 
    
 Policy 
Means or 
Tools 
INSTRUMENT LOGIC 
What General Norms 
Guide Implementation 
Preferences? 
 
(e.g. preferences for the 
use of coercive 
instruments, or moral 
suasion) 
MECHANISMS 
What Specific Types if 
Instruments are 
Utilized? 
 
(e.g. the use of different 
tools such as tax 
incentives of public 
enterprises) 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the Specific 
Ways in Which the 
Instrument is used? 
 
(e.g. designations of 
higher levels of subsidies, 
the use of mandatory vs. 
voluntary regulatory 
guidelines or standards) 
Source: Howlett and Cashore (2009) 
 
First, the path dependency approach describes in detail what has been formulated by 
Hall (1993) that paradigmatic change appears only “top-down“ from the highest level of 
abstraction which determines shifting objectives/mechanisms and settings/calibrations 
(Hacker, 2004, Mahoney, 2000). In contrast, change on the lower levels of abstraction is only 
incremental and has no paradigmatic influence on the goals/instrument logic. In general, 
early, stochastic events in a sequence have significant influence on the trajectory due to 
reinforcing mechanisms whereas later events are inertial and incremental (Howlett and 
Rayner, 2006, Mahoney, 2000, Pierson, 2000, Pierson, 2001). At critical junctures or during 
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windows of opportunity, is “when anomalies accumulate, policies fail, and the authority of the 
original policy paradigm is undermined” (Coleman et al., 1996),  and there is the possibility 
for paradigmatic change to a new path (Collier and Collier, 1991, Kingdon, 1995). 
Second, the process sequencing approach and its most prominent application, the 
punctuated equilibrium model, follows the idea of cycles switching between incremental and 
paradigmatic sequences of change (Howlett, 2009, Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Previous 
policies can create stable sequences accomplished by non-cumulative negative feedbacks 
(Bardach, 2006, Mahoney, 2000). They can also entail positive feedbacks by negative 
externalities when strong public and media attention on external shocks (e.g., catastrophic 
events like Hurricane Sandy in the US in October 2012) draws a new issue on the political 
agenda and mobilizes new interests among stakeholders (Haydu, 1998, De Vries, 2000, De 
Vries, 2005, Baumgartner et al., 2009, Jones and Baumgartner, 2012). This situation might 
eventually require more radical adjustments, transformations, or even the revision of policies 
(Van der Heijden, 2013, Genschel, 1997). Again, changes on the lower levels of abstraction in 
settings/calibrations as well as objectives/mechanisms are rather incremental whereas more 
substantial and paradigmatic change only occurs “top-down“ from the highest level of 
goals/instrument logic.  
Third, cumulative incrementalism describes a number of approaches all criticizing 
process sequencing on the basis of empirical cases where “shocks do not always result in 
institutional change, and institutional change does not always come from such shocks” (Van 
der Heijden, 2010, see also Genschel, 1997, Pierson, 2004b) but rather as a result of 
cumulative adaption (Capano, 2003, Cashore and Howlett, 2007, Coleman et al., 1996, Lee 
and Strang, 2006, Ramesh and Howlett, 1995)1. Incrementalism argues that paradigmatic 
                                                 
1 This form of incrementalism is based on what has been discuss in the literature on institutional change under 
the terms “layering”, “conversion”, “drifting” or “displacement”; see Hall, P. A. & Thelen, K. A. (2008) 
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policy change might also occur “bottom-up“ from the lower levels of abstraction by 
unpredicted and influential consequences of policy adjustments (Howlett and Cashore, 2009, 
Daugbjerg and Sonderskov, 2012). These feedbacks “may change the perceived distributional 
effects and thus change stakeholders’ policy interests“ (Daugbjerg and Sonderskov, 2012) 
including processes of increasing returns and policy learning which require further 
adjustments and eventually lead to a paradigmatic shift (Coleman et al., 1996, Pierson, 1993). 
Coleman, et al.’s (1996) findings even suggest:  
“Rather than paradigm shift that follows a society-wide debate in the partisan political 
arena or a principled confrontation in the judicial system, the paradigm change we have 
described is gradual and results from negotiations conducted over a number of years 
within the relatively depoliticized confines of an existing policy network.” (p. 298) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism. Socio-Economic Review, 7, 7-34, Mahoney, J. & Thelen, K. 
A. (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, van der Heijden, J. (2011) Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept. 
Politics, 31, 9-18, Streeck, W. & Thelen, K. A. (2005) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. For a discussion and typology on how “layering”, 
“conversion”, “drifting” or “displacement” addresses different levels of abstraction see also Kern, F. & 
Howlett, M. (2009) Implementing Transition Management as Policy Reforms: a Case Study of the Dutch 
Energy Sector. Policy Sciences, 42, 391-408. Specific models captured under the term “cumulative 
incrementalism” are called neo-homeostatic (endogenous determinants lead to gradual paradigmatic steps by 
changing settings and calibrations), quasi-homeostatic (paradigmatic change by objectives and types of 
instruments), or thermostatic (endogenous change in objectives and settings with no change in goals and 
instrumental logic), see Cashore, B. & Howlett, M. (2007) Punctuating Which Equilibrium? Understanding 
Thermostatic Policy Dynamics in Pacific Northwest Forestry. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 
532-551, Howlett, M. & Cashore, B. (2009) The Dependent Variable Problem in the Study of Policy Change: 
Understanding Policy Change as a Methodological Problem. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 11, 33-
46. 
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Unto this point it should be clear from the discussion of the different approaches that 
considering policy change on these different levels of abstraction is critical for understanding 
the complexity of the dependent variable. It will be demonstrated in Section 5 that the 
environmental policy literature lacks this holistic perspective and only focuses on single 
levels of abstraction rather than applying an inclusive concept of policy output.  
2 The “Dependent Variable Problem” and the Policy Portfolio 
Policy change has been studied in various ways but is dominantly based on case study 
research either on single countries, innovations, or types of policy instruments (Howlett and 
Rayner, 2004, Cashore and Howlett, 2007, van der Heijden, 2012, Harrison, 2010). The case 
study literature provides detailed insight on the process of policy making and implementation. 
We gain substantial knowledge about when, how, why and under what circumstances certain 
actors, coalitions, ideas or interests accomplished the adoption of specific types of policy 
instruments or modes of governance.  
However, this methodological approach hardly allows studying policy change in its 
complexity of the policy portfolio. In the literature, there is a debate on whether policy change 
means a fundamental “modification of existing policy arrangements“ (Tosun, 2013, see also 
Hacker, 2004, Pierson, 2004b, Huitema and Meijerink, 2010) or wether it is simply the 
adoption of a new policy (Knill et al., 2012b, Knill et al., 2010b, Busch et al., 2005). In fact, 
all theories on policy change discussed in Section 1 include a notion of an incremental 
accumulation of policy instruments towards a certain point in the process where the portfolio 
“tips“ towards a new paradigmatic shift (Hall, 1993, Cashore and Michael, 2007, Capano and 
Howlett, 2009, Howlett, 2009). Path dependency assumes that the accumulation of policy 
instruments is only incremental but leads to a more paradigmatic shift at a certain external 
“key breakpoint in history” while all following policy instruments adopted after this point in 
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time can be interpreted as ”a series of reactions that logically follow from this breakpoint” 
(Mahoney, 2000, see also Hall, 1993). Process sequencing also applies an aggregate 
perspective on policy change arguing that in sequences of stability policy instruments cluster 
around the status quo and only occasionally accumulate in a tipping point towards a new shift 
in the policy paradigm if the policy equilibrium is “punctuated” by external shocks 
(Baumgartner et al., 2011). Studies following the idea of cumulative incrementalism even 
assumes that there are cases of paradigmatic policy change that result from an accumulation 
of policy instruments in the policy portfolio set into one direction that is independent from 
external shocks, punctuations or windows of opportunities (Cashore and Michael, 2007). 
The fact that the accumulation of policy instruments is one central mechanism for 
policy change supports the position that we need to analyze whole policy portfolios (Tosun, 
2013, Hacker, 2004, Pierson, 2004b, Huitema and Meijerink, 2010). And even if we follow 
the second perspective discussed above – that the adoption of single policy instruments itself 
constitutes policy change – the question is still how to evaluate their real impact on policy 
change in the policy field. Kern and Howlett (2009) argue that the magnitude of change that 
newly adopted policy instruments induce depends on their degree of deviation (inconsistency, 
incoherence, and incongruence) from the existing policy mix. Furthermore, explanations of 
policy change take into consideration the specific political context as the major determinant 
for the adoption of new policy instruments (Van der Heijden, 2010, Tosun, 2013, Mahoney, 
2000). The policy portfolio itself constitutes an important part of the context that influences 
political interests and coalitions, policy preferences, benefits, etc. (Jordan et al., 2013, Tosun, 
2013, Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). This suggests that the contribution of each newly 
adopted or modified policy instrument to the actual policy change of the policy portfolio can 
only be evaluated within the respective context of the existing policy mix of the portfolio. In 
fact, we find the reflection of single or selected groups of policy instruments on the entire 
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policy portfolio in a policy field to be a crucial element discussed in the literature on policy 
innovation (Walker, 1969, Berry and Berry, 2007, Black et al., 2005) and new governance 
(Dent et al., 2007, Hanssen et al., 2009, Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Steurer, 2011).  
Policy innovation is defined as “a program or policy which is new to the states 
adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have 
adopted it” (Walker, 1969). In contrast to policy inventions, innovations are not new in a 
global perspective but their “innovativeness” depends upon the existing policy portfolio in a 
specific country. In other words, what is “new” very much depends on the context. For 
example, if we study the adoption and diffusion of a declared policy innovation such as an 
eco-tax across countries, we are neither able to assess if this really constitutes an innovation 
(in the national context) nor if the country is generally innovative (as is often assumed of 
early adopters) unless we consider the existing policy portfolio. For example, an eco-tax on 
electricity is widely considered to be highly innovative (Pedersen, 2007, Harrison, 2010, 
Barker et al., 2007) but which part of it and under which scope exactly is not as 
straightforward as it seems. For example, from an energy policy perspective, the eco-tax is not 
a new instrument but simply extends the scope of an instrument that formerly focused on all 
energy sources equally but is now focused on fossil fuels. In contrast, within  the portfolio of 
environmental instruments, it is an innovation since taxes have not been used before to 
stimulate environmentally friendly behavior. 
Furthermore, the governance literature discusses the role of the state in a changing and 
increasingly complex and global society (Dent et al., 2007, Hanssen et al., 2009, Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006, Steurer, 2011). Whether a shift in the relationship between public authorities 
and private actors constitute a substantial change in policy output cannot be captured without 
considering the portfolio of policy instruments. For example, voluntary agreements between 
national governments and local industries are discussed in the literature as a new instrument 
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to create inter-organizational, decentralized, and independent networks (Oikonomou et al., 
2009, van der Heijden, 2012). The appearance of these instruments are often discussed as an 
example of how policy output in general is shifting from traditional and hierarchical forms of 
“government” to new modes of decentralized and non-coercive “governance” (Jordan et al., 
2005, Jordan et al., 2003). Without considering the policy portfolio the scholars’ ability to test 
this “government-to-governance” hypothesis is limited. In fact, scholars from this stream of 
research demonstrate that these new “modes of governance” often manifested in policy 
instruments  as voluntary agreements are mostly working in the “shadow of hierarchy” 
defined as “the presence of the machinery of government and the (theoretical) option of 
regulating social and environmental issues hierarchically (Steurer, 2011, see also Scharpf, 
1994, Hanssen et al., 2009, Carrigan and Coglianese, 2011). That this “shadow” is not 
necessarily theoretical but persists in a larger portfolio of traditional and hierarchical 
instruments has been demonstrated by a number of studies of voluntary agreements (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2004, King and Lenox, 2000, Steurer, 2010). Given these findings, voluntary 
agreements are not as influential on stimulating policy change when considering the overall 
policy portfolio as they seemed without.  
3 The “Dependent Variable Problem” and the Newly Emerging Policy Field  
While most of the empirical policy analyses are strongly focused on their individual fields, 
theories of policy change (as general theories should) assume that their validity is universal. 
However, in order to substantiate this claim it is of utmost importance to test these theories in 
policy fields with different characteristics. If these tests can be conceptualized along 
theoretical dimensions, so-called “mixed evidence” can provide important insights about the 
conditions under which the theory is valid and thus contribute to its refinement. 
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The theoretical dimension that this dissertation has focused on is the distinction 
between old, established and new, emerging policy fields (Massey and Huitema, 2013, 
Howlett et al., 2009, May et al., 2006, Birkland, 2011, Arts et al., 2006). While empirically it 
might sometimes be difficult to define the specific moment once a field has transitioned from 
a new to an established field, historically we can clearly observe a differentiation of existing 
policy fields (Massey and Huitema, 2013). Defense and foreign policy for instance belong to 
the state competencies that even feudalist and absolutist states had whereas social policy has 
its early beginnings at the end of the 19th century and its strong development in the aftermath 
of the Second World War (Pierson, 2004a). However, even within the last three decades a 
number of new policy fields and subfields have emerged such as organic farming policy 
(Moschitz and Stolze, 2009), integration policy (Rosenow, 2009), long-term care policy 
(Theobald and Kern, 2011), innovation policy (Møller, 2010) and internet policy (Ess and 
Dutton, 2013).  
What makes the distinction between established and emerging fields interesting for the 
analysis of policy change? New and old policy fields provide a different context for political 
decision-making and policy change. The most important difference is that in emerging fields 
– as they are evolving – actors, interests, and ideas, even institutions are more dynamic (e.g, 
Coleman et al., 1996, John and Margetts, 2003). Historic institutionalism has strongly argued 
for the significance of path dependencies in established fields: actors, interests, and coalitions 
are set, existing policies determine future decisions through positive feedback, e.g. vested 
interests (Pierson, 2004b, Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, Streeck and Thelen, 2005, Thelen, 
1999). Most “new” policies in these established fields constitute policy successions, 
maintenance, and terminations rather than innovations (Hogwood and Peters, 1982, 
Baumgartner et al., 2009, Hall and Taylor, 1996). Paradigmatic change is rare as it requires 
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windows of opportunities or the accumulation of small changes over time (Cashore and 
Howlett, 2007, Howlett and Cashore, 2009, Howlett, 2009).  
In contrast to that, new fields are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about 
the relevant actors and their preferences, the boundaries of the problems, and the strategies 
and technologies to tackle them (Howlett et al., 2009). New policy fields do not completely 
start from scratch and actors and policies from bordering areas will shape discourses and 
decision-making in the new field. However, newly emerging policy fields address cross-
sectoral and multidisciplinary issues which include overlapping institutions of government 
and interest groups and thus increase the overall number and diversity of actors and interests 
(John and Margetts, 2003, True et al., 1999). The involvement and the role of new actors have 
to be clarified and negotiated creating the uncertainty these new fields are characterized by.  
The increasing range of policy fields that have emerged during the last thirty to forty 
years result from the changing perspective of human action in a more and more diversified 
environment. On the one hand, new policy fields such as integration or internet policy result 
from human-induced factors such as the internationalization of the private sphere through 
global trade, mobility, and communication networks (Møller, 2010, Ess and Dutton, 2013, 
Rosenow, 2009). On the other hand, what has changed is the scientific perspective on our 
natural environment as a global system which asked for new political solutions to increasingly 
“wicked” problems (Tollefson et al., 2012, Gale, 2009). On a geographical scale, the 
environment refers to distinct areas where human infrastructure and natural habitats for 
animals and plants interact within complex systems such as regional water circles or even 
global climate. On a temporal scale, scientists nowadays become aware that natural systems 
are globally dependent and at a constant change influenced by human action such as 
economic growth, urbanization, exploitation of natural resources, or migration and population 
growth. This has led towards a development of policy fields addressing the complex and 
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global human-society-environment interaction with the most renown being the preservation of 
global biodiversity and the mitigation of climate change.  
The case of a newly emerging policy field that this dissertation has focused on is the 
issue of climate mitigation. There are a number of specific challenges this particular field 
imposes on traditional policy making. First, political actors striving for climate mitigation are 
challenged by a high level of uncertainty on the consequences of climate change and the 
success of actual measures to mitigate global warming (Pearce et al., 1989). One source of 
uncertainty and failure to predict changes accurately lies in the non-linear character of the 
process of climate change which assumes that once a tipping point is reached larger climatic 
changes become irreversible and persistent (Caulfield, 2004, Duhaime and Caron, 2006). 
Hence, success and failure of certain policy instruments for climate mitigation depend on a 
variety of uncertain factors such as the development of prices of conventional energy in the 
world market (Carfi and Schiliro, 2012, Kikuchi, 2011, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leach, 2011, 
Doman, 2004). For example, until now it is highly controversial whether the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme will have an actual effect on the net reduction of greenhouse gases 
(Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2008, Löschel and Vincent, 2008).  
Second, the challenge is that actual policy has to change today’s status quo of current 
behavior, interests, and rents for the reduction of greenhouse gases in order to reach the future 
long-term and highly uncertain goal of climate mitigation (Stern, 2007, Bowen et al., 2012, 
Boeters and Koornneef, 2011). On the one hand, it is discussed whether current climate 
mitigation policy risks decreasing the competitiveness of local industries’ products on 
globalized markets (Löschel and Vincent, 2008, Hentrich et al., 2009, van Asselt and 
Biermann, 2007). On the other hand, climate mitigation policy is no longer an ideologically 
driven and diffuse aim of a political subgroup such as the Greens but that emerged as a 
business model and driver of economic modernization in the field of renewable energy 
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production and technological innovation (Bohringer et al., 2012, Dewald and Truffer, 2011, 
Fankhauser et al., 2008, Frondel et al., 2010, Aitken, 2010, Birchfield and Duffield, 2011, 
Chandler, 2009, Claudy et al., 2011). Thus, it is strongly linked with other political issues 
such as energy security and independence, centralization vs. decentralization of the energy 
system, or environmental and intergenerational justice (Bina and La Camera, 2011, Cowell et 
al., 2011, Ikeme, 2003, Jänicke, 2009, Carley, 2011, Lin et al., 2013, Radoman, 2007, 
Sovacool et al., 2011). These issues are highly complex but also provide a number of side 
payments for political bargaining during the process of policy making.  
New policy fields emerge because issues such as global warming are successfully 
mobilized to the national political agenda (Baumgartner, 2013, Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009). This process can take a variety of forms, e.g. external shocks, the accumulation of 
local problems and/or solutions, etc. As in the case of climate mitigation, however, new issues 
are more and more often mobilized by international and supranational institutions such as the 
United Nations and the EU. These institutions play a powerful role in shaping national 
discourses as will be outlined in the following section.  
4 State-of-the-Art: Climate Mitigation Policy in Europe 
“Among the factors that challenge environmental governance structures, global climate 
change promises to be one of the most critical” (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Climate change 
refers to human-induced emission of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, sulphur hexafluoride) predominantly in the developed world since the industrial 
revolution. The major emissions come from carbon dioxide produced by fossil-fuel usage for 
electricity, industrial production and manufacturing, transportation, and agriculture (IPCC, 
2007). Long-term effects are rising sea levels, increased droughts, and higher frequency of 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007). As a consequence, climate change is geographically 
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global but local in its consequences, with contemporary causes but future consequences 
(Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Tollefson et al., 2012, Gale, 2009).  
The problem of climate change has been addressed on various political levels ranging 
from international negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), EU climate mitigation programs, and national climate policy. 
International efforts to reach an agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
under the UNFCC aim to effectively avoid greenhouse gases where they are cheapest (e.g. 
Pearce et al., 1989) and to equalize marginal abatement costs across firms, sectors and 
countries (EBRD, 2011, Schaffrin, forthcoming). Climate change has been on the 
international agenda since the Rio Summit on Environment and Development in 1992. In the 
following years, emission targets have been set with the overarching goal of keeping the 
global temperature rise to 2° C compared to preindustrial levels. This goal was codified in an 
international treaty, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 1997 and signed by 37 
industrialized countries and the EU which agreed to adopt policies on the national-level to 
meet these targets. However, the achievements to reduce global greenhouse gases after twenty 
years of debate are highly uncertain given the failure of the international community to 
establish an agreement at the latest climate conferences in Durban (South Africa, 2011) and 
Doha (Qatar, 2012) (den Elzen et al., 2009, Campbell, 2013).  
Second, on the supra-national level, the EU played an outstanding role as an 
international leader in climate mitigation politics (Conca, 2005, Schreurs and Tiberghien, 
2007, Fernandez et al., 2010). Climate change has been intensively discussed since the early 
1990s by domestic political elites in Western Europe which was supported by strong 
environmental movements and the electoral success of green parties throughout European 
parliaments (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Rihoux and Rudig, 2006, Fabian, 2010). As 
early as 1990, the EU sought to set voluntary emission reduction targets and was a major 
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player during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997. During the process of ratification from 
1998 to 2005, the EU played a key role convincing other countries to make stronger 
concessions to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, 
Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). In 2005, the EU implemented its carbon emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) (Directive 2003/87/EC), one of the world’s most ambitious and encompassing 
climate policy instruments covering about 12,000 installations (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 
2007, Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, Löschel and Vincent, 2008). Two years later, the European 
Council announced the 20/20/20 agreement within the EU Climate and Energy Package 
(Number 406/2009/EC) which comprises a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 
1990 levels, including a target of 20% of renewables of total energy consumption by 2020 as 
a keystone to establish effective policies on the national level (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, 
Stephenson and Boston, 2010).  
However, the European Union’s actual influence on national climate mitigation policy 
remains limited. Despite the Commission’s initial support for specific market-based 
instrument to increase the share of renewable energy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, top-
down harmonization ultimately failed in 2005 and since then has largely disappeared from the 
Union’s agenda (Toke and Lauber, 2007). The influence of the Commission is largely limited 
to monitoring national policies and to assessing whether Member States are on track to reach 
the national targets laid down in the directives (Kitzing et al., 2012, Haas et al., 2011). Thus, 
despite the prominence of EU-wide agreements on climate mitigation, nation states are the 
central actors for actual implementation (e.g., Bulkeley et al., 2012, Green Globe, 2013, Hovi 
et al., 2009). The core drivers on the national level from the beginning were environmental-
leader states such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany which played a crucial role 
pushing an ambitious climate mitigation policy, outbalancing laggards in Southern and 
Eastern Europe (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, Liefferink et al., 2009, Knill et al., 2012a). As a 
21 
 
result, we observe substantial variation in the regulatory efforts and national strategies on 
climate mitigation among EU member states (Albrecht and Arts, 2005, Kerr, 2007, Tubi et al., 
2012, Garrone and Grilli, 2010). National policy portfolios on climate mitigation can be of 
varying size and shape adopting a range of instruments such as traditional pollution control 
(regulative instruments or command-and-control) to voluntary or market-based instruments 
(e.g. carbon taxes, emission trading schemes, feed-in tariffs) (Busch et al., 2005, Tews et al., 
2003, Bomberg, 2007, Jordan et al., 2005). 
5 State of the Art: Climate Policy Research and Policy Change 
While the previous sections have situated the contribution of my dissertation in the general 
policy literature, this part provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in the policy field my 
work has focused on: climate mitigation policy. Research on climate mitigation policy is still 
highly embedded within in the more general environmental policy literature. I demonstrate 
how my work fits into the existing research in this field and where it moves beyond the 
current state of knowledge. The “dependent variable problem” identified for policy change 
can be observed in this literature as well and it is further complicated through the multilevel 
governance structure outlined in the previous section. Using the schema from Howlett and 
Cashore (2007, 2009) again, we can systematize existing work according to the level of 
abstraction and in addition to the level of investigation (from global to local) as shown in 
Table 2.  
On the macro level of goals and the instrumental logic, policy output is conceptualized 
from an international relations perspective as the national ratification and commitment 
towards international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol (Battig and Bernauer, 2009, 
Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2013, Bhatti et al., 2010, Zahran et al., 2007). The focus of this line of 
work is on the role of specific actors (governments, non-governmental organizations, business 
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lobbies, etc.) within the process of political bargaining (Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2013, 
Böhringer and Löschel, 2003, Pittel and Rübbelke, 2008, Giorgetti, 1999). An analysis of 
global and supranational agreements is important considering the global nature of the problem 
and the need for a concerted solution. However, as international agreements are legally 
binding but hard to enforce, this line of research does not allow drawing conclusions on 
policy changes on the national level. For example, scholars would be interested to see if 
challenging international goals are actually translated into measures for climate mitigation 
with “real teeth” or whether national portfolios are mostly “symbolic”. It also lacks an 
analysis of whether paradigmatic changes in goals are transferred into radical shifts in the 
instrumental logic and the choice of specific types of policy instruments. For example, highly 
ambitious national targets for the production of renewable energy can be implemented in a 
traditional way favoring large, centralized, monopolistic energy suppliers, for example, by 
supporting mainly large-scale offshore wind parks. Instead, these goals can lead to more 
radical changes in electricity production when policy measures strongly support decentralized 
and small-scale on-shore wind energy managed by local communities rather than large 
businesses (Wiener and Koontz, 2010).  
These issues are addressed by research on the meso level which looks at national 
policy-making in individual countries or in cross-national comparison. One group of studies 
has emphasized policy stability and path dependency as a result of persistent national styles of 
regulation and policy making (Bailey and Rupp, 2005, Bailey, 2007, Lees, 2007). In contrast, 
the literature on environmental pioneer- and leadership (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, Knill et 
al., 2012a, Liefferink et al., 2009) seeks to describe and explain policy change as processes of 
policy diffusion and convergence (Heichel et al., 2005, Busch and Jörgens, 2005a, Holzinger 
et al., 2011b).  
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Table 2: Research Perspectives on Different Levels of Abstraction 
Level of 
abstraction 
Level of 
investigation 
Environmental policy 
literature Concept of policy output 
macro:  
goals and 
instrument 
logic 
global, 
supranational, 
regional 
international relations, 
multilevel governance 
commitment/ leadership in 
international agreements and 
compliance with emission 
targets; target setting and 
implementation of EU regulation 
meso: 
objectives 
and 
mechanism 
cross-national, 
national 
policy leaders and 
laggards, pioneers, policy 
diffusion/ convergence, 
policy styles, policy 
innovation 
focus on single policy 
instruments relative to policy 
portfolio of the country or across 
countries; adoption of 
qualitatively distinct types of 
policy instruments 
micro:  
settings and 
calibration 
national, 
subnational, 
local 
policy design, policy 
efficiency 
detailed aspects of policy 
instrumentation such as revenues 
of taxes or carbon caps 
 
A number of studies analyze the interaction between the levels of goals/instrument 
logic and objectives/mechanisms within the multilevel setting of EU climate politics 
(Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Knill and Tosun, 2009, Knill, 1998, Knill et al., 2009). For 
example, Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) find that domestic policy output on the meso level 
influenced the goal setting on the macro level when in fact single member states of the EU 
pushed for ambitious emission goals on the EU and the international level. At this point in 
time, these countries already established a portfolio on climate mitigation policies based on 
traditionally strong regulation for environmental protection of the domestic economy. Their 
intention had been to establish a global agreement in order to avoid free-riding and to gain 
competitiveness of their products in global markets. Several studies (Knill and Tosun, 2009, 
Knill et al., 2009, Knill, 1998) analyze if and how the European Union affects national policy 
adoption of EU standards on environmental impact assessment, nitrogen oxide emissions, and 
eco-labels. Their analysis indicates that the EU indeed stimulates new policies in countries but 
that its impact varies and is constrained by different national administrative traditions and 
levels of political, economic, or informational integration with the EU and the mode of 
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governance that is applied, i.e. hierarchical governance or information exchange. Albrecht and 
Arts (2005) investigate the interaction between the two levels of abstraction more directly 
looking at how domestic climate mitigation policy complies with international goals on 
greenhouse gas reduction using data on the National Communications of twenty-three 
European countries to the UNFCCC. They provide evidence that international targets 
influence the adoption of national climate mitigation policy and even stimulate a certain 
degree of convergence in the national policy output (Albrecht and Arts, 2005).  
The majority of empirical research in this field applies a small-N case study design 
either focusing on individual types of instruments (e.g., voluntary agreements) (Bailey, 2008, 
van der Heijden, 2012, Fouquet and Johansson, 2008, Garrone and Grilli, 2010) or 
instruments with special characteristics (e.g., policy innovations) (Berry and Berry, 2007, 
Voß, 2007, Carley, 2011, Jordan et al., 2003, Jordan et al., 2005, Jordan et al., 2011, Jordan et 
al., 2013). These case studies provide evidence, for example, that new modes of governance 
have been evolving in climate mitigation policy but co-exist with traditional modes. However, 
if the aim is to comprehensively describe policy change in this field and to identify general 
trends and patterns, one needs to consider whole portfolios rather than individual instruments. 
Large-N analysis based on quantitative data can complement these analyses with a systematic 
assessment of country differences and changes for answering questions such as who are 
leaders, which countries are most innovative, etc.? There are only a handful of large N 
analysis with similar attempts (Kerr, 2007, Tubi et al., 2012, Garrone and Grilli, 2010, Knill 
et al., 2010a, Knill et al., 2012b) but they are either focused mostly on environmental rather 
than climate policies or use very limited measures for policy output such as the existence of a 
national climate policy program or public energy R&D spending. Tubi et al (2012) comes 
closest to a portfolio perspective by relying on the Germanwatch Index an expert rating of 
national climate mitigation performance for a comprehensive assessment of policymaking. 
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However, as a summary measure it lacks detailed information on instruments and their 
characteristics on the level of settings and calibrations.  
Busch and Jörgens (2005b, 2005a) and Tews et al. (2003) find that a set of “new” 
environmental policy instruments and policy innovations such as energy taxes or eco-labels 
constitute new regulatory patterns in a number of countries through causal mechanisms of 
global policy convergence such as non-obligatory diffusion, legal harmonization and coercive 
imposition. However, its implicit assumption that the adoption of a number of “new” 
environmental instruments or policy innovations automatically constitutes a substantial 
change in the overall policy portfolio is questionable. First, single policy innovation might 
only be the exception from the rule if the majority of the policy portfolio remains with 
traditional modes of governance (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Jordan et al., 2013). Second, 
what is more influential to trigger policy change than the actual policy innovation is its 
interaction within the existing policy mix (Duval, 2008, Enevoldsen and Brendstrup, 2000, 
Johnson, 2007, Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). Policy instruments that fit into the existing policy 
mix would not have substantial impact on policy change whereas highly deviating policy 
instrument might trigger interaction effects changing the whole policy portfolio. Third, as we 
know from the extensive case study literature, there is substantial variation in the specific 
settings and calibrations of policy instruments (Duval, 2008). Thus, “new” environmental 
policy instruments such as eco-taxes adapt to the specific administrative style predominant in 
the countries (Enevoldsen and Brendstrup, 2000, Harrison, 2010, Pedersen, 2007). 
The last argument hints to the point that on this level of abstraction on objectives and 
mechanisms it is important to integrate settings and calibrations as well as the instrumental 
logic in order to provide a full picture of policy change. A number of studies only focus on 
policy instruments as the object of concern (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, Knill et al., 2010a, 
Busch and Jörgens, 2005b, Busch and Jörgens, 2005a, Tews et al., 2003). One network of 
26 
 
scholars clustered around Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger Wurzel, and Anthony Zito investigates the 
history of “new” environmental policy instruments in a number of countries (Jordan et al., 
2003, Jordan et al., 2005, Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, Wurzel et al., 2013). These studies 
aggregate the findings from different case studies on the level of objectives and mechanisms 
to conclude on a change in the instrumental logic from traditional “government” to new 
modes of environmental “governance”. Furthermore, we find a number of studies with the 
focus on policy objectives and mechanisms which include calibrations as a measure of the 
policy instruments’ intensity, i.e. the “specific calibration of a given regulatory instrument” 
(Knill et al., 2012b) (Knill et al., 2010b, Knill et al., 2012b, Liefferink et al., 2009, Holzinger 
et al., 2011b, Jahn and Kuitto, 2011, Tosun, 2013). Each of these measures makes an 
important contribution by highlighting specific aspects about the instruments applied, for 
example, their scope, their instrument type or their calibration but no measure has tried to 
integrate these different dimensions.  
The micro level is constituted by settings and calibrations. Studies on this level focus 
on the policy design and refinement of policy instruments concerning, for example, specific 
tax-rates of eco-taxes (van Asselt and Biermann, 2007, Verde and Tol, 2009, Raymond and 
Cason, 2011). The overarching question for this line of research has been to what extent 
nation states with different characteristics are capable of designing effective climate policy 
instruments (e.g., Carley and Miller 2012; Wiener and Koontz 2010). On this level, national 
characteristics and administrative styles have been identified as determinants which can either 
enable or hinder policy change and achievement of international goals (Matisoff, 2008, 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000, Weale et al., 1996, Weale et al., 2000). For instance, 
„[e]specially, high-regulating countries with a comprehensively and consistently developed 
regulatory framework of environmental instruments might face considerable problems of 
adjustment, if European policies reflect regulatory approaches that depart from domestic 
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arrangements.“ (Holzinger et al., 2011b) Scholars from this perspective argue that some of 
these administrative styles are more resistant towards policy change. Vogel (2003), for 
example, states that the institutionally powerful British government is constrained to certain 
types of instruments by its informal approach to enforcement and minimal use of prosecution 
against environmentally negative businesses on the lowest level of abstraction.  
Considering, the young age of this policy field, there has been a great deal of research 
interest into policy change in climate mitigation policy. However, I have demonstrated that 
the focus of these studies is highly variable and measurement approaches are often selective 
and limited. While some studies try to bridge two levels of abstraction, for example, 
objectives and instruments, most work has focused on one of the three levels. A 
comprehensive analysis of instruments including goals/instrument logic, the level of 
objectives/mechanisms as well as calibrations/settings does not exist. Although the research 
questions of the work is highly diverse, many studies are interested in identifying leaders, 
(innovative) policy change or trends in policymaking (e.g., towards new modes of 
governance). However, the chosen research designs focusing mostly on case studies of 
selected instruments allow only a partial answer to these questions as they lack a 
comprehensive assessment of policy-making in the field. As I will outline in the following 
section, my dissertation addresses this research gap by investigating policy change by an 
integrative approach of the three levels of abstractions and focusing on the entire policy 
portfolio.  
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6 My Contribution 
This dissertation addresses the research question of how to understand and explain policy 
change in a newly emerging policy field. Capturing policy change has been a conceptual, 
methodological, and substantive challenge described as the “dependent variable problem“. 
The challenges are interdependent. An undefined concept of policy output and policy change 
has resulted in simplistic and highly variable measurements of policies and policy change. 
This variation restricts the scholars’ perspective and the usefulness of the results for political 
actors, for example, to uncover symbolic policy innovation or to predict major changes in the 
modes of governance. The overview of the literature on climate mitigation policy reveals 
three highly critical issues for the research on policy change which are discussed in my 
dissertation: (1) the conceptualization of policy change on different levels of abstractions, (2) 
the consideration of the entire policy portfolio, and (3) the newly emerging policy field. These 
issues, if properly addressed, serve as a basis to describe, explain, and predict policy change 
and its impact on policy outcome (Knill et al., 2012b, Bailey and Ditty, 2009, Verde and Tol, 
2009, Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, Bernauer and Koubi, 2009). 
Theoretical contribution 
The theoretical contribution of the debate within this dissertation lays in the attempt to 
integrate different concepts of policy output and policy change on three levels of abstraction – 
goals and instrument logic, objectives and mechanisms, and policy settings and calibrations. 
As discussed above, this distinction is crucial for theory-testing since competing approaches 
postulate policy change on different levels. My dissertation contributes to the literature by 
providing a conceptualization which integrates these three levels of abstractions into an 
analysis on policy instruments. In Chapter 2, it is discussed that policy actors are able to 
intentionally design objectives and mechanisms to be congruent with more general goals and 
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instrumental logic and, at the same time, incorporate rules and principles of settings and 
calibration on how to distributes benefits and burdens, including structures for 
implementation (Bobrow, 2006, Howlett and Lejano, 2012, May, 2003, Schneider and 
Sidney, 2009, Almond, 2004, Ingram et al., 2007, Jenkins, 1978, McConnell, 2010). First, 
from the policy analysis literature we know that the design of a policy instrument comprises a 
wider range of settings and calibrations which are set already during the policy process 
(Almond, 2004, Eliadis et al., 2005, Hepburn, 2010, Howlett and Rayner, 2007, Ingram et al., 
2007, Schneider and Sidney, 2009). Thus, policy instruments are not a black box but comprise 
very different characteristics which all determine the instruments’ intensity as discussed by 
Knill et al. (2012b) (see also Carley and Miller, 2012, Holzinger et al., 2011a, Clinton and 
Dryzek, 2006, Grant and Kelly, 2008, Howell et al., 2000, Knill et al., 2010a, Lapinski, 2008, 
Liefferink et al., 2009, Mayhew, 1993, Tsebelis, 1999). Chapter 2 extends this literature and 
discusses this concept of policy intensity by theoretically deriving a wider and more 
systematic set of settings and calibrations which influence the actual policy output.  
Focusing on the level of policy instruments on the level of objectives and mechanisms 
including respective settings and attributes also allows an aggregation of information from 
both these levels to the highest level of the instrumental logic. First, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
demonstrate that the aggregation of calibrations and settings in the country cases reflect on the 
dominant administrative styles as described in the case study literature (Howlett, 1991, 
Howlett, 2003). Second, how an aggregation of information on the specific type of 
instruments can be used to locate country specific changes in the degree of innovativeness and 
modes of governance is presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
The dissertation more generally contributes to the literature on policy change using 
this integrative approach to define a number of concepts such as policy innovations, symbolic 
innovations, or modes of governance. A policy innovation in Chapter 3 is defined on the meso 
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level of abstraction if it is either new in the policy portfolio (new mechanism) or if it 
addresses new objectives. Symbolic innovations are seen as those innovations which are 
constituted by low intensity in calibrations and settings on the micro level of abstraction. It 
could be demonstrated in Chapter 3 that high intensity in policy innovations reveal substantial 
policy change in the overall policy portfolio. In Chapter 4, new modes of governance on the 
level of the instrument logic are revealed by the aggregation and combination of certain types 
of instruments from the level of objectives and mechanisms.  
An additional theoretical contribution of the dissertation is its amplification to place 
policy instruments in the context of the national policy portfolio. It is argued that policy 
change as a whole can only be analyzed when considering the full set of the countries’ policy 
instruments within a respective policy field. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, policy instruments 
are only new and innovative in a specific context where no such policy exists at the point of 
adoption. In Chapter 4, the results reveal that looking at only single or selected sets of policy 
instruments would reveal substantial bias whereas the focus on the policy portfolio allows to 
demonstrating the dominance of traditional modes of government within the countries.  
The dissertation presents a theoretical discussion on how to apply mainstream theory 
on policy change on the case of newly emerging policy fields such as climate mitigation 
policy. Here, the high level of uncertainty, fragmentation of political actors and interests, 
changing party positions and policy preferences, and diffuse side payments raises question on 
when new interests and political coalitions are stabilized to provide substantial and long-term 
policy investment in the national portfolio of climate mitigation. Chapter 5 on veto player 
theory and Chapter 4 on the “government-to-governance” hypothesis both identify the 
specific challenges that a newly emerging policy field induces for these mainstream theories. 
The results suggest that more theory building is necessary to include the concept of climate 
leaders into veto player theory. Furthermore, Chapter 4 contributes evidence that questions 
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the general trend proposed by the “government to governance” hypothesis and argues for a 
more refined conceptualization of how, when, and why different modes of governance persist.  
Methodological contribution 
In all chapters, the dissertation relies on a cross-national and longitudinal research design 
which allows to identify, compare and explain different patterns of policy change. It thereby 
goes beyond the existing body of research focusing on individual policy instruments or 
portfolios of single countries. This literature cumulates substantial value and insight to the 
literature on policy change pointing out the mechanisms of policy adoptions, diffusion, and 
convergence. However, as identified by the “dependent-variable problem” the ability to 
compare and integrate their results is limited not only because concepts are insufficiently 
defined but also because applied indicators are highly variable, have low concept validity and 
often rely on subjective, expert evaluations of changes that do not rely on systematic criteria 
for assessment. Thus, the methodological contribution of this dissertation lies in the 
development of a theory-based and sound measurement that matches the conceptual outline of 
policy change and its application for identifying and comparing dynamics of innovations 
across countries.  
First, the approach enables the operationalization of policy output and policy change 
on various levels of abstractions, different types of innovations and instruments, and as a 
substantial part of the policy portfolio. In Chapter 2, the validity, reliability, and usefulness of 
the Index of Climate Policy Activity is demonstrated. It serves not only to capture policy 
output of national policy portfolios but provides a mean to compare types of instruments, 
innovations, or even single tools across countries and for a longer period of time. Even though 
the approach is applied only in the context of climate mitigation for a selected set of countries, 
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with minor adaptations it is universally applicable to study policy change in other policy 
fields in a variety of contexts.  
Second, the Index of Climate Policy Activity’s applicability is also demonstrated in 
Chapter 3 where national trajectories of policy innovations within the countries can be 
analyzed. Furthermore, the specific design features of single policy instruments give insight 
whether they are “symbolic” or designed with “real teeth”.  
While the four individual contributions are united by their cross-national and 
longitudinal focus, they use different research designs that were identified as the best way to 
fulfill their individual purposes. The focus of Chapter 2 and 3 is descriptive – the aim is to 
develop new measurements and to use them for describing patterns of policy change. They 
rely on a comparative case study design of three countries: Austria, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. The reasons for selecting these cases is outlined in the chapters. However, the 
index is designed for the use of large N analysis as well.  
Chapter 4 relies on a large-N design of policy portfolios for testing the “government-
to-governance” hypothesis. This provides innovative evidence to the debate in two ways: 
First, by looking at portfolios it allows quantify the rise of new modes of governance in 
comparison to other policy measures. Second, it investigates the generalizability of case study 
research by looking if the described pattern can be found in all EU member states or just for 
selective groups of countries.  
Finally, Chapter 4 combines the merits of quantitative analysis for testing competing 
theories and qualitative case studies for discerning the underlying mechanisms (Rohlfing, 
2008, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). Mechanisms in our case do not refer to the temporal 
order of cause and effect (Lieberman, 2005) but is rather an illustration of the processes 
outlined by the theory that are responsible for the effect of climate leaders – thus mediating 
variables which are not available for the quantitative analysis.  
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Substantive contribution 
The dissertation provides a number of substantial contributions for the research on climate 
mitigation policy. It addresses the challenges of a newly emerging policy field and discusses 
how different interests, actors, and policy preferences influence national climate politics in 
Chapter 5. For the context of EU climate politics, the analyses demonstrate that national 
climate mitigation varies across the member states both in the quantitative size of the policy 
portfolio (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5) and qualitative aspects of innovativeness (Chapter 3). A 
systematic overview on country patterns in national choices of policy instruments and the role 
of the state for new modes of governance is given in Chapter 4. In general, it is one step 
further towards a systematic measurement that allows the comparison, evaluation, and even 
ranking of national policy portfolios using a quantitative method on the basis of publicly 
available data. It adds to the existing and more generally applied tools such as the 
Germanwatch Climate Performance Index which serve as an orientation on how nation states 
can be evaluated in terms of climate action. Furthermore, this dissertation provides the basis 
for more research on the determinants on the adoption of climate mitigation policy and its 
actual performance in the reduction of greenhouse gases.  
Limitations 
Although this dissertation aims to shed new light from the perspective of a newly emerging 
field, it is outside of the scope to provide a systematic comparison of results for old and new 
fields (e.g. in a meta-analysis). Nevertheless, results generated on the basis of these articles 
are compared with existing theoretical and empirical work in established fields and its results. 
Part of the contribution of this dissertation has been the collection of new data summarized in 
the Index of Climate Policy Activity. Due to data availability, this however is reduced to 
policies of energy production (Chapter 2 and 3), energy efficiency, or renewable energies 
34 
 
(Chapter 5). The operationalization of the Index of Climate Policy Activity has been very time 
consuming because it demands information on six settings and calibrations to be coded for 
every policy instrument in the national portfolio from 1998 to 2010. This is the reason why 
for Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 only three countries, Austria, Germany, and the UK, were 
selected to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of this approach. Thus, these novel 
data are available only for the three countries so that for the larger N Perspective of Chapter 4 
and 5 I had to rely on different approaches to operationalize policy output such as the density 
approach in Chapter 4  and weighted intensity in Chapter 5 (see discussion in Chapter 2). 
Although climate mitigation policies are taken as an exemplary case for newly 
emerging fields, it has specific characteristics which may limit the transferability of the results 
to other new fields: (1) As stated repeatedly, the implications and time frame of climate 
change are unclear. This puts decision-makers in a very different situation than in other new 
fields such as long-term care or immigration policy where developments and implications are 
not good but definitely better predictable for individual nation states. (2) Climate mitigation 
policy in the EU is highly regulated under the Effort Sharing Agreement of the Climate and 
Energy Package (Number 406/2009/EC). This puts significant pressure on member states to 
be active in this field. It makes the EU to a leader in climate policies – however it limits the 
transferability of the results to climate-policy making in other areas of the world. However, 
while the results may look different – the concepts (policy output, policy portfolio, instrument 
choice and definition of innovation) and measurements (Index of Climate Policy Activity) are 
transferable and future research using them could bring important comparative insights.  
7 Overview 
As outlined in the previous section, the aim of this dissertation has been to illuminate change 
in climate mitigation policy and using this new field of policy-making to derive general 
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conclusions for theories and empirical testing of policy change. The individual chapters 
contribute in different ways to this overarching goal of understanding and explaining policy 
change. The major advancement that connects the work in all contributions is the idea that 
whole policy portfolios rather than individual policies need to be the basis for a meaningful 
theoretical and empirical analysis of policy change. All four papers leverage the new field of 
climate mitigation policy as a case study for how policy change can be theoretically 
conceptualized, empirically measured, understood and explained to advance not only this 
particular field but general political science scholarship on policy analysis.  
Chapter 2 (with Sebastian Sewerin and Sybille Seubert) provides the theoretical basis 
for my dissertation research by developing a new concept for understanding policy output and 
policy change. Comparing national policies is a complex research project, and existing 
attempts at comparisons are fragmented. A major shortcoming of existing work is the focus 
on single policy instruments, which is limited considering that countries have whole portfolios 
of policies that interact and commonly produced intended and unintended policy outcomes. 
We reconsider the concept of policy output and propose a refined measure as a function of 
both the density of regulation (number of policy instruments) and the intensity of the policy 
instruments (content of policy instruments). We theoretically derive six policy-design features 
(objectives, scope, integration, budget, implementation, monitoring), which are used for 
weighting national climate policy instruments on an Index of Climate Policy Activity. 
Focusing on national climate policy for energy production in Austria, Germany, and the UK 
from 1998 to 2010, the article presents an empirical application and compares the policy-
specific data to other measurement approaches (density, strictness, and scope approach). A 
comparison with expert evaluations of Germanwatch and results from the case study literature 
demonstrates that our Index of Climate Policy Activity provides valid results for national 
policy output. It provides a novel theoretical tool to operationalize policy output and to 
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conduct cross-national analysis of policy change that can advance analysis of climate policy 
portfolios but is also generally applicable to other policy fields.  
Chapter 3 (with Sebastian Sewerin and Sybille Seubert) directly builds on the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity presented in the previous chapter and the collected data. It is the first 
part of a research endeavor that aims to describe and understand change in policy portfolios 
from different theoretical perspectives. The theoretical concept underlying this chapter is the 
idea of policy innovation. This paper examines policy change in the area of climate mitigation 
and investigates the role of policy innovations in radically altering a policy portfolio. We 
analyze whether policy innovations are merely symbolic or truly radical and if they contribute 
to `tipping´ policy portfolios towards a new instrumental logic. We study policy innovations 
in the context of policy portfolios, distinguish between levels of policies at which innovations 
might occur, and analyze policy dynamics over time. The analysis utilizes the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity for assessing the relative importance of policy innovations in 
complex policy portfolios. Thus, the paper can serve as a blueprint for further systematic 
comparative analyses. Empirically, we analyze policy innovations in the energy production 
policy portfolios of Austria, Germany and the UK between 1998 and 2010 and find high 
stability in the instrumental logic but substantial deviation in policy settings and calibrations.  
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of policy portfolios from a different theoretical 
perspective — the (changing) role of the state in policy-making. It builds on the debate of 
changing modes of governance and its central hypothesis that policymaking in modern states 
moves away from traditional hierarchical regulation form of “government“ and towards new 
forms of decentralized network “governance“ (government-to-governance hypothesis). The 
theoretical part provides a typology of policy instruments along the dimensions of 
monocentrism/polycentrism and coercion. The empirical analysis of instrument choice in 
climate mitigation policy extends previous analysis in two important ways. First, unlike 
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earlier studies that focus on the dimension of monocentrism/polycentrism, the analysis 
includes the level of coercion as an indicator of change from government to governance. 
Second, it provides a more systematic test by assessing instrument choice in the context of 
whole policy portfolios and compares instruments across nineteen EU countries. The findings 
cast doubt on the general trend of “government-to-governance” in climate policy and reveals 
substantial differences between countries in the development of climate mitigation policy 
across time. Typical instruments for “governance” complement rather than replace the 
dominant traditional forms of “government”. Instrument choice seems to follow a sequential 
pattern where traditional government forms the basis of policymaking and is then extended in 
some (but not all cases) to new forms of governance such as tradable permits or voluntary 
agreements.  
Chapter 5 (with Dr. Karolina Jankowska) aims to explain policy change by testing 
hypotheses of veto player theory in the field of climate mitigation. Veto player theory has 
been selected as one of the most prominent approaches to explain policy stability and change. 
While existing empirical tests focus on established policy fields such as social or economic 
policy, this chapter discusses and tests to what extent its predictions hold in the context of 
newly emerging policy fields such as climate mitigation policy. New fields provide a different 
context for political decision-making, with a status quo outside the median preferences, a lack 
of policy baggage and newly emerging actors and interests that challenge some of the 
theoretical mechanisms underlying veto player theory. We argue for an extension of veto 
player theory based on an absolute anchoring of preferences (rather than using the range) and 
the identification of policy leaders. The influence of veto players and their preferences is 
tested in a comparative mixed-methods design combining a large-N pooled time-series cross-
section analysis of national policies on energy efficiency in 25 EU member states from 1998 
to 2010 with a case-study analysis of the renewable electricity laws in Poland (2005) and 
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Germany (2000). The findings demonstrate that climate leaders rather than veto players are 
important predictors of change in climate mitigation policy. The case study suggests that 
political actors other than official veto players, such as ministers or the EU, strongly influence 
the process of agenda setting and decision-making. The findings underscore the importance of 
including a measure of the internal cohesion of veto players, the presence of leaders, and the 
consideration of motives other than policy preferences in future analyses.  
 
Table 3: Overview on the Individual Chapter of the Dissertation 
Title Aim Status 
Toward a Comparative 
Measure of Climate Policy 
Output (with Sebastian 
Sewerin and Sybille Seubert) 
Discuss different approaches 
to conceptualize and measure 
climate policy output and 
demonstrate the validity and 
reliability of the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity. 
Revised and resubmitted to 
Policy Studies Journal (Sept 
10, 2013) 
The Innovativeness of 
National Policy Portfolios – 
Climate Policy Change in 
Austria, Germany, and the 
UK (with Sebastian Sewerin 
and Sybille Seubert) 
Elaborate on symbolic 
innovation and tipping points 
within a discussion of policy 
innovations in the context of 
the climate policy portfolio 
Revised and resubmitted to 
Environmental Politics (Oct, 
5) as part of the Special Issue 
„Innovations in Climate 
Policy - The Politics of 
Invention, Diffusion and 
Evaluation“ by Andrew 
Jordan and Dave Huitema 
New Climate Governance 
and Policy Instruments – A 
Comparative Analysis of the 
“Government-to-
Governance” Hypothesis 
Providing a theoretical 
framework how to classify 
policy instruments along the 
government/governance 
distinction, testing the 
„government-to-governance“ 
hypothesis for climate 
mitigation policies 
Submitted to Regulation and 
Governance (Sept 08, 2013) 
Breaks or engines? The role 
of veto players and leaders in 
the new field of climate 
mitigation policy (with Dr. 
Karolina Jankowska) 
Elaborate and test veto player 
theory and the idea of 
climate leaders in the context 
of national climate mitigation 
policy using a mixed 
methods approach. 
Submitted to European 
Political Science Research 
(Sept 04, 2013) 
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The dissertation is a multi-paper dissertation. All chapters share the aim of understanding and 
explaining policy change in the field of climate mitigation in a cross-national comparative 
framework. The individual chapters are self-standing manuscripts submitted in the format 
required for the journals to which they have been submitted. Chapter 3 has been submitted as 
part of a special issues project and thus builds on other contributions in this issue - 
specifically the editorial introduction. Table 1 presents a short overview on the individual 
contributions of the chapters and their publication status. 
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Abstract: Tangible efforts to mitigate climate change take place today mainly on a national 
rather than an international level. Comparing national policies is a complex research project, 
and existing attempts at comparisons are fragmented. We reconsider the concept of policy 
output and propose a refined measure as a function of both the density of regulation (number 
of policy instruments) and the intensity of the policy instruments (content of policy 
instruments). We theoretically derive six policy-design features (objectives, scope, 
integration, budget, implementation, monitoring), which are used for weighting national 
climate policy instruments on an Index of Climate Policy Activity. Focusing on national 
climate policy for energy production in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010, the 
article presents an empirical application and compares the policy-specific data to other 
measurement approaches. We demonstrate that our Index of Climate Policy Activity provides 
valid results for national policy output. Thus, this approach seems a promising concept for 
further comparative analyses.  
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the efforts of international diplomacy have failed to establish an 
encompassing regime to address global climate change. This has led to new research interest 
in how far nation states are capable of designing effective climate policy instruments (e.g., 
Carley and Miller 2012; Wiener and Koontz 2010). In spite of a growing body of research, 
different national policy portfolios on climate mitigation, i.e. all national policy instruments, 
have not been compared in terms of the actual success of the countries’ strategies. The reason 
for this is the lack of a common understanding of the concept of policy output (Graham, 
Shipan, and Volden 2012; Green-Pedersen 2004; Howlett and Cashore 2009). This article 
addresses this shortcoming by proposing a comparable conceptualization and measurement of 
policy output. 
Policy output refers to the results of a policy process in which political actors interact, 
communicate, and bargain within a set of formal and informal procedures, rules, and 
institutions. The concept has been applied in studies on policy subsystems like environment, 
energy, or health (May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006), analyzing the adoption of types of 
or even single policy instruments (Berry and Berry 2007; Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2005; 
Raymond and Cason 2011). Attempts have been made to investigate policy portfolios using 
pre-selected policy instruments across different countries (Albrecht and Arts 2005; Knill, 
Debus, and Heichel 2010; Liefferink et al. 2009). Yet, an analysis of single or pre-selected 
policy instruments can lead to biased conclusions, predominantly due to undetermined policy 
interactions or portfolio effects (e.g., Howlett and Rayner 2007). In our view, a comparison of 
several countries’ efforts on climate mitigation needs to focus on the policy output of the 
whole policy portfolio. 
One approach to policy output, advocated by Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012), 
distinguishes between policy density (number of policy instruments) and intensity (content of 
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policy instruments). They include the specific policy-design features "scope" and "level of 
regulatory strictness" to determine intensity. As literature on policy design has shown, a 
policy instrument comprises a wide range of design features, such as goals, the tools to reach 
these goals, benefits and burdens affecting the target populations, and rationales legitimizing 
the policy and implementation structures (Bobrow 2006; Eliadis, Hill, and Howlett 2005; 
Schneider and Sidney 2009). We take the density–intensity approach one step further and 
consider a whole set of theoretically derived design features to create a new measurement of 
national policy output. Doing so, we are able to analyze the most common policy instruments 
in climate policy research: regulatory, soft and market-based instruments, public investments, 
and framework policies. 
We demonstrate the theoretical foundation and validity of our approach in three sections. 
The first section provides an overview of policy output, discusses current approaches to 
determining policy intensity, and deduces relevant design features from the public policy 
literature. In the second section, we outline the empirical application of climate policy output 
– our Index of Climate Policy Activity calculated as the number of policy instruments and 
weighted by their intensity. We compiled data by undertaking a context-based analysis of 
national policy instruments in the energy-supply sector in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 
1998 to 2010. The index’ validity is demonstrated by taking expert ratings and case-study 
literature as a point of reference. In the third section, we compare approaches to measuring 
climate policy output. Finally, we discuss the implications as well as limitations of the 
analysis. 
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Theory 
Conceptualizing Policy Output and Policy Instruments 
The concept of policy output describes political action capturing laws, policies, policy 
instruments, principles, or policy programs. Policy output gives “concrete form to the 
generalized intentions of statements of policy … [and] ... combine in different ways the basic 
resources and tools of governments – laws, public personnel, public expenditure, tax 
incentives and exhortation" (McConnell 2010, 350). This concept is fundamental to a number 
of research streams such as policy change (see Howlett and Cashore 2009; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012), policy diffusion (e.g., Carley and Miller 2012; Wiener and Koontz 2010), 
theories on the policy process (see Sabatier 2007; Weible et al. 2012), or analyses of policy 
outcome (e.g., Jahn and Kuitto 2011; Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012). These studies focus on 
specific types of policy output such as policy innovations (Berry and Berry 2007) or new 
environmental policy instruments (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2005), investigating leadership or 
pioneering (Wurzel and Connelly 2012), and convergence (Wiener and Koontz 2010). Hence, 
scholars stress that despite this plethora of studies, there is little comparability of findings due 
to the lack of a common operationalization of policy output (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 
2012; Green-Pedersen 2004; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Pierson 2001). As a result, larger-N 
comparative research is rare.  
Policy instruments constitute the core of policy output as the 'set of techniques by which 
governmental authorities […] wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect 
social change' (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998, 50; see also Howlett 2009; Jordan 
et al. 2003, 2011). They are designed to be congruent with more general goals and rationales 
and to incorporate rules and principles on how to distribute benefits and burdens (Bobrow 
2006; Howlett and Lejano 2012; May 2003; Schneider and Sidney 2009). In climate policy 
research, policy instruments are discussed from two different angles. The ‘tools of 
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government’ approach focuses on the resources available to public authorities. Hood (1983, 
2007) distinguishes between four functions of policy tools: nodality, authority, treasure, and 
organization. 
‘Nodality denotes the capacity of government to operate as a node in information networks—a central 
point of contact. Authority denotes government’s legal power and other sources of legitimacy. Treasure 
denotes government’s assets or fungible resources, and organization denotes its capacity for direct action, for 
instance, through armies, police, or bureaucracy.’ (Hood 2007, 129)  
A second typology suggested by Bemelmans-Videc et al. (1998) – ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’, and 
‘sermon’ - refers to the relationship between public authorities and private actors. ‘Sticks’ are 
measures taken up by governmental units to influence people to act in accordance with 
formulated rules. ‘Carrots’ try to influence behavior in a less authoritative way as the 
addressees are not obliged to react. ‘Sermon’ aims to provide sufficient information for actors 
to make a reasonable or desired choice. More recent developments on policy instruments 
extend this typology adding ‘ties’ such as voluntary agreements and ‘adhesives’ which are 
framework policies that combine different measures under a policy package or political 
process (Lodge and Wegrich 2005; Steurer 2011). 
Either of these two angles allows to distinguish between a standard set of policy 
instruments most widely applied in climate policy research: regulatory measures (‘authority’, 
‘stick’), soft instruments (‘nodality’, ‘sermon’), market-based approaches (‘treasure’, 
‘carrot’), framework policies (’organization’, ‘adhesives’), and public investments (‘treasure’, 
‘carrot’) (see Appendix 1) (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998; Hood 2007; 
Macdonald 2001; Steurer 2011). 
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Policy Density and Intensity 
Albrecht and Arts suggest two basic elements of policy output, covering "the launching of 
PAMs [policies and measures] as well as the organization and mobilization of resources to 
execute these” (2005, 888). Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012) pursue this thought and 
introduce the terms “density” (number of policies) and “intensity” (organization and 
mobilization of resources) in their effort to conceptualize policy output. Policy density refers 
to “the degree of penetration and internal differentiation of a policy field, and explores how 
the numbers of policies or instruments change over time” (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012, 3). 
Policy intensity, on the other hand, refers to the “specific calibration of a given regulatory 
instrument” (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012, 5; see also Tosun 2013). This concept has been 
addressed in various forms under different terms such as “importance”, “strength”, 
“innovativeness”, “prevalence”, “significance”, or “stringency” (see Carley and Miller 2012; 
Clinton and Dryzek 2006; Grant and Kelly 2008). In sum, policy intensity describes the 
"organization and mobilization of resources" (Albrecht and Arts 2005, 888), namely, the 
amount of resources, time, effort, activity, or political commitment that is invested or 
allocated to a specific policy instrument. 
Adding policy intensity to policy density is necessary, as Grant and Kelly (2008) point 
out: “simply counting laws without accounting for their content is likely to produce 
measurement error when attempting to measure policy production [policy output]” (p. 306). 
One approach is to count the most intensive policy instruments (e.g., Albrecht and Arts 2005; 
Jahn and Kuitto 2011; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010). Hence, validity greatly depends on 
well-grounded derivation of the predefined threshold and on the scope of the investigation.  
A second approach is to count all the policy instruments (density) in a policy portfolio 
and weight them by intensity. Weightings can be derived from experts evaluation (e.g., Binder 
1999; Coleman 1999; Mayhew 2005) or the media (e.g., Howell et al. 2000; Kelly 1993). The 
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validity of these approaches depends on the selection of the experts and whether media are 
ideologically biased (Clinton and Dryzek 2006; Lapinski 2008). Intensity weightings derived 
from design features of policy instruments are unaffected by such bias. For example, studies 
operationalize intensity by assessing the design feature regulatory strictness, such as a limit 
value for vehicle emissions (Carley and Miller 2012; Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer 2011; 
Liefferink et al. 2009; Tosun 2013). Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012) add the policy 
instruments' scope as an additional indicator for policy intensity, asking who (scope) is 
regulated by what standard (strictness) of clean air regulation. Yet, these approaches are very 
context-specific and difficult to apply to a different set of policy instruments. Thus, we seek to 
take their approach one step further by considering the wide range of policy instruments' 
policy-design features. 
 
Policy Intensity, Policy Design Features, and the Policy Process 
Using policy-design literature, we derive a systematic set of design features determining the 
intensity of policy instruments (see Howlett and Lejano 2012 for a review). Policy design 
describes "an activity conducted by a number of policy actors in the hope of improving policy 
making and policy outcomes through accurate anticipation of consequences of government 
actions and the articulation of specific courses of action to be followed" (Howlett and Lejano 
2012, 2; see also Bobrow 2006). Policy design incorporates a focus on the available policy 
options with a procedural component addressing political activities aiming to reach political 
agreement on one of these options (May 2003). The former substantial component describes 
the intentions and commitment of political actors shaping design features of policy 
instruments throughout the policy process. The stronger the commitment of political actors, 
the more resources, time, effort and activity are invested in the design of the policy 
instrument, which is reflected in its design features. However, with regard to the procedural 
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component, policy-design features are not only a result of intentional design but also of 
bargaining by opposing political actors, ideas, and interests at different stages throughout the 
policy process (Schlager and Blomquist 1996; Schlager 2007). Whether political key actors, 
committed to a policy instrument, are able to overcome potential conflict at various stages of 
the policy process determines the policy-design features of that instrument (Chadwick 2000; 
Gormley 2007). We go through different stages of the policy process and use political 
commitment as a proxy to derive relevant design features of a policy instrument in order to 
determine its intensity. Due to different institutional setups, the set of actors as well as their 
roles in the policy process varies across countries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; deLeon 1999). It 
is necessary to focus on the full policy process in order to derive a complete set of policy-
design features.  
At the stages of agenda setting and policy formulation, establishing objectives is a critical 
step and pre-determines all further progress throughout the policy process (Howlett, Ramesh, 
and Perl 2009; Howlett 2009). Precise objectives for policy instruments are rare in 
governmental decisions, due to their distributive character of benefits and burdens for target 
groups and, thus, the many opposing interests and evolving conflicts among political actors 
(Ingram and Schneider 1997; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006). If ambitious objectives 
are set, it can be assumed that proponents continue to invest in the intensity of the policy 
instrument throughout the policy process (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009).  
During policy formulation, the scope of a policy instrument is set. It decides about the 
allocation of resources or economic burden and is likely to produce winners and looser 
(Ingram and Schneider 1997; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006). Thus, with an 
increasing scope, political bargaining and lobbying becomes more intense (Almond 2004; 
Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009; Schneider and Sidney 2009). If the scope is ambitious even 
in the context of marked political opposition, the policy issue should be highly relevant to 
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political actors and they can be assumed to invest in the intensity of a policy instrument in 
subsequent stages of the policy process (Hepburn 2010; Ingram, Schneider, and DeLeon 
2007). Therefore, we assume that if political actors withstand opposition from a wide range of 
lobbying groups and present a policy instrument with a wider scope, this instrument also has a 
higher intensity. 
Policy integration is an essential issue at the stage of policy formulation (Briassoulis 
2005; Howlett 2004). Policy-design literature focuses on whether and how political actors 
intentionally create new designs of policy packages with explicit goals of optimization and 
avoidance of contradictory or conflicting mixes of political action (Doremus 2003; Hou and 
Brewer 2010). Policy portfolios can be designed to be consistent (non-contradictory in 
objectives), coherent (non-conflicting policy instruments) or congruent (optimal match 
between objectives and instruments) (Howlett and Rayner 2007). There are three arguments in 
favor of policy packages’ capacity to achieve these aims. First, they should be highly 
consistent and coherent, due to the larger number of political actors and, hence, more 
discussion of all policy instruments included in the package. Second, policy packages provide 
congruence, due to a better matching of the package’s goals with policy instruments within 
the overarching framework policy (Howlett and Rayner 2007; Kern and Howlett 2009; 
Rogge, Schneider, and Hoffmann 2011). Third, packages attract greater media attention than 
do single policy instruments, which potentially leads to higher visibility (Koch-Baumgarten 
and Voltmer 2010) and to sophisticated evaluation of the whole package including its 
individual instruments. In sum, policy intensity is higher if integrated into a package including 
framework policy. 
Another important design feature occurring at the stage of policy formulation is the 
budget of a policy instrument. This includes financial means that are invested or financial 
burdens that are imposed on societal groups. As O’Toole (2004) points out, more resources 
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increase the prospect of accomplishing implementation. Hence, decisions on financial 
investments or impositions inevitably create winners and losers by (re)distributing resources 
among societal group and, thus, challenging interests (Almond 2004). A policy instrument 
with a large public budget that is able to overcome such opposition is characterized by 
stronger commitment from political actors and thus high intensity (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 
2009). 
Implementation is the penultimate stage of the policy process, where political actors are 
concerned about how policy instruments are put into practice. Here, in particular, theoretical 
policy formulation directly affects real interests and provokes conflict between public 
agencies, administration, and target groups (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). Two issues are 
highly relevant to determining intensity. First, having single instead of multiple implementing 
agencies avoids potentially expensive cooperating costs caused by inter-organizational 
bargaining processes (Hepburn 2010; Lundin 2007). Second, as a two-way interaction 
between the legislative principal and the implementing agency, implementation bears the risk 
of failure due to inappropriate actions by either entity (May 2003). Contradictions and 
ambiguity in the formulation of the policy instrument allow opposing interests to dilute its 
actual stringency during the process of implementation. However, as May (2003) notes, 
"implementation difficulties can be partially ameliorated with the crafting of appropriate 
policy designs to build commitment and capacity of intermediaries and to signal policy intent 
to intermediaries and target groups" (p. 223). Following his argument, we assume that 
problems and conflicts in the principal–agent relationship can be addressed if a policy 
instrument comprises explicit rules for implementation and sanctioning (Hepburn 2010; 
Potoski 2002).  
Monitoring as a key activity at the stage of policy evaluation is “intended to ensure that 
policies are accomplishing their expected goals” (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009, 185). 
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Policy-design literature shows that unintended consequences of policy implementation can 
lead to positive or negative feedback either supporting or undermining policy goals (Patashnik 
2008; Pierson 1993; Weaver 2010). Highly committed political actors should have an interest 
in designing a policy instrument in such a way that it stimulates positive feedback 
mechanisms. This could entail increasing state capacities or larger groups of proponents 
(Jervis 1997; Pierson 2004) supporting the instrument in place in the long term (Jenkins and 
Patashnik 2012; Patashnik 2008; Pierson 2000). Positive feedback hardly provides immunity 
against policy failure; indeed, on the contrary, it can lead to major support for even 
malfunctioning policy instruments (Duit et al. 2010; Jenkins and Patashnik 2012). In the same 
vein, negative feedback can undermine policy goals, creating counter-activity and opposition 
to the policy instrument in place (Jervis 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2012). Negative 
feedback can also trigger a process of policy learning to adapt policy instruments to changing 
environments and avoid malfunction in the long term, if the process of policy formulation 
intentionally designed monitoring for this purpose (Olsen 2009; Weaver 2010). Thus, 
administrative monitoring carried out by non-governmental entities according to formal rules 
provides governments with a feedback mechanism to refine instruments (Hepburn 2010; 
Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). Therefore, monitoring mechanisms laid down in the 
original policy instrument increase policy intensity. 
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Data and Operationalization 
Database 
We compiled data by undertaking a context-based analysis of national policy instruments in 
the energy-supply sector in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010. In a first step, 
we collected information on policies and measures from two standardized sources, the 
Policies and Measures Databases on Global Renewable Energy, Climate Policy, and Energy 
Efficiency of the International Energy Agency (IEA, October 12, 2012), and the Climate 
Policies and Measures in Europe Database of the European Energy Agency (EEA, October 
27, 2012). These databases cover the whole period of observation from 1998 to 2010 and 
include a variety of sectors (e.g., energy, transport, housing). The data are updated every six 
month by voluntary (IEA) and mandatory (EEA) reports of the member countries’ public 
authorities. In a second step, we complemented additional policy instruments if not listed in 
the standardized datasets. We cross-verified the information on the policy design features 
(e.g., policy instruments’ specific emission target or scope) given by the databases with non-
standardized sources such as the UNFCCC National Communication, legal documents, and 
other governmental reports. Thus, we are confident that our dataset covers all policy 
instruments of the national portfolio for the energy-supply sector from 1998 to 2010.  
In total, we analyze 175 policy instruments with varying numbers per country and per 
year (see ‘density approach’ in Figure 1). We choose the year 1998 where the Kyoto Protocol 
came into force and the EU’s burden sharing agreement has been passed as point of reference 
for the starting point for national climate politics (Wurzel and Connelly 2012). 2010 is the 
most recent year where climate mitigation policies are completely available. We further 
restrict our analysis to the sector of energy production since it marks the basis of all 
greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, is most strongly addressed by political efforts to increase 
renewable energy production (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012).  
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The standardized databases we used allow to derive the five types of policy instruments 
(regulatory, soft, market-based instruments, framework policy and public investments) we 
discussed in the previous section. Appendix 1 gives detailed information about the content of 
these categories. We found this typology useful for our analysis because it covers the 
mainstream instruments discussed in the literature of climate politics (Bemelmans-Videc, 
Rist, and Vedung 1998; Hood 2007; Jordan et al. 2003; Macdonald 2001; Sager 2009; Steurer 
2011). 
Case Selection 
The Index of Climate Policy Activity should reveal valid results, first comparing policy 
output for specific policy instruments within countries as well as, second, comparing policy 
output from national policy portfolios across countries. Therefore, we compare two pairs of 
EU countries in a most similar and most different cases research design. First, we choose 
Austria and Germany, where a similar highly regulatory policy style has led to a similar 
pattern of types of policy instruments (Wurzel, Brückner, et al. 2003; Wurzel, Jordan, et al. 
2003), though the density of climate mitigation output is greater in Germany than in Austria 
(Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 2008; Jänicke 2011). Second, we compare Germany and the UK, 
where distinctive policy styles have led to different patterns of types of policy instruments. 
Germany combines regulatory and market-based instruments with soft measures such as 
voluntary agreements, whereas the UK adopts a mix of public regulation and market-based 
instruments (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007). Both countries have a similarly large policy portfolio 
(Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 2008; Jänicke 2011). The European Union’s role remains limited 
to monitor national compliance with the targets laid down in the 2001 and 2009 energy 
directives (Haas et al. 2011; Kitzing, Mitchell, and Morthorst 2012) and more direct top-down 
harmonization by the Commission failed and has largely disappeared since 2005 (Haas et al. 
2011; Toke and Lauber 2007).  
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Constructing the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
Climate policy output is a function of density and intensity. Density equals the sum of policy 
instruments in a specific domain, which can be easily extracted from existing databases. To 
measure intensity, we applied a content-based coding procedure, conducted by three 
independent coders, to each policy instrument. The bases for the coding are the six design 
features: objectives, scope, integration, budget, implementation, and monitoring (see 
discussion in the theory section). Each of the three authors of this study coded one country 
each and evaluated the coding of the other two countries. If there were differences in the 
assessment of a policy between the coders, the value of the debated design feature of the 
respective policy was resolved in a group discussion following a consensus rule. Table 1 
summarizes the coding question, possible coding values as well as the aggregation procedure 
for the six design features, which we derived from the theoretical discussion. Each policy 
instrument has been coded accordingly. 
In order to compare our index with counting approaches, we standardized the coding of 
each policy instrument from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one on the six design 
features. This means that a policy instrument is weighted down on a value between zero and 
one if it does not reach full intensity. The scale of each policy design feature depends on the 
scale of the information available. For example, objectives reveal metric information on the 
emission targets for each policy instrument whereas other design features such as monitoring 
or scope consists of two or more dichotomous questions (yes/no) or distinct categories (e.g., 
demand, supply) which were, for reasons of simplicity, weighted equally. In the following, we 
briefly describe the coding criteria as summarized in Table 1.  
Objectives are coded using two alternative indicators: emission reduction and renewable 
energy production.1 The scores are calculated with the question of how the policy 
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instruments’ objectives comply with the IPCC benchmark target of 80% emission reduction 
by 2050 compared to 1990 or 100% renewable energy production by 2050 (Metz et al. 2007). 
For example, the Voluntary Agreement between the German Government and German 
Industry in 2000 achieves an intensity of 0.66 which means that its objectives of annual 
reduction of 2000 tones in greenhouse gas emissions complies to 66% to the IPCC benchmark 
target. 
The scope reflects the discussions of the IPCC regarding the need for an encompassing 
approach for climate mitigation. We distinguish between target groups and energy sources 
that are regulated by a policy instrument. Policy instruments reach a scope of 0.5 if both target 
groups on demand and supply sides are affected, and households as well as companies. The 
value of 0 is coded for policy instruments that target only one of these groups, and 0.16 for 
each additional group. Furthermore, value is added for the scope of a policy instrument if 
multiple energy sources are addressed. We divided the value 0.5 by the number of potential 
sources of energy (0.5 for each oil, gas, coal, wind, solar, biomass, hydro, combined heat and 
power) but allocated a larger value of 0.15 for energy efficiency due to its greater potential for 
greenhouse gas reduction (Metz et al. 2007). For each additional energy source, the value 
increases by 0.05 and by 0.15 for energy efficiency. An example of a scope value of 0.31 is 
the 2002 UK voluntary emission-trading scheme, which targets only industries (demand and 
supply = 0.16) and energy efficiency (0.15).  
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Table 1: Climate Policy Design Features, Coding Scheme, and Aggregation Rules 
Design 
feature 
Coding question Coding values Specific aggregation to final value Range 
Objectives What is the policy 
objective with respect to 
policy performance? 
0=no specific target given We calculated the share of the policy 
instruments’ objective for absolute emission 
reduction or absolute increase in energy 
production from renewable energy sources on 
the benchmark of 80% emission reduction on 
the basis of 1990 levels or 100% energy 
production from renewable energy sources in 
2050. 
0–1 
objective for absolute emission 
reduction 
objective for absolute increase in energy 
production from renewable sources 
Scope Does the policy include 
branches of both supply 
and demand side? 
0=only one target group included 
0.16=for each target group households/ 
companies demand/ supply 
0.5=all groups targeted 
additive aggregation 0–1 
Are all mitigation actions 
targeted? 
0=only one mitigation action targeted 
0.05=for each additional action out of 
oil, gas, coal, wind, solar, biomass, 
hydro,and combined heat and power 
0.15=energy efficiency targeted 
Integration Is the policy instrument 
integrated in a package or 
any reference to other 
policy instruments? 
Is framework policy 
included? 
0=no 
0.5=yes 
1=yes, including framework policy 
additive aggregation 0, 0.5, 1 
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Budget What are the set 
expenditures/impositions 
of the policy instrument? 
0=no fixed costs/impositions 
absolute annual costs/imposition of 
policy instrument 
The values of intensity if calculated as the share 
of the public expenditure or imposition for the 
policy instrument on total public expenditure for 
energy and fuels or direct public revenue from 
the revenues of the value added tax (0-1) 
0–1 
Implemen-
tation 
Is there a statement about 
implementation 
procedures specifically 
allocating actors and 
rules? 
0=no statement about implementation 
procedures found 
0.25=implementation is specifically 
allocated to actors and rules 
0.25=only one specific actor 
coordinated implementation 
additive aggregation 0, 0.25, 
0.5, 
0.75, 1 
How is this 
implementation planned 
and is there sanctioning? 
0.25=implementation procedure is strict 
in the sense that it does not allow a 
range or change in standards or rules 
0.25=there is sanctioning for actors not 
complying to the implementation 
procedure  
Monitoring Is there a specific 
monitoring process for the 
policy instrument and by 
whom? 
0=no monitoring 
0.5=monitoring by the implementing 
agency 
1=a special group/institution is 
established for monitoring 
additive aggregation 0, 0.5, 1 
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Integration measures whether a policy instrument is part of a policy package including 
framework policy. We used three categories which reflect the arguments about consistency, 
coherence, and congruence in the previous section: no reference to other policy instruments 
(0); part of a package or reference to other policy instruments and thus consistent and coherent 
(0.5); policy instrument included in package in combination with framework policy and thus 
congruent with other policies (1). A fully integrated policy is, for example, the 2007 German 
"Combined Heat and Power Agreement", as it is part of and framed by the "Integrated Climate 
Change and Energy Programme".  
The budget of a policy instrument refers to the annual expenditure or imposition costs of a 
policy instrument but depends on and varies between the countries’ available resources and the 
more general spending patterns. In order to account for these between differences, we elaborate 
on how much public authorities are willing to spend on climate policy instruments as a 
percentage of total expenditure on energy and fuels taken from the Eurostat database (2012). It 
would be more accurate to follow the same approach for impositions but there is no data 
available on total public impositions from the sector of energy supply. Therefore, we used the 
value-added tax as an indicator of public taxing taken from the Eurostat database (2012) which 
is the most universal tax and widely applied for comparative research (e.g., Babiker, Metcalf, 
and Reilly 2003; Lockwood and Whalley 2010). Thus, we calculated the imposition costs of 
climate policy instruments as percentage of the value-added tax. An example of high budget 
policy instrument is the UK Carbon Trust with share of 36% of total expenditure on energy and 
fuels.  
Implementation reveals two subcategories, number of implementing actors and 
implementation procedure. Reflecting the discussion in the theory section about the merit of 
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single implementation agencies and explicit rules for implementation and sanctioning, policy 
instruments that transfer the implementation process to one specific actor score the maximum 
of 0.5. An additional 0.5 is scored if the rules of implementation are pre-set and cannot be 
changed without political action, and if sanctioning procedures for noncompliance exists. The 
German Eco-Tax Reform is an example of a policy with a high implementation score. It details 
which actors are concerned and how much they have to pay for use of the various energy 
sources. Furthermore, the tax is part of national tax legislation with a standardized 
implementation and sanctioning process.  
Monitoring reveals two equally weighted criteria for coding based on the two arguments 
presented in the theory section. If a monitoring procedure is set, the policy instrument scores 
0.5. If there is an independent monitoring entity, distinct from the implementation actor, we 
add an additional score of 0.5. For example, the Austrian law on green electricity 
(Ökostromgesetz) reaches a score of one since there is a monitoring process set (0.5) and the 
monitoring agency (Energie-Control GmbH) operates independent from the executive authority 
(0.5).  
Aggregation procedure: The score of a policy instrument's output equals the mean of the 
scores of all its design features. Naturally, not all design features can be applied to all policy 
instruments. For example, framework policies often lack a substantial budget and are in 
consequence not coded on this design feature. The scores of all policy instruments are then 
added to an annual score for the national policy portfolio.2 A national score changes when 
policy instruments are enacted, abolished, or their design features change. 
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Alternative Measures of Policy Output 
Attempts to operationalize alternative measures of policy output face the problem that no 
comparable data for climate policy instruments exist. We use our database to operationalize 
and compare alternative approaches to the Index of Climate Policy Activity.  
Studies following the density approach operationalize policy output by simply counting 
policy instruments (e.g., Albrecht and Arts 2005; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010).3 We apply 
this approach, counting all policy instruments in the climate policy portfolio. The strictness 
approach adds a set of standards or limit values as an indicator for intensity (e.g., Holzinger, 
Knill, and Sommerer 2011; Liefferink et al. 2009). However, limit values or standards can 
hardly be applied to, for example, voluntary agreements. Therefore, we operationalize 
strictness-weighting policy instruments by objectives for emission reduction (see Table 1). The 
scope approach adds the scope to the strictness measure (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012). 
Following this, we weight policy instruments by their scope and objectives (see Table 1).  
 
Results 
Testing Validity of the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
Empirical validation of the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a crucial step to establishing a 
comparable measure of policy output. We applied tests for convergent, discriminant, criterion, 
and construct validity (see Adcock and Collier 2001). The assumption that all indicators of the 
concept are empirically associated as demanded by convergent validity is supported by a 
principal component analysis (design features load on one factor) and tests with Cronbach's 
alpha (values above 0.92). As discriminant validity demands, the discrimination of the scores 
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of climate policy output for each design feature from the theoretically distinct discriminant 
indicator of “change in gross domestic product” reveals that the design features correlate 
higher with each other (above 0.7) than with change in gross domestic product (lower than 
0.6). Criterion validity is not easy to test, as alternative measures for climate policy outputs are 
rare. To our knowledge, the only elaborated measurement of climate policy output of national 
climate policy portfolios is the Germanwatch Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) (see 
Burk et al 2008 for a detailed description).4 The CCPI is based exclusively on expert 
evaluations of whole countries' climate policy outputs and, thus, applies an analytically distinct 
measure of the same concept as the Index of Climate Policy Activity. Experts were asked to 
"list the most important national policies and measures (max three) for the reduction of CO2 in 
the energy sector" and to "rate them according to their effectiveness" (Germanwatch 2012). 
Table 2 compares the expert evaluations with the scores of the Index of climate policy activity. 
Two findings indicate the validity of our index. First, those policy instruments that were 
considered “most important” in reducing greenhouse gas emissions also have high scores for 
climate policy output. Second, policy instruments rank very similarly using the expert 
evaluation of the CCPI and the Index of Climate Policy Activity.5 
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Table 2: Criterion Validity: Expert Policy Evaluation and the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
Year Policy instrument Expert rating Index scores  
 Austria   
2007 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.63 
 Quota/feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables 3 0.63/0.66 
2008 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.63 
 Green Electricity Act 2 0.59 
2009 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 4 0.63 
 Feed-in tariffs renewable electricity 4 0.62 
 Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy 4 0.15 
 Austrian Climate Change Strategy 5 0.52 
2010 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 4 0.65 
 Austrian Climate Change Strategy 4 0.52 
 Green Electricity Act 5 0.59 
 Germany   
2007 Renewable Energy Act 1,2 0.86 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 3 0.61 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 4 0.57 
2008 Renewable Energy Act 1,1,2 0.68 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 2,4 0.53 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2,5 0.57 
 Ecological tax reform 3 0.49 
2009 Renewable Energy Act Amendment 1 0.49 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.57 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 3 0.51 
2010 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.57 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 2 0.51 
 Renewable Energy Act Amendment 3 0.49 
 UK   
2007 Renewables Obligation 2,3 0.39 
 Energy Efficiency Commitment  3,4 0.29 
 National Allocation Plan (20052007) 3,4 0.28 
2008 Climate Change Levy and Agreements 2 0.36 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 3 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 4 0.38 
2009 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 3 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 4 0.35 
2010 Feed-in tariffs for renewables 2,3 0.45 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 3,4 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 4 0.35 
Note: Expert rating: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = neutral, 4= poor, 5 = very poor; Index of 
Climate Policy Activity: 0 = least intensity, 1 = highest intensity;  
Source: Burck, Bals and Ackerman 2008, authors’ calculations.  
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In addition, findings from case-study literature on country-specific patterns of 
environmental policy instruments are used to test criterion validity. Figure 2 shows the pattern 
of the Index of Climate Policy Activity per type of policy instrument (black bar). In line with 
case-study literature (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007; Wurzel, Brückner, et al. 2003; Wurzel, Jordan, 
et al. 2003), levels of policy output for regulatory instruments, soft measures, and market-based 
instruments in Austria and Germany are fairly equal. German levels of framework policies and 
public investments exceed those in Austria. Furthermore, the UK shows a different pattern 
from Austria and Germany, with more output on regulatory instruments and framework 
policies but lower output in soft measures and public investments. Thus, the findings in Table 2 
and Figure 2 support high criterion validity for the Index of Climate Policy Activity.  
In order to demonstrate construct validity, we test the theoretical expectation that outputs 
and outcomes are somewhat but not strongly correlated. We compare all measures of policy 
output with annual emission reduction (in percentages since 1990). As demanded by construct 
validity, the correlation for the Index of Climate Policy Activity is substantially higher (0.34) 
than for the alternative measures of policy output (0.15–0.21). 
Given these findings, we are confident that the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a valid 
and reliable measure of climate policy output and can be used to evaluate alternative 
quantitative approaches.  
 
Evaluating Alternative Measures of Policy Output of the Policy Portfolio 
We have demonstrated that the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a valid measurement of 
climate policy output. Given that, we may argue that alternative measures are potentially 
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biased if they reveal substantially different results. The analysis proceeds with a comparison of 
alternative measures of climate policy output with our index for Austria, Germany, and the UK 
1998–2010. Figure 1 shows the Index of Climate Policy Activity (solid black line) and 
measures of the density (solid grey line), strictness (dashed grey line), and the scope approach 
(dashed black line) (see methods section above).  
Figure 1 shows an increasing trend in the climate policy output of all measures over time. 
Policy output is lowest in Austria on all measures except for the strictness approach. Levels of 
policy output are higher in the UK than in Germany following the density and scope approach, 
but equally high for the strictness measure or the Index of Climate Policy Activity. In Austria, 
measures of the scope approach and the Index of Climate Policy Activity are nearly identical, 
whereas the strictness approach reveals much lower values. In contrast, there is an almost 
parallel development of policy density and the Index of Climate Policy Activity in Germany. 
Measures of the strictness and the scope approach reveal substantially lower values than the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity. In the UK, the difference between density and other 
measures of policy output is substantially larger than in Germany. Differences between the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity and the scope approach persist until 2007 but disappear 
thereafter.  
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Figure 1: Alternative Measures of Climate Policy Output 
Austria Germany UK 
 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC communications, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
The major finding is that policy output varies by measurement and by country. In Austria, 
each of the measures reveals similar results, but the density approach overestimates the 
progress made in policy output in comparison to the Index of Climate Policy Activity. Thus, 
policy density needs weighting in order to establish accurate measures of policy output. In 
Germany, the Index of Climate Policy Activity shows a parallel pattern to the density approach 
whereas measures of the strictness and the scope approaches underestimate the intensity in 
policy output. One reason for this finding is the strong emphasis on implementation and 
monitoring in German policy making (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007), which is included as a design 
feature in the Index of Climate Policy Activity but not in the strictness or the scope approach. 
In fact, using strictness only, one would draw the conclusion that Germany, the UK, and 
Austria produce similar levels in climate policy output, contradicting the findings from expert 
evaluation (Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 2008). Another important finding concerns the lower 
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number of policy instruments but equal levels of policy output measured by the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity since 2002 in Germany compared to the UK. This indicates that output 
per policy instrument in Germany is higher than in the UK. Furthermore, the restricted focus of 
the scope (until 2007) and strictness approach underestimates progress in British climate policy 
output. In the UK, there has been a long phase of experimental policy adoption with less 
ambitious emission targets and scope to keep risks of policy failure to a minimum. However, 
objectives and scope substantially increased after 2007 when larger packages for climate 
mitigation such as the Energy Act or the Climate Change Act were adopted. 
 
Evaluating Alternative Measures of Policy Output and Types of Policy Instruments 
Independent from results on the national level, there might be differences when types of policy 
instruments are assessed. We demonstrated in the methods section that the Index of Climate 
Policy Activity accurately reproduces findings from case study literature on country patterns in 
the use of certain types of policy instruments (see Figure 2, black bars). Thus, our index is a 
valid benchmark to evaluate alternative approaches of climate policy output for certain types of 
policy instruments.  
Figure 2 shows the Index of Climate Policy Activity and alternative measures of policy 
output calculated for five types of policy instruments in Austria, Germany and the UK as a 
mean value of 1998 to 2010. If the alternative measures are equally valid, the results should 
reveal similarity in the pattern for each measure of policy output with the Index of Climate 
Policy Activity within the countries.  
First, alternative measures might overestimate the intensity of certain types of policy 
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instruments within the country cases. In Austria, values of the strictness approach reveal only 
about half the level of values of the Index of Climate Policy Activity in the category of soft 
measures, regulatory instruments, and public investments, and only one-third in the group of 
market-based instruments. The scope approach measures level of policy output nearly equal to 
that measured by the Index of Climate Policy Activity. The deviation of both measures from 
values of the density approach, however, varies across types of policy instruments. In 
Germany, there are larger differences between the values of the scope approach and the Index 
of Climate Policy Activity for public investments and market-based instruments. Values based 
on the strictness approach deviate markedly from the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
benchmark. In the UK, the values of the strictness approach vary across types of instruments 
from half the level of the Index of Climate Policy Activity in the category of framework 
policies to only a quarter for market-based instruments. Policy output measured by the scope 
approach reveals the same level as the Index of Climate Policy Activity for framework 
policies, soft measures, and public investments, but shows lower levels for regulatory and 
market-based instruments. 
Second, comparing policy output of policy instruments across countries reveals substantial 
variation in the measurement. If the strictness approach is applied, differences in German and 
Austrian patterns of policy output disappear. The data reveal deviation of values of the density 
approach from the Index of Climate Policy Activity in Germany than in Austria or the UK. In 
the UK, the deviation of output per policy instrument measured by the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity is equal to the German values in the category of framework policies, but is different 
for market-based instruments and soft measures. Values of the index are even lower for 
market-based instruments in the UK than in Germany despite higher scores for policy density.  
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Figure 2: Mean of Policy Output Measures per Type of Policy Instrument 
Austria Germany UK 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC communications, authors’ calculations. 
 
The results reveal substantial variation in the pattern for the alternative measures of policy 
output compared to the Index of Climate Policy Activity across types of policy instruments. As 
a consequence, studies using alternative measures of policy output risk potential bias on the 
importance of certain policy instruments within one country. Furthermore, differences between 
the Index of Climate Policy Activity and alternative measures vary across the cases, suggesting 
that the results of comparative analysis of types of policy instruments across countries are 
potentially biased when alternative measures are applied.  
In sum, applying the density approach leads to substantial differences in results in 
comparison to the Index of Climate Policy Activity across and within countries whereas the 
strictness approach systematically underestimates policy output. Using the scope approach 
produces results most similar to the Index of Climate Policy Activity, for Austria even 
delivering identical levels of policy output. However, the scope approach underestimates 
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policy output for instruments in the UK and for market-based measures and public investments 
in Germany. Thus, while application of the scope approach might be adequate in specific 
circumstances or single countries, it does not provide sufficient robustness in the context of 
larger comparative studies.  
 
Conclusion 
Policy efforts at the national level continue to be the decisive arena for climate mitigation 
despite ongoing efforts at international collaboration. A wide range of policy instruments is 
used to curb greenhouse gas emissions, with marked differences but also similarities between 
nation states. The fact that policy adoption results from a unique national context renders 
international comparison a theoretical and empirical challenge. This article contributes to the 
public policy literature by providing the Index of Climate Policy Activity as an empirical tool, 
which allows the comparison of national policy portfolios. 
The article addresses the theoretical and practical challenge of conceptualizing policy 
output with the focus on policy instruments. In a second step, we consider both elements of 
policy output, density and intensity, introduced by Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012). Using 
theoretical arguments from policy-design literature, we identify multiple design features of 
policy instruments, which reflect policy instruments' intensity throughout the policy process. In 
this way, the article improves attempts to conceptualize and operationalize policy output that 
has been missing in the literature so far. The Index of Policy Activity can be constructed on the 
basis of readily and publicly available sources such as policy databases and government 
documents what we consider to be a clear advantage of our approach compared to other 
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measurements that rely on proprietary data. The comparison of our Index of Climate Policy 
Activity with case-study literature and expert evaluation on policy output clearly demonstrated 
the validity of our case study findings. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated the weaknesses 
of alternative measures of policy output using the concepts of density and intensity. It is 
important to note that counting procedures (density approach) or single-factor weighting 
(strictness and scope approach) can be highly appropriate in specific contexts. However, we 
demonstrated that they could carry potential for bias when applied to larger policy portfolios 
with various types of policy instruments. 
This article was primarily concerned with presenting the Index of Climate Policy Activity. 
We did not attempt to explain how and why the policy portfolios came into existence or 
changed over time. Nor did we seek to evaluate the performance or effectiveness of these 
policy portfolios. Granted, this empirical application is limited to a period of observation of 
twelve years and the specific sector of energy production in the respective countries. However, 
the elaborate measurement concept that we developed in this article is intended to be generally 
applicable to assess any policy instrument's intensity in any institutional and political setting.  
On this ground, we encourage both researchers and practitioners to apply the basic 
approach we used in comparative studies of policy output with a broader empirical basis (more 
policy sectors, more countries, longer time-spans). The analytical tool presented here provides 
sufficient flexibility to assess policies in any policy area due to its strong theoretical 
embedding in the policy-design literature. Minor modifications to the objectives and scope 
categories would allow applying the concept to further policy sectors such as education, health 
or environment. Also, the concept is applicable to policy making processes in any other 
national or sub-national context outside the European Union, e.g. in comparisons of US state 
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policies. Furthermore, the measurement concept developed in this article provides a basis for 
further statistical analyses of policy effectiveness or policy performance.  
83 
 
Notes 
1. We were planning to includes measures on energy efficiency but had sufficient data 
available to calculate the intensity value via either targets for renewable energy or emission 
reduction. 
2. For a discussion of aggregation, see Grant and Kelly (2008), Lapinski (2008), or Clinton and 
Lapinski (2006). 
3. Albrecht and Arts (2005) analyze policies and measures for climate mitigation, which have 
been reported by national governments to the UNFCCC as having the “most significant 
impact” (p. 894). In a similar vein, Knill et al. (2010) use forty pre-selected environmental 
policy measures on the basis of expert surveys and national and international legal databases. 
4. We thank Jan Burck from Germanwatch for providing the data. 
5. Quite small differences exist, for example, for the German Combined Heat and Power Act 
(policy activity score = 0.53) and the National Allocation Plan 2008 to 2012 (policy activity 
score = 0.57) in 2008. The difference in the ranking of the German Renewable Energy Act 
Amendment in 2009–2010 is based on a delay in the expert evaluation taking major policy 
interactions with the German phase-out of nuclear power into account in 2010 but not in 
2009. The Austrian Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy is highly linked with the 
Feed-in tariff for which we calculated a separate score but which is evaluated as being highly 
similar by the experts. Due to the very different methods applied there is necessarily 
measurement error which becomes evident in the variation of expert evaluations for single 
policy instruments. Apart from these exceptions, the expert ratings revealed equal results. 
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Appendix 1: Description of policy types. 
Policy type Description 
Soft measures 
Include education and outreach (policies designed to increase knowledge, awareness, 
and training among relevant stakeholders or users, including information campaigns, 
training programs, labeling schemes) and voluntary agreements (measures that are 
undertaking voluntarily by government agencies or industry bodies, based on a 
formalized agreement and often agreed to between a government and an industry 
body) 
Market-based 
instruments 
Include financial instruments (policies to encourage or stimulate certain activities or 
behaviors including tax incentives or credits on the purchase or installation), 
incentives and subsidies (policies to stimulate certain activities, behaviors or 
investments, e.g., feed-in tariffs, rebates, grants, and preferential loans), and tradable 
permits (GHG emissions trading schemes, white certificate systems stemming from 
energy efficiency or energy savings obligations, and green certificate systems based 
on obligations to produce or purchase renewable energy-sourced power). 
Framework 
policy 
Refers to the processes undertaken to develop and implement policies. This generally 
covers strategic planning documents and strategies that guide policy development. It 
can also include the creation of specific bodies to further policy aims, making 
strategic modifications, or developing specific programs.  
Public 
investment 
Include direct investments in government procurement programs (e.g. requirement to 
purchase energy efficient equipment and vehicles) and infrastructure investment (e.g. 
urban planning), and RD&D (investment in technology research, development, 
demonstration and deployment activities) 
Regulatory 
instruments 
Covers a wide range of instruments by which a government will oblige actors to 
undertake specific measures and/or report on specific information. Examples include 
energy performance standards for appliances, equipment, and buildings; obligations 
on companies to reduce energy consumption, produce or purchase a certain amount 
of renewable energy; mandatory energy audits of industrial facilities; requirements to 
report on GHG emissions or energy use.  
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp (October 12, 2012): EEA, 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/pam (October 27, 2012) 
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Abstract: This paper examines policy change in the area of climate mitigation and 
investigates the role of policy innovations in radically altering a policy portfolio. We analyze 
whether policy innovations are merely symbolic or truly radical and if they contribute to 
`tipping´ policy portfolios towards a new instrumental logic. We study policy innovations in 
the context of policy portfolios, distinguish between levels of policies at which innovations 
might occur, and analyze policy dynamics over time. Our analysis is facilitated by a new 
measurement for policy change in policy portfolios. This new encompassing approach sheds 
more light on the relative importance of policy innovations in complex policy portfolios. 
Thus, the paper can serve as a blueprint for further systematic comparative analyses. 
Empirically, we analyze policy innovations in the energy production policy portfolios of 
Austria, Germany and the UK between 1998 and 2010 and find high stability in the 
instrumental logic but substantial deviation in policy settings and calibrations.  
Keywords: policy innovation, policy change, policy dynamics, policy measurement, policy 
portfolio, symbolic innovations  
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Introduction 
After twenty years of debate on how to meet the challenges of climate change the major 
achievement at the latest 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha was to set out a 
timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015. This incontrovertibly marks a dead 
end in international climate politics (Campbell 2013). By contrast to international failure, 
national policies are bound to be successful in providing effective and efficient solutions for 
domestic climate mitigation. Hence recent years have seen a resurgent interest by both 
scholars and practitioners in policy innovation – “a program or policy which is new to the 
states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have 
adopted it” (Walker 1969, 881). This new wave of literature analyzes policy innovation from 
both a diffusion and evaluation perspective. Scholars studying policy diffusion explain 
international variation in countries’ policy innovations as a result of endogenous and 
exogenous factors (Benson and Jordan 2011; Jordan and Lenschow 2008; Jordan et al. 2010). 
Other studies evaluate the process of innovation in policy output with the focus on post-
adoption dynamics and its influence on the status quo (Bauer et al. 2012; Howlett and Joshi-
Koop 2011; Schmitt and Tosun in preparation). 
However, despite the large body of research, we have actually seen only pieces of the 
larger ‘elephant in the room’. The majority of studies of innovation from both perspectives – 
diffusion and evaluation – have focused on individual instruments (e.g. Chandler 2009; Lyon 
and Yin 2010; Rabe 2006) or a specific set of pre-selected innovations (e.g. Busch et al. 2005; 
Holzinger et al. 2011; Liefferink et al. 2009) and rarely consider policy innovations in the 
more complex contexts of (1) the policy portfolio, (2) different levels of policies, and (3) 
policy dynamics over time. As a result, scholars and practitioners often assume that specific 
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policy instruments, such as feed-in tariffs, are highly innovative simply because they are 
newly adopted.  
This attitude has two major pitfalls. First, without evaluating newly introduced policy 
instruments in the context of the policy portfolio, i.e. the entirety of all policies in a particular 
field, scholars and practitioners risk being misled by an impression of innovation that is 
exaggerated or merely symbolic (Strebel and Widmer 2012; Tömmel and Verdun 2009; 
Wurzel et al. 2013). Symbolic innovations result from a mismatch of different levels of policy 
where innovation might occur (van der Heiden and Strebel 2012; Makse and Volden 2011; 
Rogers 2003). Governmental action or ‘cheap talk’ on the level of policy goals might be 
perceived as innovative whereas actual instruments or other policy design features remain 
traditional (see Bauer et al. 2012; Krause 2011; McConnell 2010). Second, as discussed by 
Jordan and Huitema (this volume, citing Lynn 1997, 96), policy innovation is “an inherently 
disruptive process” with the potential to overcome interests defending the status quo. Even 
insignificant policy innovation might trigger policy dynamics within a process where 
cumulative changes lead to a ‘tipping point’ towards a regime with new policy instruments 
and new interests and coalitions formed around them (Black, Lodge, and Thatcher 2005; 
Shipan and Volden 2012). For example, the introduction of a support mechanism for 
renewable energies can be such a ‘tipping point’, changing a nation’s energy policy regime 
from centralized non-renewable energy production to decentralized renewable energies and 
energy efficiency.  
Therefore, for scholars and practitioners, it seems crucial to go beyond looking at 
innovations in isolation and to consider different levels of policy and a longer time frame. 
This article aims to provide insight by addressing two distinct questions: (1) Do policy 
innovations have largely symbolic goals or do they also include more radical innovation in 
their instruments or other policy design features? (2) Do policy innovations in their entirety 
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replicate the status quo or do they contribute to a momentum towards a ‘tipping point’ which 
changes the dominant style? We follow an evaluation perspective of policy output (see Jordan 
and Huitema, this volume; Beisheim and Campe 2012) and build on Walker’s (1969) 
understanding of policy innovation as the first-time adoption of inventions in a new context 
via means of diffusion. We apply a distinction between different levels of policies introduced 
by Howlett and Cashore (2009) and adopt the Hogwood and Peters (1982, 1983) perspective 
on policy dynamics.  
In order to illustrate the value of this encompassing approach, we conduct an empirical 
analysis of policy innovations in the sector of energy production in Austria, Germany, and the 
UK from 1998 to 2010. We use the Index of Policy Activity which has been developed to 
measure and compare policy output across countries and over time (Schaffrin et al. 2012). 
This approach allows individual policy innovations to be assessed in the context of the pre-
existing policy portfolio while evaluating the effects of policy innovations on the policy 
portfolio. The statistical analysis supports the value of this approach by revealing distinct 
policy dynamics in the countries studied. 
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Innovation, policy dynamics and policy change 
The complexity of policy innovation 
After reviewing the environmental policy literature on innovation, Jordan and Huitema (2011, 
2) come to the conclusion that:  
Contributions have largely been limited to particular aspects of the innovation process 
(namely policy diffusion) and/or case studies of specific inventions/ innovations. 
Crucially, a perspective that spans the whole policy cycle is still absent - post-adoption 
dynamics for example have largely been ignored […]. Arguably all these dimensions are 
needed to provide a full picture of climate policy innovation in the past and a firmer basis 
on which to speculate about the future.  
We aim to contribute to this ‘full picture’ by considering the complexity of policy innovations 
with regard to (1) the policy portfolio, (2) different levels of policies, and (3) policy dynamics 
over time. In order to combine all three elements in an analysis of policy innovation, we take 
as our starting-point the mainstream literature of policy change (Cashore and Michael Howlett 
2007; Hall 1993; van der Heijden 2013).  
First, building on Hall (1993), Howlett and Cashore (2009) suggest a policy taxonomy 
grounded on levels of policy and the distinction between ends and means. On the highest 
level, more general goals define an instrumental logic of implementation preferences. The 
meso-level combines objectives and types of instruments. On the lowest level, settings define 
the specific on-the-ground requirements of policy instruments whereas calibrations describe 
the specific way in which instruments are used (see Howlett and Cashore 2009, Figure 1).  
Second, scholarship has developed many analytical lenses for the study of policy 
change (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Hall 1993; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Pierson 
2001). They widely agree upon Hall’s (1993) distinction between two modes of policy 
change: incremental and radical (e.g., Capano 2003; Coleman et al. 1996). Hall argues that 
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first-order change in settings or calibrations and second-order changes of objectives and types 
of instruments are considered to be incremental, whereas third-order change is more 
paradigmatic and constitutes a radical shift in goals and the instrumental logic (see also 
Cashore and Michael Howlett 2007; Howlett and Cashore 2009).  
Categorizing into different levels and distinguishing between modes of change lay the 
ground for an analysis of symbolic policies and tipping points. Symbolic policies have 
innovative goals and might even apply new instruments but lack innovation and intensity at 
the level of settings and calibrations (see Bauer et al. 2012; Krause 2011; McConnell 2010). 
For tipping points, the instrumental logic or policy styles play a more important role. Here, 
policy innovations that vary only minutely from the prevalent policy style in related policy 
fields might cumulate in a tipping point where the sum of all instruments add up to a 
completely new instrumental logic.  
In the following, we briefly discuss three mainstream theories on policy change and 
their expectations for symbolic policy and tipping points before we turn to the dynamics of 
policy innovation in the context of the newly emerging field of climate mitigation.  
Symbolic innovation, tipping points, and theories of policy change 
Three dominant approaches seek to explain policy change in the literature and thus implicitly 
address the issue of symbolic policies and tipping points. First, the path dependency approach 
argues that early, rather stochastic events in a sequence have significant influence on the 
trajectory due to reinforcing mechanisms, whereas later events are inertial (Howlett and 
Rayner 2006; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000, 2001). Here, symbolic policies play a crucial 
role. While following a consistent policy path, they create a picture of activity but at the same 
time support the status quo in the dominant instrumental logic. Thus, symbolic policies serve 
as negative feedback in order to ensure increasing returns and policy stability (Capano 2003; 
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Howlett and Rayner 2006; Pierson 2000, 2001). Radical change in the instrumental logic is 
not a result of cumulative sequences reaching a final tipping point, but appears at critical 
junctures or during windows of opportunity, e.g. after an election (Kingdon 1995; Lindner 
2003; Thelen 1999).  
Second, the process sequencing approach follows the idea of cycles switching between 
incremental and more radical sequences of change (Howlett 2009). Its most prominent 
application is the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Baumgartner 
et al. 2009; Haydu 1998). While previous policies can create stable sequences accomplished 
by non-cumulative negative feedbacks (Bardach 2006; Mahoney 2000), they can also entail 
negative externalities that require more radical adjustments and transformation (Haydu 1998; 
de Vries 2000, 2005). Again, symbolic policies as a kind of negative feedback provide a 
useful means of buttressing existing interests. However, following this approach, cumulative 
sequences in negative externalities, for example significant public and media attention to 
catastrophic events, creates positive feedbacks and mobilizes new interests among 
stakeholders. If public pressure is strong and political actors have no capacity to react 
adequately, more radical policy change in the instrumental logic occurs (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2002; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Haydu 1998).  
Third, cumulative incrementalism criticizes mainstream theory on policy change for 
its neglect of cumulative steps as a source of more radical change (Capano 2003; Cashore and 
Michael Howlett 2007; Lee and Strang 2006).2 Here, processes of increasing returns and 
policy learning through incremental changes of policy instruments finally reach a tipping 
point for a more radical change in the instrumental logic (Coleman et al. 1996; Pierson 1993). 
Symbolic policies play no role since changes in the instrumental logic occur by the 
                                                 
2 The most prominent applications are ‘layering’, ‘conversion’, ‘drifting’ and ‘displacement’ (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010) and neo-/quasi homeostatic, or thermostatic approaches (Cashore and Howlett 2007). 
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incremental adoption of new ‘layers’ of innovative instruments with new settings and 
calibrations (Beland 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The 
analytical problem is to define the point at which incremental changes tip the instrumental 
logic towards change (Capano 2009; van der Heijden 2011). 
The dynamics of climate policy 
The analysis of climate policies provides a very interesting case study for symbolic 
innovations and tipping points within the debate on policy dynamics and policy change since 
it is a rare example of a policy field that has come into existence only in the last twenty 
years.3  
Hogwood and Peters (1983, 26) believe that innovations, i.e. “the entry of government 
into an activity in which it has not previously been involved” are rare. Instead, policy-making 
mostly deals with policy successions, which purposely adjust, transform, or replace existing 
policies (see Table 1). These successions nevertheless can include innovative elements such 
as new instruments. Hogwood and Peters (1982; 1983) predict a permanent need for policy 
adjustment, thus rendering successions the most likely next step once a policy is established. 
This distinction cuts to the main point of the Hogwood and Peters argument, that these 
categories are not “a static ordering on which individual issues can be ranked, but can be used 
to portray a trend over time whereby policies have increasingly incorporated greater elements 
of succession” (1983, 30, original italics). 
  
                                                 
3 This does not mean that the policy field was completely ‘empty’, since there are natural overlaps 
with other policy fields such as environmental policy. Some even argue that climate politics is 
merely the repackaging of existing policies from related policy fields such as environmental 
politics (Upham et al., this volume). 
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Table 1: Types of policy innovations  
Innovation in 
objectives 
new area of policy activity 
Innovation in 
instruments 
new type of policy instrument (or new technology, new institution) 
AND traditional area of policy activity 
Succession already established type of policy instrument AND traditional area of 
policy activity 
 
Figure 1 illustrates different scenarios of policy dynamics in a newly emerging policy 
field. As the left panel shows, the relative importance of innovations is higher at the outset of 
a new policy field, but over time “the relative distribution of policy change” (Hogwood and 
Peters 1983, 30) moves from innovations in objectives to innovations in instruments and 
towards policy successions. This does not preclude innovations in later periods but decreases 
their relative importance. In this baseline scenario discussed by Hogwood and Peters (1982; 
1983), policy change occurs during a critical juncture. Policy instruments might be randomly 
or purposely adopted in the initial phase of the emerging policy field but shape the succeeding 
trajectories significantly as predicted by path dependency theory or process sequencing 
(Howlett and Rayner 2006). This is why policy portfolios can quickly be ‘locked in’ to an 
equilibrium, applying mainly traditional, symbolic, and non-innovative policies (van der 
Heijden 2013; Howlett 2009; John and Margetts 2003; Tosun 2013).  
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Figure 1: The relative mix of innovation and successions over time 
 
Note: y-axis = expected policy output 
Source: Based on Hogwood and Peters (1982; 1983). 
  
Here, the policies’ innovativeness is a result of the new policy field but does not entail 
new instruments or even a change from the instrumental logic that holds in other related but 
more traditional policy fields such as environmental politics. However, following the model 
of cumulative incrementalism, ambitious early innovations can lay a foundation stone for 
climate policy making, with a number of successions making only minor but cumulative 
calibrations towards a new instrumental logic. In an alternative scenario, innovations can have 
the character of small experiments and exert their main influence on outcomes through a 
number of successions increasing their intensity in the respective settings and calibrations. 
The main point here is that innovations remain dominant over a longer time period and might 
even reach a tipping point to achieve a new instrumental logic radically different from 
traditional policy fields. In the following, we analyze whether we find such developments in 
our empirical cases.  
Operationalization, measurement, data 
In our empirical analysis, we seek to illustrate the role of symbolic innovations and dynamics 
towards tipping points leading to a new instrumental logic. We conducted an empirical 
innovation in
instruments
innovation in
objectives
successions
t0 t0 t1 t1 
 
 
103 
 
analysis of national policy portfolios in the field of climate policy for three countries: Austria, 
Germany, and the UK for the period 1998 to 2010. 1998 is chosen as the reference year as the 
Kyoto Protocol officially came into force at that time. We restrict our analysis to the sector of 
domestic energy production as it is characterized by the highest emission levels of all 
economic sectors in our country cases.  
Case Selection 
The selection of Austria, Germany, and the UK results from theoretical considerations. As 
discussed in the previous section, policy innovation can occur on different levels of policy. 
We chose our cases in order to achieve similarity in goals but greater variation of the 
prevalent instrumental logic (macro level), objectives and instruments (meso level) as well as 
settings and calibrations (micro level). Austria and Germany are characterized as similar in 
terms of general environmental policy preferences and having a strong regulatory tradition 
(Liefferink et al. 2009; Wurzel, Brückner et al. 2003; Wurzel, Jordan et al. 2003). However, 
Germany has more ambition to meet national targets on greenhouse gas emissions, whereas 
Austria tends towards symbolic policies without real teeth. Comparing the two may answer 
the question whether Austria will soon be locked in to a traditional policy path while more 
radical changes emerge in Germany. Meanwhile, comparing Germany and the UK admits an 
assessment of the countries’ differing potential to reach a tipping point to a new instrumental 
logic. Germany as a coordinated market economy with a strong emphasis on regulatory policy 
and the precautionary principle in environmental politics mainly adopts regulatory or financial 
instruments such as eco-taxes, and voluntary agreements. In contrast, UK environmental 
politics since 1997 has shifted away from strong regulation towards market-based instruments 
and voluntary agreements (Bailey 2007; Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003; Jordan et al. 2003; 
Wurzel, Jordan et al. 2003).   
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Measuring policy output 
In order to make national portfolios comparable, we apply a refined concept of policy output 
– the Climate Policy Activity Index (Schaffrin et al. 2012). It is based on the notion that a 
systematic comparison of policy instruments across countries requires not only identifying 
policy objectives and instruments but also a detailed and systematic assessment of settings 
and calibrations. As Grant and Kelly (2008) point out: “simply counting laws without 
accounting for their content is likely to produce measurement error when attempting to 
measure policy production” (p. 306). 
For each policy, we evaluate specific settings and calibrations and code them 
accordingly (see Table 2 for a description). The first attribute considers whether the policy is 
integrated into a larger package where policy interaction is considered more systematically or 
whether the policy is adopted independently of others and thus less integrated (policy 
integration). Furthermore, the policy’s scope is evaluated according to energy sources (oil, 
gas, coal, wind, solar, biomass, hydro power), energy efficiency, combined heat and power, 
and/or specific target groups (demand vs. supply, business vs. private sector). Another 
attribute focuses on policy targets (reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, percentage of 
renewable energy production, increase in energy efficiency, reduction of total energy 
consumption) in comparison to the benchmark target of 100% renewable energy production 
or 80% emission reduction in 2050. The budget covers all costs or imposts linked to the 
respective policy instrument, while implementation and monitoring focuses on whether strict 
rules are set, implementing/monitoring entities are clear, and the number of potential 
conflicting actors is low. 
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Table 2: Description and coding of settings and calibrations of climate policy output 
Policy settings and 
calibrations 
Description and Coding Range 
Integration Is policy integrated in a larger package and supplemented by an 
overarching policy process? (Coding: 0, 0.5, 1) 
Scope How many target groups and energy sources does the policy 
instrument address as a proportion of all possible target groups 
(households and companies/demand and supply) and energy sources 
(coal, gas, nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, water, 
including energy efficiency and combined heat and power)? 
(Coding: 0-1) 
Targets How much does the policy instrument contribute to reach the 
benchmark target of 80% greenhouse gas reductions or 100% energy 
production from renewable sources by 2050 (base year 1990)? 
(Coding: 0-1) 
Budget How much is spent on the policy instrument as a proportion of the 
public expenditure on energy and fossil fuels in the country? How 
much is the revenue from the policy instrument as a proportion of 
public revenue from Value Added Tax in the country? (Coding: 0-1) 
Implementation Is not more than one implementing agency involved and are rules 
and procedures defined and strict? (Coding: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1) 
Monitoring Do policy instruments include an automatic monitoring process and 
is monitoring implemented by an independent institution? (Coding: 
0, 0.5, 1) 
 
The resulting score of the weighted policy instrument is an indicator of the intensity of 
climate mitigation policy. Summing up the score (weighted number) of all policy instruments 
per country and per year provides the Climate Policy Activity Index. The bases for the data 
collection were the Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures, the Energy Efficiency, 
and Addressing Climate Change databases of the International Energy Agency (IEA).4 This 
data is supplemented by information from the Climate Policies and Measures in Europe 
                                                 
4 The databases cover measures taken up in IEA member countries and are updated twice a year. Information is 
provided by the member countries, measures by provincial or regional governments are not included 
systematically. 
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Database from the European Energy Agency (EEA) as well as UNFCCC National 
Communications and other national documents such as governmental reports on specific 
climate policy instruments.  
Operationalization of policy innovation in objectives and instruments 
Our theoretical framework distinguishes between innovations in objectives, innovations in 
instruments, and successions. A policy is categorized as an innovation in objectives if it is the 
first policy in the policy portfolio for a specific energy source (out of oil, gas, coal, wind, 
solar, biomass, hydro power), energy efficiency, combined heat and power, or/and a specific 
target group (demand vs. supply, business vs. private sector). This applies regardless of the 
type of instrument which is applied. Policies are operationalized as innovation in instruments 
when they use tools which have not previously been applied in the field of climate policy, for 
example, a carbon tax. The third category, successions, consists of traditional instruments 
aimed at energy sources or target groups that had been addressed by other policies before. 
Appendix 2 presents a detailed list of innovative policy instruments identified in the analysis.  
Following this systematic approach for assessing policy portfolios, we can calculate 
the score of climate policy output per type of innovation, which allows us to assess the 
relation in the numbers of innovations and successions on the overall policy portfolio. 
Furthermore, by assessing which types of instrument are preferred in our cases, we also get a 
general picture of the instrumental logic dominant in the climate policy portfolio. We can then 
compare our findings with existing research on national policy styles which has identified 
distinct national approaches to environmental problems. This allows us to analyze whether the 
climate policy portfolio is similar to their general environmental policy style or whether they 
constitute a new instrumental logic.  
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Results 
Dynamics of innovation in the climate policy portfolio 
The paper proceeds with an analysis of domestic climate policy dynamics. We analyze the 
general development of climate policy instruments in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 
1998 to 2010 to establish whether the portfolios fall into an early lock-in on a traditional 
policy path or whether policy innovations reach a tipping point in later times when the policy 
field is established. 
Figure 2 shows the Index of Climate Policy Activity, distinguishing between 
innovations in objectives, innovations in instruments, and successions. We see that in all three 
cases policy output has substantially increased in the observation period. In Austria, policy 
output rose between 1998 and 2007 and has remained stable since then whereas both 
Germany and the UK show a substantially higher level and growth of policy output.  
Over the whole observation period, successions dominate policy output in all 
countries. In Austria we see a pattern of innovations in objectives dominating in the early 
period until 2000, followed by a predominance of innovations in instruments which is then 
replaced after 2003 by non-innovative successions. Likewise in Germany and the UK we see 
that innovations in objectives are higher in numbers than innovations in instruments at the 
beginning of the observation period. In Germany a turning point is reached in 2004, while the 
UK passed this point in 2002. What is striking is that in both countries the highest levels of 
policy activity after 2000 are in successions, whereas in Austria policy innovations produce 
more policy activity than successions until 2002/3 – although on a smaller scale. 
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Figure 2 Index of Climate Policy Activity from 1998 to 2010 
Austria Germany UK 
 
Note: y-axis: policy output of national portfolio climate mititgation taken from the Climate Policy 
Activity Index. 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that innovations play a minor role in Austria but seem to cumulate 
in tipping the policy portfolio in Germany and the UK. In the case of Austria, with only 
moderate overall policy output, a lock-in on successions is reached as early as 2002 with only 
a minor (though relatively constant) part of policy output achieved through innovations. In 
both Germany and the UK, however, the policy activity of innovations continues to grow. 
Yet, in the British portfolio innovativeness is found mainly in instruments whereas in the 
German portfolio both innovations in objectives and innovations in instruments remain 
relatively strong. The British case also shows a very irregular pattern with a drop in 
innovations in instruments from 2005 to 2006 followed by a sudden spike of innovativeness 
around 2007/8. One reason for this is that between 1999 and 2006 a number of policy options 
were discussed by the British government in the form of various white papers, which 
ultimately formed the basis of the large Climate Change Act of 2008. In Germany, 
innovations in objectives occur step by step over time and thus go hand in hand with 
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innovations in new instruments. This development culminated in 2006 when a large number 
of policies were combined in the Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme.  
Symbolic innovation 
The findings in Figure 2 give an impression of the dynamics of the national climate mitigation 
portfolios but do not reveal whether innovations are symbolic and whether they actually 
cumulate in a tipping point of a new instrumental logic.  
In the next step, we analyze how innovations’ settings and calibrations compare to the 
whole policy portfolio to demonstrate how much innovations alter the characteristics of the 
countries’ climate mitigation policy (Figure 3). Innovations are symbolic if their settings and 
calibration indicate less policy intensity, i.e. less resources, time, or political commitment 
allocated than the average policy instruments in the policy portfolio (Schaffrin, Sewerin, and 
Seubert 2012). We measure six policy settings (scope, target) and calibrations (integration, 
budget, implementation, and monitoring) (see Table 2).  
Figure 3 reveals that the Austrian climate policy portfolio is characterized by moderate 
policy integration and scope, and low targets, implementation, monitoring, and budget. In 
Germany, policies are highly integrated, have wider scope, and are very strict in 
implementation and monitoring, while targets and budget are low on average. In the UK’s 
policy portfolio, integration, implementation, and monitoring are moderate, and policies have 
on average low scopes, targets, and budget. 
  
 
 
110 
 
Figure 3: Average climate policy output per type of instrument by innovation-type 
 
Note: The exact labels of the types of policy instruments as provided by the IEA databases are 
Education and Outreach, Finciancial instruments, Incentives and Subsidies, Public Investments, 
Research, Development and Distribution,Regulatory Instruments, Tradable Permits, Voluntary 
Agreements, and Framework Policy. For a detailed description see Appendix 1. 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
 
Austrian innovations in objectives seem to be more symbolic with marginally lower 
settings and calibrations but with a higher average budget. Innovations in instruments in 
Austria are also more symbolic with regard to integration and targets, but more ambitious in 
implementation. In Germany, innovations in objectives are more ambitious including greater 
scope and more detailed implementation procedures but less monitoring and integration than 
the total policy portfolio. German innovations in instruments are highly integrated with larger 
scope and targets, but marginally lower implementation. This can be attributed mainly to the 
Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme of 2007 which comprised a large number 
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of policies under a common framework. British innovations in objectives seem to be much 
more symbolic when entering a new area where early policy experiments keep targets, scope 
and integration low in order to minimize risk and avoid negative consequences in the event of 
failure. In contrast, innovation in instruments contribute to the portfolio a higher level of 
integration, scope, target, and budget and only marginally lower levels in implementation and 
monitoring.  
Tipping points in the instrumental logic of climate mitigation portfolios 
In the last step of the analysis, we investigate whether a radical change in the instrumental 
logic of climate mitigation policy occurs, if at all, by cumulating in a tipping point over a 
longer time period. For this purpose, we compare the policy innovations’ types of policy 
instruments with the policy portfolio to determine their contribution to the overall mix in 
types of policy instruments as an indicator for the instrumental logic. Furthermore, we 
compare the instrumental logic of the portfolio with policy styles in the related field of 
environmental politics in order to evaluate whether innovations really differ from the 
traditional policy style and thus contribute to tipping the instrumental logic.  
Figure 4 shows the average policy output level per type of policy instrument for the 
total portfolio as well as specifically for innovations. In general, we see that regulatory 
instruments, framework policies and incentives and subsidies are the instruments with the 
highest level of output. These are followed by educational and financial measures, and 
Research, Development, and Distribution (RD&D). Tradable permits, voluntary agreements 
and public investment are least important for the countries’ overall policy output.  
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Figure 4: Mean policy calibrations and settings per innovation type 
 
 
 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
 
Austria’s instrumental logic is characterized by high incentives and subsidies; 
moderate education and outreach, financial and regulatory instruments, and framework 
policies; and low public investments, tradable permits, and voluntary agreements. We find a 
similar pattern in the German policy portfolio with respect to education, financial instruments, 
incentives and subsidies, regulatory instruments and tradable permits. However, Germany 
shows a higher output in RD&D, voluntary agreements, and framework policies, with no 
output in public investments. The UK demonstrates a different choice of policy instruments. 
In contrast to Germany and Austria, policy output is clearly dominated by regulatory 
instruments followed by framework policies and financial instruments. Incentives and 
subsidies as well as education and outreach are of minor importance in the UK.  
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The second and third panels of Figure 4 examine how particular types of instruments 
are applied for innovations. Despite the variety of policy instrument in the Austrian policy 
portfolio, when entering a new area only incentives and subsidies and financial instruments 
are adopted and constitute innovations in objectives. In contrast, the instrumental logic of 
innovations in instruments in Austria is not substantially different from the rest of the 
portfolio with the exception of less public investments and framework policies. In Germany, 
innovations in objectives are distributed more widely while basically following the 
instrumental logic of the policy portfolio as shown in Panel 1 in Figure 4. Exceptions are 
higher levels in financial instruments and lower levels in RD&D and tradable permits. For 
German innovations in instruments, we find the same pattern with even lower levels of 
RD&D and education and outreach. In the UK, the results reveal only financial instruments to 
be characterized by substantially higher levels of policy output of innovations in objectives. 
British innovations in instruments also follow a very similar instrumental logic to the policy 
portfolio but with comparatively higher levels of policy output for public investments and 
voluntary agreements.  
The findings are in line with what several authors consider the environmental policy 
style, i.e. the instrumental logic, dominant in these countries (Lees 2007; Richardson 1982). 
We find that Austria adopts policy instruments in conformity with its more regulative, 
corporatist, and consensual style in the field of environmental policy, which has been 
traditionally more resistant to market-based policy types and has only recently adopted 
environmental taxes (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003; Wurzel, Brückner et al. 2003). However, 
while still relying on regulation and framework policies, it expands its portfolio by incentives 
and subsidies. In Germany, the strong consensus-oriented stance of the government, based on 
the principle of the social market economy, a strong legalistic tradition, and corporatist design 
(Richardson 1982; Weale et al. 2000) resembles the Austrian policy style but also includes 
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further policy instruments such as education and outreach and voluntary agreements (Bailey 
2007; Lees 2007; Wurzel, Jordan et al. 2003). It seems that Germany, due to its larger 
portfolio, also reveals a larger variation in climate mitigation policy than Austria. In the UK, 
the dominance of regulatory instruments and framework policies reflects the British tradition 
of accommodation and widespread consultation between political actors, experts, and interest 
groups. Yet, the relatively high importance of tradable permits in the British climate policy 
portfolio also points to a shift towards more market-based policy instruments (Jordan et al. 
2003; Lees 2007).  
Taken together these findings suggest that the countries’ specific instrumental logic is 
substantially but not radically influenced by policy innovation. This finding is independent of 
high (as in the cases of Germany and the UK) or low (as in the case of Austria) levels of 
overall innovativeness and irrespective of policy styles in the countries.  
 
Conclusion 
Innovations in climate policies have been the subject of much research within the field of 
environmental policy studies. The aim of this article was to contribute to this field by 
investigating how innovations are situated within (1) the policy portfolio, (2) different levels 
of policies, and (3) policy dynamics over time. In our theoretical discussion and empirical 
analysis, we addressed the questions (1) Do policy innovations have largely symbolic goals or 
do they also include more radical innovation in their instruments or other policy design 
features? (2) Do policy innovations in their entirety replicate the status quo or do they 
contribute to a momentum towards a ‘tipping point’ which changes the dominant style?  
The results demonstrated different dynamics in the development of the policy portfolio 
of climate mitigation policy in Austria, Germany, and the UK with innovations playing a 
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dominant role at the beginning when the policy field of climate mitigation was newly 
emerging. As in Austria, innovations were soon replaced by successions as predicted by the 
dynamics approach. In contrast, we found a dynamic in Germany and the UK where the 
policy portfolio continued to grow in policy output and innovations remained strong over a 
longer time period.  
When comparing the specific calibrations and settings of innovations with the 
portfolio, we discovered that Austrian policy innovation is tentative symbolic but contributes 
a higher budget and implementation to the portfolio. However, as predicted by the path 
dependency and the process sequencing approach, the proportion of innovation on the 
portfolio was only marginal and their influence on changing the instrumental logic of the 
policy portfolio was rather low. In Germany, innovations were by no means symbolic but 
played a crucial role expanding the policy portfolio. We found innovations in objectives 
gradually addressing new policy areas using a variety of policy instruments with ambitious 
targets and scope being strongly implemented. The British strategy seemed to be more 
symbolic and experimental with regard to innovations in new objectives, for example, 
offshore wind power whereas innovative instruments have a larger scope and more resources.  
By looking at complete policy portfolios we can show that despite the occurrence of 
innovations climate mitigation policy is more symbolic in one country but more substantial in 
others. As discussed by the cumulative incrementalism approach, policy innovation might tip 
the climate mitigation portfolio toward a new instrumental logic. In our empirical analysis, we 
observed that policy innovation expanded the portfolio by introducing new types of policy 
instruments. We found no evidence of a radical change in the instrumental logic in either 
country which is in line with what the path dependency and the process sequencing approach 
expect. However, the question remains when exactly such a tipping point is present. Given 
that the policy field of climate mitigation is still in flux and rapidly developing for the next 
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two decades, it is not clear to this point whether the current development which we see in the 
data is just the starting point for a more radical but cumulative change. We find indication for 
this development in Germany and the UK where experiences and knowledge from the 
increasing number of climate policy instrument in the early phase cumulated in a larger 
package in both countries.  
Reviewing case-study literature on environmental politics suggests insights on 
whether symbolic policy innovations are in fact applied as a negative feedback mechanism to 
support the status quo interests as predicted by the path dependency and the process 
sequencing approach. For example, between 2000 and 2007, the Austrian federal government 
was dominated by the ÖVP, a pro-business conservative party mostly in favor of the status 
quo and no strong ambitions regarding climate politics (Klingemann et al. 2006; Wurzel, 
Brückner et al. 2003). In Germany, we find a typical scenario described by the process 
sequencing model where strong public pressure and media attention on climate change meets 
the opportunity to actually change the status quo with entering of the green party into 
government in 1998, the German presidency of the EU council in 2005, and the G8 summit in 
Heiligendamm in 2007 (Jänicke 2011; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). Important was also the 
antagonism of the green party and the large energy-production companies, breaking with 
traditional and more consensual policy style based on voluntary agreements, with industry in 
the “shadow” of strong regulation (Lees 2007). In the UK, a change in government - Third 
Way and New Labour – constituted a shift of British policy style from highly regulatory to 
more market-based approaches in cooperation with selected industries (Bailey 2007; Jordan et 
al. 2003). This supports the process sequencing approach but leaves the question unanswered 
why the UK applies different strategies for innovations in objectives and innovations. 
The conclusions drawn from our analysis have to be interpreted in light of its 
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limitations. Our analysis is restricted to the limited period of observation. Even though we 
used the most recent data available the analysis is still truncated to 12 years while 
developments in the countries might continue for 20 or even 50 years. Still, the fact that the 
field is evolving renders it an interesting case for the analysis of policy change and 
innovations compared to many other policy fields which have a long history, such as 
financial, economic or social policy. However, the paper provides a blueprint for further and 
more detailed analyses of the impact of policy innovations on the overall policy portfolio, of 
the different levels of policy innovations, and of the policy dynamics resulting from the 
introduction of policy innovations to either a newly evolving or established policy field. 
Building on the conceptual outline and measurement approach presented in this article, 
researchers could address these aspects to conduct further large-N comparative studies. These 
studies could shed more light on the relative importance of policy innovations in complex 
policy portfolios and could help to identify cases of symbolic innovations more 
systematically. They also could provide systematic assessments of policy portfolios’ range of 
innovativeness by taking up the distinction between innovation in objectives, innovation in 
instruments, and policy successions. This can facilitate a better understanding of the temporal 
patterns of policy innovations. Furthermore, with a clear focus on policy dynamics, future 
analyses can help us achieve a better understanding of the tipping points of policy portfolios 
which is, especially in light of the environmental challenges we face, important not only for 
academic debates but also for policymakers.  
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Appendix 1: Description of policy types. 
Policy type Description 
Education 
and outreach 
Policies designed to increase knowledge, awareness, and training among relevant 
stakeholders or users, including information campaigns, training programs, labeling 
schemes. 
Financial  
Policies to encourage or stimulate certain activities or behaviors. These include tax 
incentives, such as tax exemptions, reductions or credits on the purchase or 
installation of certain goods and services. 
Incentives 
and subsidies 
Policies to stimulate certain activities, behaviors or investments. These include feed-
in tariffs for renewable energy, rebates for the purchase of energy-efficient 
appliances, grants, and preferential loans and third-party financing.  
Framework 
policy 
Refers to the processes undertaken to develop and implement policies. This generally 
covers strategic planning documents and strategies that guide policy development. It 
can also include the creation of specific bodies to further policy aims, making 
strategic modifications, or developing specific programs.  
Public 
investment 
Policies guiding investment by public bodies. These include government procurement 
programs (e.g. requirement to purchase energy efficient equipment and vehicles) and 
infrastructure investment (e.g. urban planning). 
RD&D Policies and measures for the government to invest directly in or facilitate investment in technology research, development, demonstration and deployment activities. 
Regulatory 
instruments 
Covers a wide range of instruments by which a government will oblige actors to 
undertake specific measures and/or report on specific information. Examples include 
energy performance standards for appliances, equipment, and buildings; obligations 
on companies to reduce energy consumption, produce or purchase a certain amount of 
renewable energy; mandatory energy audits of industrial facilities; requirements to 
report on GHG emissions or energy use.  
Tradable 
permits 
Refers to three kinds of systems – GHG emissions trading schemes, white certificate 
systems stemming from energy efficiency or energy savings obligations, and green 
certificate systems based on obligations to produce or purchase renewable energy-
sourced power (generally electricity). In GHG trading schemes, industries must hold 
permits to cover their GHG emissions; if they emit more than the amount of permits 
they hold, they must purchase permits to make up the shortfall. If they emit less, they 
may sell these. White certificate schemes create certificates for a certain quantity of 
energy saved, for example a MWh; regulated entities must submit enough certificates 
to show they have met energy saving obligations. Again, if they are short, this must 
be made-up through measures that reduce energy use, or through purchase of 
certificates. Green certificates refer to renewable energy certificates which represent 
the certified generation of one unit of renewable energy, generally one megawatt-
hour. Certificates can be traded and used to meet renewable energy obligations among 
consumers and/or producers. 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Refers to measures that are undertaking voluntarily by government agencies or 
industry bodies, based on a formalized agreement. There are incentives and benefits 
to undertaking the action, but generally few legal penalties in case of non-compliance. 
The scope of the action tends to be agreed upon in concert with the relevant actors. 
These are often agreed to between a government and an industry body, with the latter 
agreeing to certain measures; for example, reporting information on energy use to the 
government, being subject to audits, and undertaking measures to reduce energy use 
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp (October 12, 2012)  
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Appendix 2: Innovation in objectives and in instrument. 
Austria 
1995 Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy Generation (innovation in objectives) 
1996 Energy Taxes (innovation in instruments) 
2000 Renewable Energy Targets/Quota System (innovation in objectives) 
 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) (innovation in objectives) 
2001 Eco-Plants Feed-In Tariffs (innovation in instruments) 
 Green Certificates Trading for Small Hydro (innovation in instruments) 
 Federal Environment Fund (innovation in instruments) 
 AUT Labelling of Electricity Bills (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Ökostromverordnung 2002 (feed-in tariffs for green electricity (innovation in 
instruments) 
2003 Green Electricity Act: Promotion for combined heat and power (CHP): (Federal Law 
Gazette I No 45/2008) (innovation in instruments) 
2007 Climate and Energy Fund (innovation in instruments) 
Germany 
1999 Eco-Tax Reform - First Stage (innovation in objectives) 
2000 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Extra Law (Gesetz zum Schutz der Stromerzeugung 
aus Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung - Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz) (innovation in 
objectives) 
 Renewable Energy Act (innovation in objectives) 
 Contracting und andere Energiedienstleistungen (innovation in instruments) 
2001 National Energy Agency (dena) (innovation in objectives) 
 CHP Agreements with Industry (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Combined Heat and Power Law (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungs Modernisierungsgesetz) 
(innovation in objectives) 
2003 Law to Amend the Mineral Oil Tax Law and Renewable Energy Law (innovation in 
objectives) 
2004 Renewable Energy Sources Act  2004 (innovation in objectives) 
 Regional Testing Ground Agreement for Flexible Mechanisms, BASREC Testing 
Ground Facility (innovation in instruments) 
2005 National Climate Protection Programme 2005 (innovation in instruments) 
2006 Energy Taxes: Coal, Biodiesel, Natural Gas (innovation in objectives) 
2007 Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme (innovation in instruments) 
 CHP Agreements with Industry (innovation in instruments) 
 Smart Metering (innovation in instruments) 
 Novellierung CHP-Law (innovation in instruments) 
2008 Renewable Energy Heat Act (innovation in objectives) 
2009 Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWärmeG) (innovation in objectives) 
 2009 Amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (innovation in objectives) 
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UK 
1998 Reduced VAT for Energy Savings Material / The Value Added Tax (Reduced Rate) 
Order 1998 (innovation in objectives) 
1999 10% Renewable Energy Target - Green Certificates (innovation in objectives) 
 Emissions Trading Agreement (innovation in instruments) 
2000 Reduced VAT for Energy Savings Material (innovation in objectives) 
 UK Climate Change Programme (innovation in instruments) 
 New Opportunities Fund - Financing Renewable Energy in the UK (innovation in 
objectives) 
 Energy Crops Scheme - England (innovation in objectives) 
2001 The Carbon Trust (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Renewables Obligation Order 2002 No. 914 - IS regulatory, tradable permit, process 
(innovation in instruments) 
 UK Emissions Trading Scheme (innovation in instruments) 
 Climate Change Agreements (innovation in instruments) 
2004 UK Energy Act 2004 Part 2 Sustainability and Renewable Energy Sources, Ch. 2 
Offshore Production of Energy (innovation in instruments) 
2007 Energy Technologies Institute (innovation in instruments) 
2008 Energy Act 2008, Part 1, Ch. 2: Storage of Carbon Dioxide (innovation in instruments) 
 Energy Act 2008, Part 2 Electricity from Renewable Sources, Feed-In Tariffs for Small-
scale Generation of Electricity (innovation in instruments) 
 Electricity Act 2008, Part 5 Misc., Smart Meters (innovation in instruments) 
 Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: The Target for 2050 
(innovation in instruments) 
 Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: Carbon Budgets 
(innovation in instruments) 
 Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: Other (innovation in 
instruments) 
 Climate Change Act 2008, Part 2 The Committee on Climate Change (innovation in 
instruments) 
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Abstract: The changing role of the state in policy-making has been intensively discussed in 
public policy centering on the prominent hypothesis that modern states have moved from 
traditional hierarchical government to new forms of decentralized network governance. This 
contribution situates the shift in policy styles in the choice of policy instruments alongside 
two dimensions: (1) the number of actors involved (monocentrism/polycentrism) and (2) the 
degree of coercion. Using this extended conceptual framework we empirically test the 
government-to-governance hypothesis in the new field of climate mitigation policy. While 
case study literature has identified the rise of new modes of governments in this field, this 
study provides a new quantitative test of the hypothesis relying on complete policy portfolios 
rather than individual instruments for nineteen EU member states from 1990 to 2010. Results 
from hierarchical cluster analysis question a real shift towards governance. While some 
country clusters with wide portfolios make increasing use of new instruments such as 
voluntary agreements and tradable permits, traditional state-focused and coercive measures 
build the core of climate mitigation policy in the sample over the whole period.  
 
Keywords: climate mitigation policy, cluster analysis, government-to-governance hypothesis, 
hybrid governance, policy instruments 
 
 
129 
 
Introduction 
 
Policy change and the role of the state in policymaking are central themes in political science 
research. In interpreting and explaining policy change, political science scholarship, as well as 
work in legal studies and public administration, has observed a change in policymaking 
apparent since the early 1980s, with a rise of new partnerships and collaborations between 
public authorities and private actors (Bevir et al. 2003, Dent et al. 2007, Gunningham 2009, 
Kjaer 2005, Kooiman 2003, Rhodes 1997). These new modes of governance are identified as 
a trend in policymaking in modern states away from traditional hierarchical regulation of 
‘government’ and towards new forms of decentralized network ‘governance’ (Bode 2006, 
Caporaso & Wittenbrinck 2006, Hysing 2009, Rhodes 2000, Tollefson et al. 2012, van 
Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004).  
 
This ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis has received much attention since it 
raises the question of how a changed role of the state affects policy output, public acceptance, 
and accountability relationships. For example, public authorities often face the problem of 
information-asymmetry and lack sufficient capacities to provide efficient regulation to ensure 
compliance (Enevoldsen & Brendstrup 2000). Public-private partnerships as a new mode of 
governance are seen as a way to achieve results more efficiently by creating less market 
disturbance than traditional forms of regulation (Alexeeva-Talebi et al. 2008, Bailey & Ditty 
2009, Hentrich et al. 2009, Smale et al. 2006, van Asselt & Biermann 2007). 
 
Given the importance of the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis for these 
questions, it seems crucial to test its basic claims empirically. According to Treib et al. 
(2007), governance includes at least three domains: polity, politics, and policy (see also 
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Driessen et al. 2012, Howlett 2009, Tollefson et al. 2012, Van Tatenhove & Leroy 2003). The 
majority of empirical research has focused on the influence of private actors on the political 
process (politics) and the change in modes of governance for political institutions (polity) 
(Duit 2007, Tompkins & Adger 2005, Treib et al. 2007). As Sager (2009, p. 537) states, ‘there 
has been surprisingly little theorizing work based on empirical evidence concerning the 
question of the relationship between modes of governance [...] and instrument choice’. Within 
the last twenty years, ‘more attention has been paid to emerging modes of environmental 
governance and to how they can increase the capacity of economic, social, and cultural 
systems to help humans mitigate and adapt to climatic change’ (Lemos & Agrawal 2006, p. 
314). In this realm, a number of studies have focused on ‘new’ environmental policy 
instruments such as voluntary agreements or market-based instruments as devices to detect 
new modes of governance (Jordan et al. 2005, Jordan et al. 2003c). It is argued that these new 
tools of governance give more responsibility to private actors than hierarchical forms of 
government do.  
 
However, a systematic quantitative test of the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis 
for a large number of national policy portfolios over a longer time period is still missing. The 
majority of studies on ‘new’ environmental policy instruments is on single or a selected 
number of cases, and their results bear the potential for bias. For example, we may not be able 
to tell whether the adoption of a number of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments 
constitutes a fundamental shift in the national mode of governance if they are analyzed in 
isolation of the whole policy portfolio. Thus, policy instruments might be simply ‘layered’ on 
top of the existing portfolio without changing its basic characteristics (Beland & Hacker 2004, 
Howlett & Rayner 2006).  
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Furthermore, environmental policy literature translates the ‘government-to-
governance’ hypothesis into one dimension that deals only with the number of actors involved 
(polycentrism), where regulatory instruments are placed on one end and ‘new’ instruments on 
the other. As we know from the governance literature, this shift is more complex, including at 
least one additional dimension on the changing relationships between public authorities and 
private actors (coercion). This multi-dimensionality implies a larger variety in the modes of 
governance than suggested by the literature of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments. 
 
Therefore, this article provides a systematic test of the ‘government-to-governance’ 
hypothesis, considering both dimensions of governance (polycentrism and coercion) based on 
complete national policy portfolios on climate mitigation for nineteen European Union (EU) 
member states. Climate mitigation policy has emerged as a new field of policymaking since 
the 1990s. It is a typical case for an environmentally, politically, economically, and 
technologically complex issue which is highly distinct from more traditional, single-media 
environmental problems such as acid rain (Durant et al. 2004). Because climate mitigation 
policy is a newly emerging policy field, it is less biased by traditional coalitions and interests 
than established policy fields. This allows policymakers to formulate a more evaluative and 
selective choice on the specific type or combination of policy instruments, which makes it an 
ideal case for studying new modes of governance (Doelle et al. 2012). Comparing complete 
policy portfolios on national climate mitigation cross-nationally and over time will allow us to 
improve our understanding of the relevance and timing of new modes of governance in 
climate policymaking and the degree to which this trend is shared across countries. 
 
In the first section, the two dimensions of new modes of governance are discussed, 
and types of policy instruments are systematically categorized along these dimensions. The 
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following section describes data and methods used to perform a cluster analysis on the 
respective types of policy instruments in nineteen EU member states for the time periods of 
1990 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010. The results section reveals substantial variation of the 
national policy portfolios on climate mitigation with respect to the ‘government-to-
governance’ hypothesis. While in some countries (those with intense policymaking, e.g., 
Germany, Sweden, Denmark) we can observe a trend towards new modes of governance, 
other clusters arise that rely mainly on traditional forms of government such as regulation 
with varying degrees of financial investment (e.g., Spain, Slovakia). 
 
1 Modes of Governance and Policy Instruments 
 
1.1 Basic dimensions of governance 
 
The ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis is based in a broad discussion of a variety of 
disciplines on the concept of ‘governance’ (Dent et al. 2007, Radcliffe & Dent 2005). All of 
these are rooted historically in the traditional understanding of ‘governance’ consistent with 
the concept of hierarchy which is one of four distinct modes of social coordination and 
organization (Polanyi 1957), namely hierarchy, market, association, and community ( 
Driessen et al. 2012, Gamble 2000, Steurer 2011). Thus, 'governance' describes any 
authoritative form of governmental steering that aims to provide public goods and correct 
market failures (Caporaso & Wittenbrinck 2006, Kooiman 2003, Poulsen 2009, Sorensen & 
Torfing 2007, Weale 2011). ‘Governance’ in this understanding is based on the hierarchical 
authority of the state as a unitary actor, whereas markets are polycentric and self-regulated 
through the mechanisms of prices and competition (Hanssen et al. 2009, Lemos & Agrawal 
2006, Steurer 2011). Associations use symmetry, trust, and voluntary cooperation in order to 
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provide a common good for groups of actors such as trade unions or NGOs with a common 
interest (Hanssen et al. 2009). Community is built on 'the deployment of solidaristic 
relationships and time- and space-specific knowledge' (Lemos & Agrawal 2006) and 
describes the traditional understanding of family, social clubs, or local constituencies 
(Hanssen et al. 2009, Lemos & Agrawal 2006).  
 
Two dominant but overlapping perspectives on the ‘government-to-governance’ 
hypothesis can be found in the literature which both apply a different understanding of 
‘governance’ than the traditional interpretation. Both are focusing on two basic dimensions, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 (Caporaso & Wittenbrinck 2006, Dent et al. 2007, Hanssen et al. 2009, 
Radcliffe & Dent 2005, Steurer 2011, Weale 2011). Polycentrism, the first dimension, 
describes who the relevant actors are, ranging from a monocentric pole of public authority’s 
dominance to a polycentric pole with multiple actors and sources of power (Gunningham 
2009, Tollefson et al. 2012). The second dimension refers to the relationship between public 
and private actors, with the range from high coercion for traditional regulative and 
authoritative steering to low coercion with equal partnership between private and public 
actors (Bressers & O'Toode 2005). 
 
The first perspective on the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis defines 
‘governance’ in opposite terms to ‘government’, which is defined as the hierarchical 
regulation of public authorities. ‘Governance’, in contrast, is seen as the cooperation between 
public and private actors, linking traditional modes of social coordination and organization, 
namely hierarchy, market, associations, and community (Bevir & Rhodes 2004, Kjaer 2005, 
Marinetto 2003, Radcliffe & Dent 2005, Rhodes 1997). According to this definition, 
‘governance’ is polycentric and less coercive, where the state is only one of several equally 
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powerful non-public actors in self-organizing, interdependent, and autonomous networks 
(Marinetto 2003, Rhodes 1997, Rhodes 2000). Examples of these network-based modes of 
coordination and organization are public-private partnerships or voluntary agreements 
(hierarchy-market) (Oikonomou et al. 2009, van der Heijden 2012), co-management such as 
social partnerships (state-association) (Hall & Kennedy 2008, Lemos & Agrawal 2006), and 
local citizenship (state-community) (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1. Dimensions and expectations of governance 
Source: Adapted from Tollefson et al. (2012)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1 by the grey solid arrow, proponents of this perspective 
postulate a general trend from ‘government-to-governance’ in which the state increasingly 
endows private networks with major responsibilities for the provision of public goods. This 
eventually results in a process of 'hollowing out' the state so that public authority is restricted 
to framework policy and the provision of the very basic public goods such as crime protection 
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(Bode 2006, Caporaso & Wittenbrinck 2006, Driessen et al. 2012, Hysing 2009, Radcliffe & 
Dent 2005, Rhodes 1997, Rhodes 2000, Tollefson et al. 2012, van Kersbergen & van 
Waarden 2004, Weale 2011). Empirical evidence for this perspective comes, for example, 
from research on New Public Management reforms which sought to incorporate market 
mechanisms and stakeholder participation into public management and welfare policy in a 
number of Western European countries in the 1980s (Borghi & Van Berkel 2007, Dent et al. 
2007).  
 
The second perspective shares the definition of ‘governance’ but questions the 
assumption that monocentric and highly coercive forms of governance give way to polycentric 
and less coercive arrangements (e.g., Doelle et al. 2012). Instead it is argued that new modes 
of governance are complementing rather than replacing traditional ‘government’ (Jordan et al. 
2013, Poulsen 2009). This issue is discussed with the hypothesis of the 'shadow-of-hierarchy', 
which states that new forms of ‘governance’ are most effective in combination with 
hierarchical instruments (Carrigan & Coglianese 2011, Driessen et al. 2012, Heritier & Eckert 
2008, Heritier & Lehmkuhl 2008, Steurer 2011, Weale 2011). As a consequence, national 
governments rely more heavily on other organizations such as markets, associations, or 
communities for social coordination but the dominant steering role remains with their 
authority (Davies 2002, Gamble 2000, Kooiman 2003, Ling 2002, Marinetto 2003, Pierre & 
Peters 2000, Tollefson et al. 2012). It furthermore suggests a dominant role of other ‘hybrid’ 
modes of governance with different combinations of coercion and polycentrism, as illustrated 
by the dashed grey arrows in Figure 1. 
 
Findings from comparative case study analysis on ‘new’ environmental policy 
instruments support these arguments and cast doubt on the more general trend from 
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‘government-to-governance’ as postulated by the first perspective (e.g., Jordan et al. 2011, 
Jordan et al. 2005, Jordan et al. 2003c). It is demonstrated that ‘governance’ complements 
rather than replaces traditional ‘government’ (Hysing 2009, Jordan et al. 2011, Jordan et al. 
2005, Jordan et al. 2003b, Jordan et al. 2013, Poulsen 2009). Furthermore, the number and 
diversity of policy instruments increases over time (Jordan et al. 2011) and 'new governance 
arrangements tend to be much more diverse, unpredictable and plain “messy” than a simple 
‘government-to-governance’ thesis would suggest' (Doelle et al. 2012, p. 52). 
 
1.2 Policy instruments, coercion, and polycentrism 
 
Having discussed the basic dimensions of ‘governance’, the challenge for an empirical 
analysis on the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis is how to evaluate specific types of 
policy instruments on the level of polycentrism and coercion. A policy instrument is defined 
along these dimensions as a 'set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their 
power in attempting to ensure support and effect social change' (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998, p. 50). It is characterized by 'the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the 
politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation' (Lascoumes & Le Gales 
2007, p. 4) (see also Howlett 2009, Jordan et al. 2011, Sager 2009, Steurer 2011).  
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Two typologies are discussed in the literature on policy instruments but have not yet 
been transferred to the dimensions of coercion and polycentrism. The ‘tools of government’ 
approach focuses on the resources available to public authorities to either influence behavior – 
nodality, authority, treasure – or to detect information – organization (Hood 2007). 
 
Nodality denotes the capacity of government to operate as a node in information networks—a central point 
of contact. Authority denotes government’s legal power and other sources of legitimacy. Treasure denotes 
government’s assets or fungible resources, and organization denotes its capacity for direct action, for 
instance, through armies, police, or bureaucracy. (Hood 2007, p. 129) 
 
The second approach suggested by Bemelmans-Videc et al. (1998) – ‘sticks’, 
‘carrots’, and ‘sermon’ – more explicitly refers to the level of coercion exerted by public 
authorities on private actors. ‘Sticks’ describes highly coercive, hierarchical, and regulatory 
‘command-and-control’ legislation taken up by public authorities to influence people to act in 
accordance with formulated rules. ‘Carrots’ are economic instruments such as incentives and 
subsidies which try to influence behavior in a less coercive way, as the addressees are not 
obliged to react. ‘Sermon’ is the least coercive and aims to provide sufficient information for 
actors to make a reasonable or desired choice (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998, Jordan et al. 
2003a, Sager 2009, Steurer 2011).  
 
As Hood (2007, p. 139) notes, 'there are some basic aspects of control and surveillance 
[...] that are not easily classified under the headings of "carrots, sticks, and sermons"'. For 
example, market-based instruments such as emission trading schemes include both elements 
of more coercive regulation (cap on emissions) and less coercive incentives (market price for 
certificates). Furthermore, the categorization lacks ‘detecting’ elements as suggested by the 
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‘tools of government’ approach (Hood 2007) and information on polycentrism as the second 
dimension of governance (Howlett 2009, Tollefson et al. 2012, Treib et al. 2007). For this 
reason, Steurer (2011) extends this typology by adding ‘ties’, such as voluntary agreements, 
and ‘adhesives’, which are framework policies that combine different measures under a policy 
package or political process (see also Lodge & Wegrich 2005). Both are indicators for high 
polycentrism independent from levels of coercion.  
 
The ‘tools of government’ (Hood 2007), levels of coercion (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998), and polycentrism (Steurer 2011) form the basis for a standard set of policy instruments 
apparent in the environmental policy literature. We identified regulatory instruments 
(‘authority’, ‘stick’), public investments (‘treasures’, ‘sermon’), information policy 
(‘nodality’, ‘sermon’), market-based instruments (‘treasure’, ‘carrot’), voluntary agreements 
(‘organization’, ‘ties’), and political processes (‘organization’, ‘adhesives) (Jordan et al. 2011, 
Jordan et al. 2005, Jordan et al. 2013, Macdonald 2001, Sager 2009). Figure 2 gives an 
overview on how these types of policy instruments ideally can be sorted along the two 
dimensions of coercion and polycentrism. The exact placement of single policy instruments, 
however, depends on the concrete mode of implementation.  
 
Regulatory instruments are the strongest example of traditional ‘government’, which is 
characterized by a highly coercive and monocentric principal-agent relationship. Public 
authorities, or the principal, steer the behavior of private actors, or the agents  (e.g., individual 
households, communities, companies), by using means of 'command-and-control' such as 
laws or directives (Bannink & Ossewaarde 2012, Lascoumes & Le Gales 2007, Sager 2009, 
Steurer 2011).  
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Figure 2. Types of policy instruments and the dimensions of governance  
Source: Adapted from Tollefson et al. (2012) 
 
Information policy is the strongest example of a form a ‘governance’ that is clearly 
distinct from ‘government’. It has a low degree of coercion and is highly polycentric. Under 
specific circumstances, 'regulation by information' is considered to be an effective tool of 
social coordination that provides knowledge and information. It relies not only on moral 
persuasion but can also create public or market pressures through increased transparency (Mol 
2006, Sager 2009, Steurer 2011).  
 
On the diagonal between regulatory instruments of ‘government’ and information 
policy of ‘governance’, we find financial instruments with elements of both ideal types of 
coordination and organization. Examples of financial instruments are any kinds of taxes 
which impose a coercive form of incentive in order to stimulate certain behavior (Lascoumes 
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& Le Gales 2007). These are clearly monocentric instruments managed by public authorities 
even though policy processes to change the tax rate or amend tax abatement might include a 
number of stakeholder groups. 
 
Market-based instruments such as subsidy schemes or tradable permits more clearly 
address public authorities and market actors and thus are situated on the polycentric side of 
the first dimension. They are less coercive than regulatory or financial instruments since 
'addressees are not obliged to take the measures involved', just incentivized to do so (Sager 
2009). Incentives and subsidies are a more coercive sub-type of market-based instruments, as 
public authorities directly manipulate prices to steer market behavior (Lascoumes & Le Gales 
2007, Steurer 2011). Tradable permits are described as regulated self-regulation in which the 
state sets the framework but allows markets to find the most efficient solution (Lemos & 
Agrawal 2006, Steurer 2011).  
 
Voluntary agreements include more elements of ‘governance’ than financial or 
market-based instruments do. Here, private actors are not passive recipients of governance but 
play an active and equal role in the governance process (Steurer 2011). Thus, voluntary 
agreements are clearly polycentric -- the degree can vary depending on the sectoral scope of 
the instruments. Coercion is generally seen as lower than for regulatory instruments but can 
vary depending on the way the agreements are specified (Carrigan & Coglianese 2011, 
Lascoumes & Le Gales 2007). 
 
Public investments in, for example, research, development, and distribution (RD&D) 
or public ownership are an example of a hybrid form of governance. For these highly 
monocentric instruments, the state is the dominant actor providing public goods where market 
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mechanisms would fail (Macdonald 2001). Instead of using legal force, governments provide 
information and try to 'lead by example' by 'applying respective principles and practices in 
their own domain' (Lodge & Wegrich 2005, Steurer 2011).  
 
Policy processes are a second example of a hybrid mode of governance with a high 
degree of coercion and polycentrism. These organizational instruments and operational 
policies include the 'organization, administration and delivery of policies and services' and 
strongly relate to polity, i.e. the organization of political institutions, rules, and procedures 
(Borghi & Van Berkel 2007, Carmel & Papadopoulos 2003, see also Steurer 2011). These 
instruments integrate a variety of political actors, expert groups, stakeholders, and lobbyists 
within the process of policy formulation and strategy building. 
 
The framework presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is an important theoretical tool that 
allows us to empirically test the 'government-to-governance' hypothesis. If the hypothesis 
holds, we should find a high number of informational instruments, market-based instruments, 
and voluntary agreements as typical examples of ‘governance’. Higher numbers of regulatory 
instruments and financial instruments, which present traditional forms of ‘government’, or 
policy processes and public investments, which are hybrid modes of governance, would shed 
doubt on the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis.  
 
2 Data and Methods 
 
The analysis is based on aggregate data on the annual numbers of domestic policy instruments 
for nineteen EU member states which were active within the time period of 1990 to 2010. We 
use data from the three databases ‘Policies and Measures Databases on Global Renewable 
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Energy', 'Energy Efficiency', and 'Addressing Climate Change’ from the International Energy 
Agency (http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp, accessed June 28, 2012). The 
databases cover the whole period of observation from 1990 to 2010 and include a variety of 
sectors (e.g., energy supply, transport, housing). The data contain voluntary reports on climate 
mitigation measures which are updated every six months by national agencies of the IEA 
member states.  
 
The datasets distinguish between nine categories of policy instruments: information 
policy, financial instruments, incentives and subsidies, policy processes, public investments, 
RD&D, regulatory instruments, tradable permits, and voluntary agreements. These are 
consistent with the seven ideal types of policy instruments discussed in the previous section 
(regulatory instruments, information policy, financial instruments, market-based instruments, 
voluntary agreements, policy processes and public investments), except that the IEA 
categorization further distinguishes between incentives/subsidies and tradable permits and 
between public investments for infrastructural projects and for RD&D. Appendix 1 shows a 
detailed description of these policy types. As discussed above, tradable permits as well as 
incentives and subsidies follow very different market logics, which suggests the need to 
analyze both policy types separately. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to distinguish between 
investments for RD&D, which include mainly non-governmental actors such as companies, 
universities, or other epistemic communities, and public investments in public infrastructure 
projects, where public authorities are the only relevant actors involved. 
 
In line with what we know from the literature (Hood 2007, Lascoumes & Le Gales 
2007, Sager 2009), the instruments discussed are seldom found in pure form but, rather, 
combine different elements from the nine IEA categories. For example, a feed-in tariff for 
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electricity from renewable energy includes characteristics of both regulatory instruments and 
incentives and subsidies. This is clearly an advantage for this analysis since it allows us to 
consider each element individually as well as in combination with other elements. If an 
instrument includes elements of multiple categories, we divide 1 by the number of the 
categories. For example, the feed-in tariff would be counted 0.5 for regulatory instruments 
and 0.5 for incentives and subsidies.  
 
In order to observe variation in climate policy instruments across countries, we use 
hierarchical cluster analyses based on the cumulated number of policies and measures in the 
respective policy categories for climate policy instruments.  We estimated two cluster models 
for policy instruments adopted in the time periods 1990 to 2005 and separately for all 
additionally added policy instruments from 2006 to 2010. The overall number of adopted 
climate policies is about equally high between 1990 and 2005 (268 policies) and the following 
5-year period until 2010 (343 policies). The cluster analysis encompasses only countries with 
at least one climate policy instrument in each time period. This reduces the sample from 
twenty-seven EU member state to nineteen countries (excluding Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia). The years 1990 and 2005 were both chosen 
as reference years in which major climate programs came into force. 1990 is the reference 
year for the national targets of emission reduction of the Kyoto-Protocol. In 2005, the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme and the Second European Climate Program (ECCP II) marked the 
starting point for the wider coordination of EU climate politics. 2010 is the latest year for 
which we have complete data available for our sample countries.  
 
Climate policy harmonization efforts in Europe have been intensified within the last 
decade, resulting in the formulation of binding greenhouse gas emission targets under the EU 
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Effort Sharing Decision (No. 406/2009/EC). However, the majority of sectors such as 
transport or housing are not regulated by strict EU directives but fall under the responsibility 
of domestic regulation. Numbers of and variation in climate policy instruments strongly 
increase among the member states after 1998. This is why we find policy instruments on 
climate mitigation of all categories in the countries.  
 
Cluster analysis is the standard procedure for identifying distinct country groups with 
similar characteristics (e.g., Gough 2001). We used hierarchical cluster analysis with 
Euclidian Distance as a similarity measure and the Wards linkage procedure (Everitt et al. 
2001, Wagschal 1999). In order to ensure robustness of the results, other linkage procedures 
have been tested and revealed similar results. The number of policy instruments per category 
is z-standardized in order to provide comparable results across the types of policy 
instruments. The cluster analysis groups cases by simultaneously taking a number of selected 
characteristics into account and by maximizing homogeneity within and heterogeneity 
between clusters. Ideally, countries within clusters should be more similar to each other than 
to any country of another cluster, across all characteristics. We performed two separate cluster 
analyses for 1990 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010. Applying both recommended stopping rules of 
Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F index (Calinski and Harabasz 1974) and Duda/Hart Je(2)/Je(1) 
index (Duda et al. 2001), the analysis revealed six country clusters (see Appendix 2-3).  
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3 National Variation in Climate Policy Instruments 
 
3.1 National characteristics of climate policy instruments 
 
The first step of the analysis is an aggregate comparison of the types of instruments that were 
applied in all EU countries in the two time periods. If the ‘government-to-governance’ 
hypothesis is correct, we should observe a dominance, or at least an increase, in incentives 
and subsidies, tradable permits, voluntary agreements, and information policy after 2005.  
 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of climate policy instruments as an average for 
the period 1990 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010 across the nineteen EU member states. Regulatory 
instruments, incentives and subsidies, and policy processes are adopted most widely before 
2006. These are followed by financial instruments and measures on RD&D or information 
policy, with fifty percent of the countries with less than two policies (median). Voluntary 
agreements, tradable permits, and public investments are less often applied. After 2005, we 
find an increasing median adoption rate for all categories except for regulatory instruments. 
Policy processes replace regulatory instruments as the second most widely applied policy 
instruments. Information policy, financial instruments, and tradable permits have been more 
often adopted since 2005 according to the median. However, overall variation within the types 
of policy instruments increases for regulatory instruments, financial instruments, policy 
processes, and incentives and subsidies, which means that a few countries adopted a high 
number of these instruments.  
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Figure 3. Cumulated number of adopted climate policy instruments 
Note: Median = white bar, left end of the box = 25th percentile, right end of the box = 75th percentile. 
Source: IEA Policies and Measures Database on Global Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and 
Addressing Climate Change; own depiction. 
 
What we can read from the results is that traditional forms of ‘government’ such as 
regulatory policy instruments and policy processes, but also hybrid forms of 'governance' such 
as incentives and subsidies dominate national policy portfolios from 1990 to 2005. Types of 
policy instruments typical for ‘governance’ are found in the moderate field (information 
policy) or play a minor role (voluntary agreements, tradable permits) in the earlier period. 
After 2005, forms of ‘governance’ increase, whereas types of policy instruments typical for 
‘government’ – regulatory instruments and policy processes – are still applied rather 
frequently.  
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3.2 National climate mitigation from 1990 to 2005 
 
Apart from this general trend, there is substantial variation between the countries and across 
the time periods in the combination of the policy instruments. We performed two separate 
cluster analyses for 1990 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010. Table 1 gives a descriptive overview of 
the content of the clusters by comparing the average number of policies across the countries 
of a specific cluster in each category. The clusters are named according to the specific 
combination of the country groups’ dominant policy instruments. 
 
(Cluster 1) The ‘innovative leader’ cluster which encompasses Sweden and the UK is 
characterized by a strong engagement in all policy categories except for public investment and 
voluntary agreements.  
 
(Cluster 2) A second 'traditional I' cluster includes three Southern European countries 
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and three Eastern European member states (Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia). This group of countries combines a medium number of traditional regulatory 
instruments as typical instruments of ‘government’, forms of ‘hybrid governance’ such as 
public investments and policy processes, and incentives/subsidies as examples of 
‘governance’. 
 
(Cluster 3) A ‘traditional II’ cluster includes Austria, the Czech Republic, France, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg. Those member states share the same policy types as countries of 
the ‘traditional’ Cluster 2 except for their low engagement in public investment. Moreover, 
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they apply more ‘hybrid governance’ and ‘governance’ by sharing higher numbers of policy 
instruments in the categories of RD&D and information policy.  
 
(Cluster 4) Even the ‘incentives’ cluster including Belgium, Germany, and Italy builds 
on a high number of regulatory and financial instruments as typical tools of ‘government’. 
However, this cluster has complemented these traditional strategies with forms of 
‘governance’ (tradable permits, incentives and subsidies, and information policy) and ‘hybrid 
governance’ (RD&D). 
 
(Cluster 5) Denmark constitutes a single ‘knowledge’ cluster characterized by a 
combination of forms of ‘government’ (regulatory and financial instruments) and ‘hybrid 
governance’ (policy processes, public investments) without any instruments of ‘governance’.  
 
(Cluster 6) Finland and the Netherlands form a sixth, ‘voluntary’ cluster that has a 
strong emphasis on voluntary agreements between the public and the business sector, which 
are considered a type of ‘governance’ replacing policy processes. Additionally, these 
countries add a combination of forms of ‘government’, ‘governance’, and ‘hybrid 
governance’ on financial instruments, RD&D, and information policy to the national portfolio 
in order to provide resources and knowledge for companies to fulfill their part of the 
agreement.  
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Table 1. Cluster mean in the number of climate policy instruments across 19 EU member states 
 Government               -               to             -              Governance Hybrid governance 
1990-2005 Regulatory Financial Incentives/ subsidies 
Tradable 
permits 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Information 
policy 
Policy 
processes 
Public 
investments 
RD&D 
          
Cluster 1: ‘innovative leaders’ (UK, SE) high high high high moderate high moderate high high 
          
Cluster 2: ‘traditional I’ (ES, GR, HU, PL, PT, SK) moderate low moderate low low low moderate moderate low 
          
Cluster 3: ‘traditional II’ (AT, CZ, FR, IR, LU) moderate low moderate low low moderate moderate low moderate 
          
Cluster 4: ‘incentives’ (BE, DE, IT) high moderate high moderate low high moderate high moderate 
          
Cluster 5: ‘knowledge’ (DK) high moderate low low low high high moderate low 
          
Cluster 6: ‘voluntary’ (FI, NL) moderate moderate low low high high low moderate moderate 
          
2006-2010 Regulatory Financial Incentives/ subsidies 
Tradable 
permits 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Information 
policy 
Policy 
processes 
Public 
investments 
RD&D 
          
Cluster 1: ‘innovative leaders’ (UK) high moderate high high high high high moderate high 
          
Cluster 2: ‘laggards‘ (CZ, GR, HU, LU, PL) low low low low low low low low low 
          
Cluster 3: ‘traditional’ (ES, IR,IT,SK) high high high low low low high low low 
          
Cluster 4: ‘incentives’ (BE, PT, SE) moderate high high low low low low high low 
          
Cluster 5: ‘knowledge’ (AT, DE, NL) low moderate moderate low low moderate low low moderate 
          
Cluster 6: ‘voluntary’ (DK, FI, FR) moderate moderate moderate moderate high moderate low high moderate 
          
Source: International Energy Agency 2010, own calculations. 
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Note: Scaling between 0=min and 1=max for each policy type where 0 means that the cluster has no policy instruments of this category and 1 means the cluster has the maximum 
country-mean of the respective policy type across all clusters. On this scale: 0-0.33=low, 0.33>0.66=moderate, 0.66>1=high. For example, in 1990-2005, voluntary agreements 
are most often adopted by the countries of Cluster 6 (cluster mean = 5.6) and least often by the countries of Cluster 2 (cluster mean = 0.3). The value for voluntary agreements of 
Cluster 1 is then calculated as follows: (meancluster 1 – meanmin)/(meanmax – meanmin) = (2.4 – 0.3)/5.6-0.3) = 0.4 (moderate).  
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Following the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis, we would expect to find a 
dominance of typical instruments for ‘governance’ such as information policy, voluntary 
agreements, and incentives and subsidies starting already in 1990. As the cluster analysis for 
1990 to 2005 shows, these types of instruments provide a substantial share of the national 
policy portfolios. However, hierarchical forms of regulatory 'government' along with ‘hybrid 
governance’ of policy processes are more dominant and have formed the basis of climate 
mitigation in this period. This finding suggests that there is much more variation in national 
pathways towards policy change in a newly emerging policy field than the ‘government-to-
governance’ hypothesis postulates.  
 
Yet, the findings reveal remarkable differences in the combination of single-policy 
instruments in order to provide different but equivalent strategies. For example, resources-
intensive policy processes that are mainly located in the public sector are ‘outsourced’ towards 
private actors by means of voluntary agreements, information policy, or RD&D. In fact, 
patterns of national climate mitigation found in the countries are very similar to those reported 
in case study literature on environmental policies. For example, the results clearly confirm 
literature describing the change in German policy traditions from a regulative dominance 
towards the more open and innovative character of new environmental policies (Bailey 2007, 
Jänicke 2011, Wurzel 2010, Wurzel et al. 2003b), the leadership role of Sweden and the UK in 
European climate politics (Andersen & Liefferink 1997, Rayner & Jordan 2011), and the 
reluctance of Austrian (Wurzel et al. 2003a), French (Szarka 2003, Szarka 2006), and Irish 
politics to adopt market-based instruments (Flynn 2003, Leonard 2008). The question remains 
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whether the data reveal a trend of increasing polycentrism and less coercion towards new 
modes of ‘governance’ that clearly replace regulatory instruments of hierarchical 'government'. 
 
3.3 Developments in national climate policy from 2006 to 2010 
 
A second cluster analysis was performed for the period 2006 to 2010 for all policy instruments 
that were additionally added to the national policy portfolios or had been changed during that 
time. Again, six country clusters are identified. Table 1 shows that typical forms of 
‘government’ (regulatory instruments) and ‘hybrid governance’ (policy processes, public 
investments) are more selectively adopted by specific clusters in 2006 to 2010. Types of policy 
instruments that increase across all clusters are based on both ‘government’ (financial 
instruments) and ‘governance’ (incentives and subsidies, voluntary agreements, and tradable 
permits). Furthermore, ‘hybrid governance’ by RD&D and ‘governance’ by information policy 
are more concentrated in three clusters after 2006 than between 1990 to 2005. Irrespective of 
the distribution of policy instruments, we find substantial differences between the clusters. 
 
(Cluster 1) In the ‘innovative leaders’ cluster, the UK is still using a wide range of 
policy types and all forms of ‘government’, ‘hybrid governance’, and ‘governance’ except for 
public investments and financial instruments in 2006 to 2010. 
 
(Cluster 2) The former ‘traditional-investment’ cluster in 1990 to 2005 (also Cluster 2) 
contributes most of its countries to the new Cluster 2 the ‘laggard’ countries, which all share a 
low overall number of policies, including Greece, Hungary, and Poland. In addition, the 
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‘traditional-knowledge’ cluster in 1990 to 2005 (Cluster 3), including the Czech Republic and 
Luxembourg, is incorporated into the new Cluster 2 . 
 
(Cluster 3) Countries in this cluster intensified their ‘traditional’ policy record by 
increasing forms of ‘government’ (regulatory and financial instruments), and ‘hybrid 
governance’ (mainly policy processes). This approach is well known from the ‘traditional-
knowledge’ cluster in 1990 to 2005. In fact, next to Italy, Spain, and Slovakia, we find Ireland 
as a former ‘traditional-knowledge’ member in the ‘traditional’ cluster. Thus, it seems that this 
cluster is a pool of countries with strong emphasis on traditional forms of ‘government’.  
 
(Cluster 4) Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden form the fourth ‘incentives’ cluster. 
Traditional forms of ‘government’ (regulatory and financial instruments) are joined with tools 
of ‘hybrid governance’ (public investments) and ‘governance’ (incentives and subsidies). 
These countries even intensified their portfolios along the ‘government’ approach by 
increasing financial instruments. 
 
(Cluster 5) Even though the ‘knowledge’ cluster includes a different set of countries 
from those it contained from 1990 to 2005, this group shares a rather similar combination of 
climate policy instruments in 2006 to 2010 to those of Denmark between 1990 and 2005. 
These countries shift their portfolio from highly monocentric types of policy instruments 
(regulatory policy and policy processes), towards a larger polycentric mix of ‘government’ 
(financial instruments), ‘hybrid governance’ (RD&D), and ‘governance’ (information policy). 
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(Cluster 6) The ‘voluntary’ cluster remains strong with voluntary agreements as a 
typical polycentric form of ‘governance’ complementing traditional, monocentric forms of 
‘government’ (regulatory instruments) and ‘hybrid governance’ (public investments). 
Additionally, this cluster adds other forms of ‘governance’ such as incentives and subsidies 
and tradable permits after 2005.  
 
Summing up, the results demonstrate a high variation in the respective modes of 
governance across countries. We find Cluster 1 to adopt high numbers of policy instruments 
for all types, while  Cluster 2 countries make only minor efforts to increase their policy 
portfolios. Cluster 5 and Cluster 6 increasingly add more typical instruments of ‘governance’, 
whereas Cluster 3 and Cluster 4 intensify their portfolios with monocentric and more coercive 
forms of ‘government’ and ‘hybrid governance’. Notably, we find in Cluster 2 that countries 
with very small policy portfolios in 1990 to 2005 predominantly adopt more coercive and 
monocentric forms of ‘government’ when substantially increasing their number of policy 
instruments in 2006 to 2010. In contrast, forms of ‘governance’ are applied foremost in country 
clusters where the existing portfolios already include a large stock of regulatory instruments of 
hierarchical 'government'. For example, voluntary agreements and information policy -- two 
typical types of ‘governance’ -- have been dominantly applied in addition to strong regulation 
and tax policy in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark. This development is based 
more on traditional policy styles (Liefferink & Birkel 2011, Wurzel et al. 2003b, Zito et al. 
2003) and the institutional corporatist setting (Andersen 1997, Andersen 2004, Pedersen 2007) 
than on a general trend from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. The question of how these patterns 
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and shifts can be explained is beyond the scope of this paper and needs to be answered in more 
detailed analyses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper provides an empirical application of the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis in 
the newly emerging field of climate mitigation policy from 1990 to 2010 across nineteen EU 
member states. It identifies the two basic dimensions of social coordination and organization – 
low coercion/high coercion and monocentrism/polycentrism – and systematically categorizes 
types of policy instruments as discussed in the literature on ‘new’ environmental policy 
instruments and climate politics. Following the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis, we 
expect that policy instruments which are characterized by low levels of coercion and high 
levels of polycentrism clearly would replace traditional forms of hierarchical 'government'.  
 
The empirical part of the paper provides detailed insights into the development of 
climate policies between 1990 and 2010. Respective modes of governance of climate 
mitigation differ markedly across countries. In the analysis, we find less support for the 
'government-to-governance' hypothesis. First, hierarchical 'government' is the dominant mode 
applied by public authority to mitigate climate change within all of the countries, independent 
of the respective timing of the policy adoption. Second, in the context of the novel and 
presumably unbiased policy field of climate mitigation, new modes of governance only 
complement rather than replace traditional forms of hierarchical 'government'. These findings 
are in line with the hypothesis of the 'shadow-of-hierarchy' discussed in the literature, which 
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states that new modes of governance are most effective in combination with hierarchical 
instruments (Carrigan & Coglianese 2011, Driessen et al. 2012, Heritier & Eckert 2008, 
Heritier & Lehmkuhl 2008, Steurer 2011, Weale 2011). Furthermore, national climate 
mitigation substantially varies in the adoption of policy instruments with traditional forms of 
‘government’ along with new forms of ‘governance’ and ‘hybrid governance’. It seems that 
countries choose a specific combination of these types of instruments in orientation to their 
national characteristics. More detailed analyses of the clusters would shed more light on the 
respective mechanisms and explanations of the country patterns we found.  
 
While interpreting the results, the reader should acknowledge certain limitations of this 
study. Development of national climate mitigation policy in some member states such as the 
UK or Spain after 2005 is impressive. Yet, it is still an ongoing process of policymaking, and 
the selected time frame provides only a small snapshot of the overall development. 
Furthermore, the number of domestic instruments is only a proxy for certain forms of 
‘government’ and ‘governance’ and does not consider the policies’ content or specific 
calibration. The same instrument adopted in two countries might reveal different forms of 
‘government’ or ‘governance’ when studied in detail. For example, voluntary agreements in 
the pluralist UK are less coercive than in the corporatist Netherlands (van der Heijden 2012).  
 
Despite these limitations, using policy portfolios instead of individual policies provides 
a more systematic test of the ‘government-to-governance’ hypothesis. For the field of climate 
mitigation policy, it reveals that, despite the widespread use of new forms of ‘governance’, 
‘government’ and ‘hybrid governance’ still dominate instrument choice in the light of whole 
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portfolios. This bears implications for the wider governance literature as well in particular for 
the selection of research designs: While case studies have strongly improved our understanding 
of new governance forms and their development, incorporating large N analysis will achieve 
the needed assessment of the relative importance and timing of this phenomenon.  
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Appendix 1. IEA-description of policy categories 
Policy 
category 
Description 
Information 
policy 
Policies and measures designed to increase knowledge, awareness, and training among relevant 
stakeholders or users. This can include general information campaigns, targeted training 
programs, labeling schemes that provide the user information on a product’s energy usage or 
emissions. 
Financial  Policies and measures that encourage or stimulate certain activities or behaviors. These include 
tax incentives, such as tax exemptions, reductions or credits on the purchase or installation of 
certain goods and services. 
Incentives 
and 
subsidies 
Policies and measures that encourage or stimulate certain activities, behaviors or investments. 
These include feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, rebates for the purchase of energy-efficient 
appliances, grants, and preferential loans and third party financing.  
Policy 
processes: 
Refers to the processes undertaken to develop and implement policies. This generally covers 
strategic planning documents and strategies that guide policy development. It can also include the 
creation of specific bodies to further policy aims, making strategic modifications to existing 
policy, or developing specific programs.  
Public 
investment 
Policies and measures guiding investment by public bodies. These include government 
procurement programs (e.g. requirement to purchase energy efficient equipment and vehicles, or 
to source a certain percentage of energy use from renewable sources) and infrastructure 
investment (e.g. urban planning and transport infrastructure). 
RD&D Policies and measures for the government to invest directly in or facilitate investment in 
technology research, development, demonstration and deployment activities. 
Regulatory 
instruments 
Covers a wide range of instruments by which a government will oblige actors to undertake 
specific measures and/or report on specific information. Examples include energy performance 
standards for appliances, equipment, and buildings; obligations on companies to reduce energy 
consumption, produce or purchase a certain amount of renewable energy; mandatory energy 
audits of industrial facilities; requirements to report on GHG emissions or energy use.  
Tradable 
permits: 
Refers to three kinds of systems – GHG emissions trading schemes, white certificate systems 
stemming from energy efficiency or energy savings obligations, and green certificate systems 
based on obligations to produce or purchase renewable energy-sourced power (generally 
electricity).  
Voluntary 
agreements 
Refers to measures that are undertaking voluntarily by government agencies or industry bodies, 
based on a formalized agreement. There are incentives and benefits to undertaking the action, but 
generally few legal penalties in case of non-compliance. The scope of the action tends to be 
agreed upon in concert with the relevant actors. These are often agreed to between a government 
and an industry body, with the latter agreeing to certain measures; for example, reporting 
information on energy use to the government, being subject to audits, and undertaking measures 
to reduce energy use 
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp, accessed June 28, 2013 
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Appendix 2. Cluster Solution Climate Policies 1990-2005 
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Appendix 3. Cluster Solution Climate Policies 2006-2010 
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Abstract 
 
Veto player theory is undoubtedly one of the most prominent approaches for explaining policy 
stability and change. While some studies have corroborated the influence of veto players and 
their preferences, other empirical work has provided mixed evidence. Three critical points are 
discussed: the identification of veto players, the measurement of policy preferences and the 
assumption of equivalence of veto players. This article aims to shed new light on the 
theoretical debate and empirical influence of veto players by applying the model to a newly 
emerging policy field. While most empirical studies have tested veto player theory in 
established fields such as social or economic policy, the new field of climate mitigation 
provides a different context for political decision-making. In this situation with a status quo 
outside the median preferences, a lack of policy baggage and newly forming actors and 
interests, the absolute anchoring of preferences and the identification of leaders seems to be an 
important extension of the veto player perspective. Using a mixed-methods approach, this 
article combines a large-N pooled time-series cross-section analysis of national policies on 
energy efficiency in 25 EU member states from 1998 to 2010 with a case-study analysis of the 
renewable electricity laws in Poland (2005) and Germany (2000). The findings demonstrate 
that climate leaders play a crucial role in stimulating climate mitigation policy. The case study 
suggests that political actors other than official veto players such as ministers or the EU 
strongly influence the process of agenda setting and decision making. The findings underscore 
the importance of including a measure of the internal cohesion of veto players, the presence of 
leaders, and the consideration of motives other than policy preferences in future analyses.  
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Introduction 
 
Explaining why decision-makers adopt (or do not adopt) new policies is one of the primary 
interests of political science. Institutions and actors have naturally been central theoretical 
access points for such explanations. One of the most prominent theoretical models has 
synthesized their influence in the concept of veto players, political actors or parties in 
institutionally defined positions with veto power over legislation (Jahn, 2010, Tsebelis, 2002, 
Andrews and Montinola, 2004, Kaiser, 2007). Veto player theory’s central hypothesis – more 
veto players, larger differences in their policy preferences, and lower internal coherence 
decrease the likelihood of policy change – has been subject to numerous empirical studies 
(Kaiser, 2002, Swank, 2002, Kittel and Obinger, 2003). These empirical evaluations have been 
focused on traditional policy fields, such as economic or labor market policy, where the status 
quo is established and defended by strong interests (MacIntyre, 2002, Allan and Scruggs, 2004, 
Andrews and Montinola, 2004).  
 
However, we lack an understanding of the explanatory power of veto player theory in newly 
emerging policy fields such as climate change mitigation (see Jensen and Spoon, 2011, Knill et 
al., 2009). New policy fields provide a different context for decision-making which may 
challenge some of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the veto player approach. (1) While 
in established policy fields the status quo is close to the median preferences of all veto players, 
in new fields the status quo may be in a different position. Thus, even with a wide range of 
preferences, preferences of all actors may be towards expansion and thus policy change. In the 
context of climate change mitigation, this may be likely with EU emission sharing targets 
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influencing those preferences. (2) Preferences, lobby groups, political cleavages and informal 
coalitions have to be newly formed in these fields. This dynamic situation can create veto 
players’ policy preferences to be more vulnerable towards attempts to influence them through 
processes of framing or bargaining at the time of decision-making (Weaver, 1986, Pierson, 
2001). (3) In established fields most “new” policies constitute policy successions, maintenance, 
and terminations rather than innovations (Hogwood and Peters, 1982, Hogwood and Peters, 
1983). In new fields, where existing policies do not need adjustments, policy change requires 
mobilization of new issues. Thus, the role of political key actors “pushing” for climate 
mitigation rather than on veto players “blocking” legislation has been the major focus of 
climate policy analyses (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011, Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Albrecht 
and Arts, 2005).  
 
Therefore, this study examines theoretically and empirically how veto player theory can be 
applied and adapted for the field of climate mitigation and newly emerging policy fields more 
generally. The central focus will be on the role of the mobilizing political actors where we 
draw on the concept of climate leaders (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Liefferink et al., 2009, 
Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). We use a mixed-methods approach, combining a quantitative 
analysis of all policies on energy efficiency adopted in the EU between 1998 and 2010 and a 
case analysis of renewable energy laws in Poland and Germany. This allows us both to test 
veto player and climate leader influence and to examine the nature and mechanisms of this 
influence in two concrete policy decisions in a mixed-methods design (Curry et al., 2009, 
Lieberman, 2005, Rohlfing, 2008).  
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The article begins with a brief overview of veto player theory and its critiques. It then 
examines arguments from the literature on environmental leadership relating to whether and 
how climate leaders influence climate mitigation policy. The methods section describes our 
mixed-methods research design. The basic statistical and analytical findings demonstrate that 
climate leaders play a key role in changing the status quo towards more climate mitigation 
policy. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that new coalitions are formed. It shows that the 
internal coherence of veto players is a crucial element which had been overlooked in most 
empirical research. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these results for 
veto player theory and climate mitigation policy. 
 
1. Theoretical Considerations 
 
1.1 Veto player theory 
 
Veto player theory defines veto players as individual or collective actors whose agreement is 
needed to change the legislative status quo (Becher, 2010, Tsebelis, 2002, Ganghof, 2003). The 
main focus has been on constitutionally defined veto players – actors who have a formal role in 
the legislative process (Bassinger and Hallerberg, 2004, Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). They 
can be institutional such as the president or partisan like the two political parties of a minimum 
winning coalition government (Schmidt, 2002, Crepaz, 2001, Kastner and Rector, 2003).  
 
The traditional veto player approach assumes that political decision making is based on rational 
choices following defined policy preferences from which the winset, i.e. the set of policies that 
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can change the status quo, can be calculated (Wagschal, 1999, Crepaz, 2001, Schmidt, 2002). 
The basic prediction is that with an increasing number of veto players this winset is reduced 
and thus policy stability is likely to increase (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). Empirical studies 
following this approach thus use the number of veto players as a predictor for policy change 
(Kastner and Rector, 2003, Schmidt, 2002, Crepaz, 2001). For example, in a single-party 
majority government in a unicameral parliamentary system like the UK until 2010, there is 
only one party and therefore one veto player. In Germany, since the 1950s the number of veto 
players has been three, given the two parties of the coalition government and the veto power of 
the second chamber. 
 
The veto player theory developed by George Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002) additionally 
considers the policy preferences of the veto players. Policy preferences are the ideological 
beliefs which determine the ideal point of a political party for a policy in a one-dimensional 
policy space. The basic argument is that it is not the number of veto players but the range of 
their policy preferences that affects policy stability. In France, for example, we would count 
the president, the first and the second chamber as separate veto players; but after 2007 all were 
held by one party and thus their disagreement on a policy, measured by the range of policy 
preferences, is de facto zero. If veto players belong to different political parties, the question is 
how much these parties differ in their policy preferences. The wider the range of policy 
preferences, the smaller becomes the winset of those veto players who favor policy change. As 
a consequence, policy stability is more likely as the range of policy preferences increases (see 
also Merkel, 2003, Ganghof and Bräuninger, 2006, Jahn, 2010). The majority of studies 
following this approach use the salience of single-policy issues such as environmental 
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protection from, for example, the party manifestos to measure the parties’ policy preferences 
(Knill et al., 2009, Jensen and Spoon, 2011, Tsebelis, 1999, Jahn, 2010). 
 
1.2 Empirical evidence and critique  
 
Evidence from empirical studies on the traditional veto player approach (number) and the 
Tsebelis account (range) in various fields of policy making is mixed. A number of studies find 
higher stability in economic policy (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998, MacIntyre, 2002), welfare 
state reforms (Korpi and Palme, 2003), and public expenditure (Bawn, 1999). No or even a 
positive effect of the number of veto players is found on retrenchment or expansion of labor 
market or policy reform (Allan and Scruggs, 2004, Andrews and Montinola, 2004). 
Furthermore, research on labor law production (Tsebelis, 1999), public budgets (Tsebelis and 
Chang, 2004), or legislative output (Kreppel, 1997) generally support the claim that with a 
larger range of policy preferences policy stability increases. For environmental legislation, the 
studies from Knill et al. (2009) and Jensen and Spoon (2011) support the veto player approach. 
 
These findings concur with theoretical critiques of veto player theory along three major lines 
(Merkel, 2003, Ganghof and Bräuninger, 2006, Ganghof, 2003). First, the problem of 
identification describes how difficult it is “to distinguish real veto players from other 
potentially influential actors” (Ganghof, 2003, p. 3). Political decision making takes place in 
different political arenas, for example, the parliament and the cabinet, where different sets of 
actors, such as parliamentary factions or ministers, are involved (Merkel, 2003, Ganghof and 
Bräuninger, 2006, Becher, 2010). Veto player theory suggests that internal cohesion of 
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collective veto players addresses this issue. An example is when the conflicting interests and 
preferences of ministers weaken the position of the government (Tsebelis, 1995). However, 
internal cohesion is introduced theoretically but rarely used in empirical applications (Knill et 
al., 2009, Jensen and Spoon, 2011). 
 
Second, scholars have raised concerns about the measurement of preferences (Ganghof, 2003, 
Jahn, 2010, Merkel, 2003, Kaiser, 2007). They argue that policies usually reflect more than one 
dimension, for example, environmental protection and economic growth, which leaves more 
alternatives for political bargaining (e.g., Becher, 2010). Besides, preferences are not constant 
at the time of decision-making as suggested by Tsebelis (1995, 2002), but might change over 
time depending on other motives such as office-, rent- , or vote-seeking (Müller and Strom, 
1999). These motives introduce substantial side-payments into the actual winset (Andrews and 
Montinola, 2004, Ganghof, 2003, Ganghof and Bräuninger, 2006).  
 
Third, several authors doubt the equivalence of veto players. Veto player theory focuses 
primarily on competitive veto players (e.g., government and oppositional majority in the 
second chamber) but leaves less room for cooperative relationships which enable rather than 
block legislation (e.g., parties in a coalition government) (Merkel, 2003, Crepaz, 2001, 
Ganghof, 2003). As we will see in the following section, in the field of climate mitigation 
debate focuses more on cooperative leadership (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Wurzel and 
Connelly, 2011).  
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1.3 Climate leaders and the mechanisms for changing policy preferences 
 
Leaders are defined as entrepreneurs pursuing “policy ideas that can lead to a revision of policy 
goals, in turn causing a redefinition of actor interests” (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, p. 24). 
This definition addresses the critical issues of veto player theory. With regard to identification, 
it stresses that leaders can be a variety of policy entrepreneurs: for example, businesses, 
environmental NGOs, or political parties (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Wurzel and 
Connelly, 2011, Harrison, 2010). Studies show that political parties such as the Social 
Democrats (Korpi and Palme, 2003) or the Greens actively serve as leaders pushing for 
environmental or social legislation on the national and EU level (Müller-Rommel and 
Poguntke, 2002, Karapin, 2012, Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). The definition of leadership 
concerns the measurement of preferences, pointing out that leadership is not only based on 
actual policy but also on political ideas (Knill et al., 2012, Liefferink et al., 2009, Schreurs and 
Tiberghien, 2007). Furthermore, the definition states that leaders are not equivalent to 
competitive veto players but are highly cooperative, influencing other political actors to follow 
their lead (Liefferink et al., 2009, Knill et al., 2012).  
 
Given the definition of leadership, we may now try to integrate both approaches within the 
case of climate mitigation policy. Figure 1 illustrates the different predictions made by each 
account, based on two hypothetical countries with varying numbers of veto players and range 
of preferences.  
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First, climate mitigation is a new policy field where policy change occurs in only one direction: 
the adoption of climate mitigation policies, as illustrated in Figure 1. Veto player theory argues 
that, independent of the direction of change, more veto players or a wider range of policy 
preferences trigger policy stability around the status quo, i.e. no climate mitigation policy 
(Tsebelis, 1999, 2002, Kastner and Rector, 2003).  
 
Second, the leadership concept gives rise to the argument that the preference range or the 
number of veto players may be a necessary but not sufficient determinant of policy change. 
Veto player theory focuses on the relative position of veto players but neglects to anchor their 
absolute preferences in the policy space. Taking the definition of veto players as actors who are 
necessary for policy making, we could argue that policy has to conform with the actor’s 
preference which is closest to the status quo (VP1 in both countries). However, as illustrated by 
the example, we would expect that Country 2 would adopt more ambitious climate policy 
measures than Country 1 despite its larger preference range and higher number of veto players. 
 
Third, in contrast to the scenario where climate mitigation policy necessarily ends up at the 
minimum, we argue that climate leaders can play a substantial role in changing policy 
preferences and, thus, in “pulling” the result of climate mitigation policy further to the median 
or even the maximum. Only veto players with preferences that exceed a certain absolute 
threshold (e.g., the 75%-quintile across all countries) are defined as climate leaders (Knill et 
al., 2012, Liefferink et al., 2009). We argue that higher numbers of climate leaders enable 
higher legislative output in climate mitigation policy because they increase the winset of all 
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veto players. In our example of Figure 1, VP4 in Country 2 but not VP3 in Country 1 would be 
a climate leader as defined above.  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical approaches to veto players and climate leaders 
 
 
Note: VP = veto player,        = status quo,              = range,   = median 
 
 
The expectations of both theories are not necessarily competing. In countries with the same 
number of climate leaders, we might still find variation in climate mitigation policy according 
to the number of veto players and their range in preferences. The reason is that climate leaders 
find it more difficult to convince other veto players the larger the number of veto players and 
the higher their distance in policy preferences is. These hypotheses will be tested in the 
following.  
 
2 A Mixed Methods Design 
 
The goal of our research is to test veto player theory and the climate leaders approach. We 
apply a mixed methods design in which qualitative and quantitative methods are combined in a 
single program of inquiry to allow a certain degree of triangulation of the findings (Bryman, 
        VP1   VP2 VP3   VP4 
VP1        VP2   VP3 
Country 1 
Country 2 
 
 
178 
 
2006, Creswell and Plano, 2011, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). Here, the complementary 
strengths of quantitative components examining the magnitude and frequency of veto player or 
climate leader influence and qualitative components examining the nature and understanding of 
this influence can yield greater insight than either approach alone (Curry et al., 2009, 
Lieberman, 2005, Rohlfing, 2008). To develop our explanation, we follow Lieberman’s (2005) 
suggestion of a nested approach starting with a quantitative analysis and, if the model results 
are robust, proceeding to a qualitative small-N analysis.  
 
2.1 Quantitative analysis 
 
The quantitative analysis seeks to demonstrate that, next to veto players and policy preferences, 
climate leaders are an important factor influencing climate mitigation policy. We analyzed a 
longitudinal sample of countries over a 12-year period using a cross-sectional time-series 
approach.  
 
Data  Our sample consists of observations for 25 EU member states from 1998 to 2010 
(excluding Malta and Cyprus due to lack of data). 1998 marks the starting point of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the year in which the EU’s burden-sharing agreement was made (Wurzel and 
Connelly, 2011); 2010 is the most recent year for which climate mitigation policies are fully 
available.  
 
Dependent variable  Our dependent variable is the annual adoption rate of policies and 
measures on energy efficiency, compiled from the MURE-Database 
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(www.isisrome.com/mure/index.htm). We chose the field of energy efficiency since it has been 
designated a key for successful climate mitigation (IEA, 2013). We constructed a metric 
variable counting the number of climate policies adopted per year and per country. The MURE 
database provides semi-quantitative expert evaluations of the policy’s performance on 
emission reduction (low, medium, high) which we apply as weights for the policies (for a 
similar approach see Albrecht and Arts, 2005, Knill et al., 2009, Tsebelis, 1999).  
 
Independent variables  Our analysis focuses on how the number of veto players, the range of 
policy preferences, and the presence of climate leaders affect climate policy adoption. We use 
information from the Comparative Political Dataset III in order to derive the number of veto 
players (Armingeon et al., 2010,  see also Jahn, 2010, Tsebelis, 2002, Ganghof and Bräuninger, 
2006). We only count veto players belonging to different parties (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). First, 
the type of government (single party, multi-party minority or majority cabinet) determines how 
many parties count as veto players in the executive. For minority governments, we additionally 
added non-governmental parties in parliament with the policy preferences closest to the 
government and sufficient seats to enable a majority vote. Second, we counted the president as 
one additional veto player if the position brings a veto right and is occupied by a non-
governmental party. Third, the second chamber is counted as a veto player if it is not controlled 
by a government majority and it holds a veto right. 
 
Furthermore, following Tsebelis (2002, 1995), we calculated the range of policy preferences of 
all veto players using the Comparative Manifesto Project Data (Klingemann et al., 2006). To 
our knowledge, this is the only dataset available covering all EU member state for the period 
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1998 to 2010. It counts the number of quasi-sentences (issue-salience scores) in party 
manifestos on two environmental issues. Per416 measures anti-growth politics and steady-state 
economy; ecology; Green Politics; and sustainable development. Per501 includes sub-
sentences on preservation of the countryside, etc; general protection of natural resources 
against selfish interests; proper use of national parks, soil banks, etc; and environmental 
improvement (Klingemann et al., 2006). We assume that parties with a high proportion of these 
quasi-sentences in their manifestos (high salience scores) also consider climate change an 
important problem. The range is calculated for all veto players per country and per year. For 
example, in countries with multi-party majority governments but no veto rights for the second 
chamber or president, the range is calculated by subtracting the salience scores of the most 
extreme cabinet parties. For minority governments, we extended the range by the salience 
score of the parties which are closest to the government’s range of policy preferences and 
which hold sufficient seats to enable a majority vote. The same procedure was applied if the 
second chamber has veto power and is controlled by opposition parties. Furthermore, 
presidents with veto rights from non-government parties were included in the calculation of the 
range. 
 
For the third independent variable, we follow the approach applied by Knill et al. (2012) using 
a fixed percentage threshold of the 75-quintile of all veto players per year across countries as a 
benchmark to identify climate leaders. In addition, we calculate the share of climate leaders on 
veto players in order to account for country differences in the absolute number of veto players 
across countries.  
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Control variables  Clearly the national targets for emission reduction under the EU burden-
sharing agreement are a driving force behind climate policy making in the EU (Wurzel and 
Connelly, 2011). Since these targets are constant over time, they cannot be included as a 
control variable in a pooled time-series cross-section model. Instead we introduced two factors 
that constitute the basis for the calculation of the targets and their achievement over time: the 
annual percentage growth in gross domestic product, taken from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database; and carbon dioxide emissions in kilograms per $1 of gross 
domestic product in purchasing power parities, provided by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Millennium Development Goals Database. Both variables 
account for changes in the energy intensity of national industries and economic circumstances 
in the respective member states. Finally, we included a dummy variable for EU membership to 
assess if being part of the burden-sharing agreement stimulated national policy making.  
 
Method  We used unit root tests to assess if our variable is stationary. Since unit root tests are 
often criticized for lack of power, we compared results from three different tests: the Levin-Lin 
test, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test, and the Hadri LM stationarity tests (Baltagi, 2001). All three 
tests indicate that our dependent variable, weighted climate policies, is stationary (p < .05). 
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We estimate the following model: 
Climateit = β1Number of Veto Playerit + β2Preference Rangeit + β3Climate Leaderit + β4GDP 
Growthit-1 + β4Emission Changeit-1+ β5EU Memberit+ β6Climateit-1 + γiCountryi + 
δtYeart + εit. 
 
where i represents country, t stands for year and εit for the error term. The model includes a 
linear time trend, since the Bayesian Information Criterion prefers a linear time trend to 
dummies for each year. We use country dummies to correct for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Both a Wald test of the country dummies and a Hausman test underscore the 
necessity of fixed effects.  
 
Since we look at the policies and measures adopted in a given year, one would expect that 
policies adopted in previous periods form an explanatory factor in themselves. This dynamic 
relationship is modeled with a lagged dependent variable (LDV). Panel-corrected standard 
errors are used to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of 
errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). All variables are entered in logarithmized form to adjust for 
skewedness in their distribution and to enable interpretation as constant percentage changes. 
We introduce a one-year lag for the control variables since changes in gross domestic product 
and carbon emissions of the preceding year are generally used as a benchmark for actual 
political decision making.  
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2.2 Qualitative analysis 
 
The quantitative approach seeks to demonstrate that climate leaders play a role in climate 
mitigation policy, whereas our qualitative analysis focuses on the within-case processes, 
demonstrating how climate leaders accomplish wider support for climate mitigation policy. For 
this we employ a small-N qualitative analysis to assess the plausibility of the observed 
statistical relationships and to illuminate the potential causal mechanisms (Lieberman, 2005, 
Curry et al., 2009).  
 
In this in-depth qualitative study, we selected two cases on theoretical grounds, Poland and 
Germany, which differ in one of the central areas of climate policy: renewable energy 
regulation. The countries’ strategies to replace fossil fuels by renewable energies are opposite 
in design and effect (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). The Polish quota model with tradable green 
certificates failed to meet its obligation (under EU directive 2001/77/EC) to reach a share of 
7.5 percent of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption; whereas in Germany this 
share had been successfully increased to 25 percent by the feed-in tariff (Mendonça et al., 
2010). These differences are puzzling: veto player theory would expect the opposite results, 
given the number of veto players and the range of preferences in these countries. The number 
of veto players was less (two) and the range of policy preferences smaller (0.85) in Poland than 
in Germany (three; 9.81). This constellation of veto players and the outcome in climate 
mitigation adoption is ideal for studying the potential influence of climate leaders on climate 
policy. 
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Data  The basis of the case study is a systematic review of primary and secondary material. 
Primary sources included documentation, official and archival records, and media records, 
such as the German Renewable Energy Act, the Polish Energy Law and the Polish renewable 
energy industry journal Czysta Energia. Secondary materials included books, journal articles, 
and other scholarly documents on the history of renewable energy in Poland and Germany.  
 
Analyzing strategy  We used content analysis of documents and statements by public 
authorities as well as media records, and consulted secondary sources to develop analytical 
narratives for the policy-making process. Process tracing was applied in order to identify the 
intervening casual process between veto players, policy preferences and climate leaders on the 
one hand, and the adoption of climate mitigation policy on the other hand. 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Quantitative analysis 
 
Figure 2 plots the weighted number of climate policies for 25 EU countries from 1998 to 2010. 
First, we note no clear trend in climate policy adoption except that in the late 1990s there 
seems to be less activity than subsequently. Second, climate policymaking we can see that for 
most countries in most years, the weighted number of policies does not exceed ten. Exceptions 
are larger packages such as the Spanish Action Plan 2005–2007. Finally, we see strong inter-
country differences in the degree and timing of climate policy adoption. Countries like 
Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain are characterized by larger 
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peaks which stand out from the common country pattern of a relatively low rate of policy 
adoption across time. However, even in countries without strong spikes, such as Belgium, 
Germany, Hungary, or Sweden, we still see substantial variation in climate policy-making 
across time. 
 
Figure 2: Number of climate policies per country over time weighted by expert evaluation 
 
Source: MURE Database, authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 1 shows the results from the regression models. Both GDP and emissions are positively 
associated with more climate policy activity, while we find no significant effect of EU 
membership. Model 2 introduces the veto player index which is positive and significant, 
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indicating that a higher number of veto players is associated with more climate policy making. 
Adding the preference range of the veto players renders the effect of the veto player index 
insignificant.  
 
However, both veto player variables are positive and thus in contrast to their expected direction 
of influence. Models 4 and 5 test the implications of the climate leader account. Both the 
number and the proportion of climate leaders increase national climate policy. Under the 
climate leaders control, the coefficient of the preference range is negative but still not 
significant. The findings clearly support the argument that climate leaders play a significant 
role in climate mitigation policy independent of the number of veto players or the range of 
policy preferences.  
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Table 1: Estimation results for the adoption of climate policies in 25 EU member states 
between 1998 and 2010 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model4 Model5
Veto player index 1.034* 0.685 0.493 0.653
 (0.450) (0.515) (0.504) (0.509)
  
Preference range 0.124 -0.039 -0.057
 (0.089) (0.101) (0.100)
  
Number of climate 0.248*** 
Leaders (0.059) 
  
Proportion of  
climate leaders 
 0.330***
  (0.077)
  
GDP growtht-1 3.834*** 3.694*** 3.746*** 3.353** 3.347**
 (1.062) (1.044) (1.051) (1.047) (1.046)
  
Emission changet-1 4.871+ 4.561+ 4.650+ 4.862* 4.903*
 (2.563) (2.491) (2.499) (2.398) (2.396)
  
EU membership 0.545 0.540 0.545 0.164 0.194
 (0.446) (0.424) (0.425) (0.397) (0.399)
  
Year 0.054 0.054 0.051 0.068 0.067
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
  
LDV 0.147 0.134 0.134 0.111 0.113
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105)
  
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  
Constant -2.102* -1.795+ -1.905+ -1.720+ -1.764+
 (0.959) (0.971) (0.983) (0.959) (0.955)
N 275 275 275 275 275
Wald χ2 77.38 65.58 69.07 55.81 112.28
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.257 0.270 0.273 0.303 0.304
LM χ2 0.58 0.90 0.80 0.72 0.86
Prob > χ2 0.747 0.637 0.670 0.698 0.652
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; all variables 
are in logarithmic form; LDV = lagged dependent variable; fixed effects are not shown.  
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Sensitivity tests Correlation matrices and variance-inflation factors show no multicollinearity 
issues.  Lagrange Multiplier Tests find no evidence for serial correlation for the final models. 
Furthermore, a RESET for the full model report no evidence for omitted variable bias (F(3) = 
0.71; F(3) = 0.67). Using differences instead of levels (see online appendix) leads to similar 
results, except for the veto player index which is negative albeit not significant when change 
scores are used. Combining fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) can create the 
so-called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). Since the results are very similar when we drop the 
LDV or use random effects, Nickell bias if present should not affect our substantive 
conclusions despite our small T.  
 
We recalculated the full model using a 20-year span starting in 1990 as a reference year and the 
un-weighted adoption rate of climate policies and measures. All regression models deliver 
highly similar results of the political variables. The results are stable when applying the mean 
and the median instead of the 75-quintile as a threshold to operationalize climate leaders. 
Different controls have been included in the models (population density, percentage of energy 
production from renewables, energy intensity of industry, primary energy consumption, net 
energy imports, percentage of trade on gross domestic product). They do not affect the 
estimates for the political variables but were excluded from to achieve a parsimonious model. 
Furthermore, we applied different lags for the dependent variable, the political indicators and 
controls and found no substantial deviation of the results from our base model. Finally, an 
extended outlier analysis, including a reanalysis of all models excluding one country, one year, 
or one observation at a time, indicates that the results are not driven by influential cases.  
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3.2 Qualitative results 
 
The contextual analysis compares the renewable electricity laws in Poland and Germany. The 
foundation for a renewable electricity law in Poland in 2005 was the ‘Development Strategy 
for Renewable Energy Sector’, which was adopted in 2001 by the former cabinet of the 
Freedom Union (UW) and Electoral Action ‘Solidarity’ (AWS). This strategy obliged the 
government of the following legislation period to adopt a separate renewable energy law. 
Furthermore, when Poland joined the EU in 2004, it agreed to increase the share of renewable 
electricity in gross energy consumption to 7.5 percent by 2010 (Directive 2001/77/EC) 
(Jankowska, 2012). In Germany, the basis for the renewable electricity law (EEG) was the 
Electricity Feed-in Law (StrEG) of 1990, which introduced national feed-in rates for 
renewables based on electricity retail rates (Hirschl, 2008, Jänicke, 2011). 
 
Table 2 shows veto players and climate leaders as identified by the quantitative 
operationalization. In Poland, veto players consist of the coalition government of the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Union of Labor (UP) with a majority in the second 
chamber and the position of the president (SLD). The German veto players are two governing 
parties (the Social Democrats and the Green Party), both identified as climate leaders, and a 
second chamber controlled by the opposition of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Free 
Democratic Party (FDP). 
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Table 2: Veto players and climate leaders 
 Poland (2005) Germany (2000) 
Veto players 
SLD and UP cabinet
Second chamber controlled by 
SLD and UP coalition 
President, SLD 
SPD and Green Party cabinet 
Second chamber controlled by opposition 
of CDU and FDP 
Climate leaders  Both cabinet parties 
 
In Poland, the environmental minister (Czesław Śleziak, SLD) in the newly elected 
government coalition of the SLD and the UP in 2001 commissioned the renewable energy 
institute EC BREC/IBMER to prepare a draft to meet the ‘Development Strategy for 
Renewable Energy Sector’ and the EU obligation in early 2004 (Wojciechowska, 2004, 
Jankowska, 2012). The draft included the introduction of tradable green certificates besides the 
already existing quota scheme (Jankowska, 2012). After a change in government in May 2004, 
the former governmental parties remained in power but with a new environmental minister 
(Jerzy Swatoń, independent). The EC BREC/IBMER was strongly criticized and sidelined by 
the ‘Instruments for Environmental Protection’ division and its new director Wojciech Jaworski 
(independent) within the environmental ministry (Grużewski, 2004, Podrygała, 2008). The 
division prepared a proposal intended to limit support for renewable energy technologies 
(Grużewski, 2004, Podrygała, 2008). For example, representatives of the conventional energy 
industry (e.g., Bio-energia SP) were invited to participate in the process of policy formulation, 
whereas business groups representing the renewable energy sector (e.g., the Polish Economic 
Chamber of Renewable Energy) were not (Grużewski, 2004). Consequently, the final version 
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of the draft clearly favored the conventional energy sector. For example, it proposed to shift the 
responsibility for issuing green certificates from the Energy Regulatory Office to the state-
owned conventional power supply company PSA SA (Grużewski, 2004, Podrygała, 2008).  
 
This draft was rejected by the cabinet in early 2005, as it clearly failed to meet the 
‘Development Strategy for Renewable Energy Sector’ and the EU obligation (Grużewski, 
2004). Since the EU Directive was a formal criterion within the accession treaty for Polish EU 
membership, political pressure to pass a renewable energy law was high. As a compromise to 
achieve a quick solution, the environmental minister, Swantoń, proposed an idea originally 
brought forward by his predecessor,  Śleziak, to amend the existing energy law 
(Wojciechowska, 2004). During several rounds of consultation, the ministers agreed in 2005 to 
amend the existing energy law by major elements taken from the more ambitious EC 
BREC/IBMER draft (Podrygała, 2008, Jankowska, 2012). This included tradable green 
certificates without different prices for different technologies where only the bottom certificate 
price was fixed (Podrygała, 2008, Jankowska, 2012). The proposal passed the second chamber 
and was finally signed by the president in March 2005. 
 
In Germany, due to decreasing prices following the liberalization of the EU energy market in 
1998, the StrEG failed to produce sufficient dividend from the feed-in rate for renewable 
energy technologies to compete with conventional energies (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, 
Hirschl, 2008). At the same time, negotiations to phase out nuclear power in Germany placed 
more pressure on policy makers to improve the competitiveness of renewable energy sources 
(Jankowska et al., 2008). This situation demanded a revision of the StrEG feed-in tariff, 
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decoupling it from the retail electricity rate (Hirschl, 2008, DB Climate Change Advisors, 
2011). However, responsibility for the renewable energy law fell within the competence of the 
minister for the economy (Werner Müller, SPD) who, at that time, appeared to have no 
intention of changing the status quo (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, Hirschl, 2008). The 
initiative for a revision of the StrEG came from the Green Party’s parliamentary group in the 
government coalition (Eckpunktepapier von der bündnisgrünen Fraktion, 1999) in the first 
chamber of the German parliament (Bundestag) (Hirschl 2008). The major step forward was 
the proposal of fixed feed-in rates that approximated the generation costs of renewable 
technology systems independent from retail electricity rates (Jänicke, 2011).  
 
The minister for the economy initially supported the proposed amendment of the StrEG in 
cabinet, but soon prepared a separate, less ambitious proposal for a quota system, which was 
perceived as breaking the earlier agreement with the coalition partner (Jacobsson and Lauber, 
2006, Hirschl, 2008). Some members of parliament, therefore – Hans-Josef Fell, Michaele 
Hustedt (both Green Party), and Hermann Scheer (SPD) – seized the initiative and submitted a 
draft law based on the Eckpunktepapier (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999). They managed both to 
convince the majority of both cabinet parties in the Bundestag and to build a broad coalition of 
associations (e.g., VDMA, IG Metall), solar cell producers (e.g., Qcells), large energy suppliers 
(e.g., Preussen Elektra) and state-level politicians (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, Hirschl, 2008). 
It was their successful framing of the issue as a chance to put German industry and 
employment on a more sustainable economic basis which led to the approval of the EEG on 13 
December 1999 (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). With this coalition of support, the EEG was 
adopted in the German parliament on 25 February 2000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2000) and on 
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17 March 2000 even passed the opposition-dominated second chamber of state representatives 
(Deutscher Bundesrat, 2000). 
 
This analysis of the renewable electricity laws in Poland and Germany enables us to 
demonstrate the problems of identification, preference measurement, and internal coherence. In 
Poland, the minister of the environment (Czesław Śleziak, SLD) had been a strong climate 
leader but had to resign in the early phase of the process. This enabled advocates for the 
conventional energy industry such as Wojciech Jaworski to act like a veto player without veto 
power actually preventing the more ambitious EC BREC/IBMER draft becoming part of the 
political agenda. This finding points to the issue of identification and internal cohesion of 
collective veto players, where single actors influence the policy preferences of collective veto 
players. Furthermore, we find the EU to be a powerful veto player, because it linked support 
for renewable energy with the accession treaty and thus provided a crucial side payment in the 
winset. In this case, the Polish government could not risk its membership status through lack of 
compliance with the directive.  
 
In Germany, we find a situation that challenges traditional veto player theory. The agenda-
setting power of crucial climate leaders, the government parties (SPD and the Green Party), 
was blocked by the minister for the economy’s support for conventional industries. Agenda-
setting power was wielded to considerable effect by parliamentary groups  in order to push for 
a renewable energy law. These climate leaders managed to frame renewable energy as a chance 
for economically sustainable development and to manoeuver even members of the opposition 
parties in the second chamber into supporting the draft law. This finding, too, underlines the 
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issue of identification and internal cohesion of collective veto players. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of our study was to elaborate veto player theory in the context of the newly emerging 
policy field of climate mitigation. We discuss the role and integrate the concept of climate 
leaders into veto player theory as a crucial component in understanding policy change 
(Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). We hypothesized that the 
number of climate leaders and their proportion in the absolute number of veto players in the 
political system positively influence climate mitigation policy independent of the number of 
veto players and the range of policy preferences.  
 
We investigate this hypothesis by a mixed-methods design combining a pooled times-series 
cross section analysis of domestic climate policy adoption in 25 EU member states from 1998 
to 2010 with a qualitative in-depth case-study comparison of two renewable energy laws in 
Poland (2005) and Germany (2000). The results of the quantitative analysis reveal a robust 
positive effect of the number of climate leaders and their proportion among veto players. In 
contrast, we find no statistical support for the claim that the range of policy preferences 
explains policy stability in the field of climate mitigation. In the qualitative analysis, we find 
the renewable energy law to be more successful in Germany than in Poland, despite the higher 
number of veto players and wider range of policy preferences in Germany. However, as the 
analysis reveals, it is the higher numbers of climate leaders in Germany that enabled the 
adoption of the renewable energy law.  
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The findings underscore our critique that veto player theory focuses too much on the relative 
position of veto players within the policy space and leaves absolute measures aside. They also 
demonstrate that the issues of internal cohesion and identification as well as substantial side 
payments increasing the winset play a more important role than assumed by traditional veto 
player theory. In the Polish case, the EU played a substantial role in triggering policy change. 
In Germany, it was not the government parties in cabinet or the second chamber but members 
of parliament who actively sought an ambitious renewable energy law. Our analysis makes a 
compelling case that engines rather than breaks influence policy-making in new fields. Future 
research could build on this insight by systematically investigating the relative importance of 
veto players and leaders for different policy fields (new versus established) and at different 
periods in time (newly emerging, on-going crisis, etc.).  
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Online Appendix 
Appendix 1: Estimation results for the adoption of climate policies in 25 EU member states 
between 1998 and 2010 based on first differences 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Veto player index  -0.318 -0.643 -1.004 -0.835 
  (0.526) (0.633) (0.639) (0.623) 
      
Preference range   0.129 0.018 -0.002 
   (0.125) (0.117) (0.116) 
      
Number of climate    0.264**  
leaders    (0.096)  
      
Proportion of      0.371** 
climate leaders     (0.127) 
      
GDP growtht-1 4.729** 4.720** 4.477** 4.490** 4.490** 
 (1.492) (1.488) (1.596) (1.611) (1.607) 
      
Emission changet-1 5.336+ 5.348+ 4.986 4.917 4.885 
 (3.094) (3.100) (3.198) (3.096) (3.093) 
      
EU membership 0.714 0.701 0.713 0.464 0.484 
 (0.612) (0.623) (0.654) (0.633) (0.630) 
      
Year -0.053 -0.054 -0.064 -0.054 -0.052 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) 
      
LDV -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.396*** -0.400*** -0.399*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.617 0.626 0.699 0.720 0.724 
 (1.159) (1.157) (1.225) (1.214) (1.214) 
N 275 275 275 275 275 
R2 0.226 0.227 0.219 0.239 0.242 
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; all variables 
are in logarithmic form and first differenced; LDV = lagged dependent variable; fixed effects are not shown.  
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